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ABSTRACT 
In 1950, General Motors chairman Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. approached MIT’s leaders 
about establishing a business school.  The result was the School of Industrial Manage-
ment (SIM), founded in 1952 and renamed in 1964 the MIT Sloan School of Manage-
ment.  During these early years the SIM’s leaders and faculty sought to create something 
extraordinary: a business school housed, grounded, and inspired by an institute of engi-
neering and technology.  They strived to apply new scientific techniques to the nascent 
field of industrial management and to American industrial firms that increasingly deman-
ded rational, analytical, rigorously trained executives.  They struggled to integrate the 
physical and social sciences into their education and research, helping to blaze a trail that 
long-established peers would not follow until the 1960s.  And they strained to balance 
relevance with independence, colliding repeatedly with Sloan and other external advisors 
over a proper understanding of academic research, institutions, and cooperation with 
industry.   
vii 
By 1964 these efforts had developed a school at the forefront of business educa-
tion’s “new look.”  But as the extensive archival records demonstrate, it was never 
inevitable that they would succeed.  Only by ongoing experimentation and agile diplo-
macy did the School become (in the words of the 1951 Deed of Gift) “a great center of 
research and education in the field of industrial management.”  And although they helped 
transform management education through integrated, scientifically based study and 
teaching, the SIM’s deans, faculty, and leaders never found complete consensus on the 
extent to which industrial management was, in Alfred Sloan’s words, “a matter of 
science.” 
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CHAPTER ONE 
“A profession which can be developed and taught” 
The concept of the School will be to correlate the complex problems of 
management in modern technical industry with science, engineering, and 
research.  The objective will be to prepare young men of today better to meet the 
exacting demands of industrial management as they become the industrial exe-
cutives of tomorrow.1 
– MIT press release (January 1951) 	
I believe that some way can be found to make students familiar with what execu-
tives really do.  We may have to try several ways to accomplish this, but I believe 
that it can be done.  …  Somehow we must, at least in part, substitute realistic 
education for experience.2 
– Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. (November 27, 1950) 	
When these statements were written, management education was not new to MIT.  
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, renowned as an engineering school, had been 
teaching management since 1914, striving to prepare students for careers in industry that 
often grew into executive responsibility.  Yet it took nearly four decades to turn manage-
ment teaching into a management school.  From 1914 to 1930 MIT had a program in En-
gineering Administration, Course XV, which then became the Department of Business 
and Engineering Administration.  Only in 1950, after it was approached by General 
Motors CEO Alfred P. Sloan ’95, was MIT prepared to turn Course XV into the School 
of Industrial Management (SIM).   
What was new was not the fact of management education but the ambition.  Foun-
ded in 1952, MIT’s fledgling business school aimed to do what few of its peers had tried: 
																																																								
1 MIT, press release, “RE: New School of Industrial Management at MIT,” January 1951, 
AC4:202:2, 2. 
2 APS, as quoted in Erwin H. Schell to JRK, 27 November 1950, AC4:203:2, 1–2. 
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to create “a union of scientific knowledge and the know-how of its application for mana-
gerial ends.”  Thus it spent its first years building curricula from scratch, trying to incor-
porate both the physical and the social sciences, searching for balance between the theo-
retical and the empirical, between analytical principles and managerial decisions.  The 
SIM also sought to turn industrial management into a respectable academic field, empha 
rigorous research and new scientific techniques.  Some efforts would fail.  Others would 
provoke heated dispute, particularly with industrial executives (including the founder) 
who demanded not abstruse studies but practical data and recommendations.  As Sloan 
had predicted, before achieving anything “we have got to flounder around a little.”3 
A decade later, floundering had flowered into confidence.  The Ford Foundation, 
which had helped drive a sea change in business schools, had deemed the School one of 
its few “centers of excellence” for producing “a disproportionately large share of the 
field’s research … [and] significantly more rigorous degree programs than the bulk of 
business schools (MIT even required calculus!).”4  The Financial Times was dubbing 
heavily analytical, technique-oriented management education “the MIT approach.”  By 
1964, when the SIM became the Sloan School of Management, MIT was considered by 
BusinessWeek and others to be in the vanguard of educating “the truly professional 
																																																								
3 MIT, press release, 21 December 1950, AC4:199:10, 5; APS to EPB with cc to KTC and JRK, 1 
June 1953, AC4:199:13, 2. 
4 James E. Howell, quoted in John Wheeler, “Changes in Collegiate Business Education in the 
United States 1954–1964 and the Role of the Ford Foundation in These Changes,” Draft Report, 
Ford Foundation Archives, no. 004933 (1965), 142, as cited by Rakesh Khurana, From Higher 
Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the 
Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 263. 
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general management man.”5  As SIM dean Howard W. Johnson commented, 
the idea of a school of management with a research concentration on the theory 
as well as the practice of management, begun in 1952, has had a leading influ-
ence on developing a new style of business school in this country.  …  Time will 
show that the management schools of the country have taken a major turn in the 
past ten years and that the study of management decision-making on a rational 
basis is both more demanding of talent and productive of results than ever before.  
MIT’s School of Management is seen as riding the crest of this new wave.6 
Johnson was only partly right.  Historians have seen the wave but not the rider.  The 
new wave, later known as the “new look,” plays the starring role in the accepted narrative 
of management education.  Although business schools had proliferated in the U.S. since 
the founding of the Wharton School in 1881 at the University of Pennsylvania, most had 
been descending into “unrespectable vocational training” for at least 30 years.7  But in 
1959, the Ford and Carnegie Foundations released reports highly critical of management 
education, castigating even prestigious and long-established business schools for their 
low standards, lack of academically trained faculty, and unscientific methods.8  These 
reports, combined with avid media attention, drove business schools to conduct a rapid 
campaign of self-reform “to avoid further public humiliation.”  Ten years later, according 
to this narrative, “it was apparent that the Ford Foundation had, indeed, dramatically 
transformed American business education.”  Schools had turned their curricula towards 
																																																								
5 Michael Shanks, “Educating Businessmen: What the U.S. Has Learned,” Financial Times, 
November 1, 1963; Carter A. Daniel, MBA: The First Century (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell 
University Press, 1998), 178. 
6 HWJ, “Alfred P. Sloan School of Management,” in MIT Annual Report (1964), 280. 
7 Bradford T. Hudson, Academies of Industry: The Historical Origins of American Higher 
Education for Business Prior to 1916 (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008); 
Robert A. Gordon and James E. Howell, Higher Education for Business (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), 4. 
8 Gordon and Howell; Frank C. Pierson et al., The Education of American Businessmen: A Study 
of University-College Programs in Business Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). 
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the highly analytical disciplines, based on social and quantitative sciences, that they 
believed both the Ford Foundation and American corporations demanded.9 
The narrative is effective, particularly when linking the transformation of American 
management education to two postwar, “broad, interrelated social changes”: the rise of 
the “organizational society” and professional, “scientific” managers.  Because Americans 
saw their victory in World War II as a victory by large-scale organizations – the military, 
the wartime factories, the systematically planned and structured companies – they rapidly 
grew comfortable working for them in peacetime.  Large firms, particularly the new mul-
tidivisional conglomerates, seemed to be proving the power of collective action, 
rewarding hard work with predictable career paths, and even strengthening America 
against social tensions at home and the rise of Communism abroad. Moreover, those 
organizations increasingly recruited and fostered analytical decision-makers versed in the 
quantitative tools of the new management sciences (linear programming, statistical analy-
sis, cost accounting, etc.).  Chief among these rationalists were the CEOs of huge 
industrial corporations, executives who symbolized the new “relationship capitalism,” 
whom the press increasingly and unironically described as “statesmen,” and who had the 
education, logic, and sense of purpose to lead the world’s most important organizations.10  
In the words of Harvard University president James Conant, “as never before business 
needs men who appreciate the responsibilities of business to itself and to that unique 																																																								
9 Khurana, 237, 288. 
10 Khurana, 197, 199–210; Marion Fourcade and Rakesh Khurana, “From Social Control to 
Financial Economics: The Linked Ecologies of Economics and Business in Twentieth Century 
America,” Harvard Business School Working Paper (2010): 12, 17–19; Alfred D. Chandler and 
Fritz Redlich, “Recent Developments in American Business Administration and Their 
Conceptualization,” Business History Review 35, no. 1 (Spring 1961). 
5 
society of free men which has been developed on this continent.  …  They must be as 
well trained as our professional men in law and medicine.”  To expand its wealth, to 
advance its people, to protect its democracy, America depended on what one early 
reformer had called “scientifically minded business statesmen.”11 
What the narrative of management education leaves out, however, are the links to 
engineering education.  It speaks of the analytical, the rational, and the scientific, but 
rarely of the engineering schools that had adopted these watchwords long before.  The 
omission is surprising for a number of reasons, not least the engineering and scientific 
basis of the “new look,” including innovations drawn from the burgeoning field of opera-
tions research.  The Carnegie Institute of Technology12 does feature prominently in the 
narrative, but the eminence of its Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) is 
arguably both overstated and derived primarily from its dependence on economics and 
social sciences.  Meanwhile the two decades post-World War II saw a commensurate rise 
of engineers, and engineering-based thinking, into corporate executive ranks.  In 1955, 
nearly half of 25-year and 30-year alumni from MIT alone had been recruited into 
management “precisely because they were engineers.”  In the mid-1960s, one scholar 
found that “the top corporate executive in Canada and the United States is more likely to 
have a scientific or technical degree than one in law, liberal arts, or business adminis-
tration.”13  One observer ascribed the success of engineers in management to their early 
																																																								
11 James B. Conant, paper presented at the National Retail Dry Goods Association (February 12, 
1950), in Khurana, 202; J. E. LeRossignol, “Dr. Flexner on University Training for Business,” 
Journal of Business of the University of Chicago 4, no. 2, part 2 (July 1931): 137.   
12 Renamed Carnegie Mellon University in 1967. 
13 John B. Rae, “Engineering Education as Preparation for Management: A Study of M.I.T. 
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training in how to approach a problem. 
A Jesuit priest will always ask the question: “What is the moral issue involved?”  
A politician will ask himself the question: “What stand can I take which will 
most likely insure my reelection?”  …  The engineer is always faced with 
practical problems and his attitude is described by the question: “What are the 
facts which I can bring to bear on this problem and what is the most advanta-
geous design or action which I can take on the basis of these facts within the time 
permitted?”  Of all these points of view, it seems to me that the intellectual 
approach and discipline of the engineer comes closest to that attitude or intellec-
tual approach which has to be practiced by the industrial manager.14 
That observer was Karl T. Compton, MIT president (1930–1948) and chairman 
(1948–1954), and one of the chief architects of the School of Industrial Management.  
What Compton, Sloan, and others had set out to do was something very different and yet 
very MIT.  By taking advantage of the Institute’s resources, its wide-ranging scientific 
and engineering expertise, and its increasing bias towards both basic research and practi-
cal application, they expected the SIM to do more than train managers.  They wanted to 
change the field itself, to “contribute most effectively to the broader status and higher 
scientific level of industrial management.”  Unlike most business schools they would 
bring science, including the new social sciences, into the curriculum.  Unlike most 
schools they would collaborate with industry, particularly its leading executives, and 
focus specifically on industrial management.  In the view of Compton and his presidential 
successor James R. Killian (1948–1959), science may have made technology, but indus-
trial management had turned it into industry. 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Alumni,” Business History Review 29, no. 1 (1955): 73–74; Andrew C. Gross, “On Engineering 
Education and Engineering Students,”  Journal of Higher Education 40, no. 7 (1969): 525. 
14 KTC to APS with cc to JRK, EPB, Frank A. Howard, and Waddill Catchings, “Subject: 
Engineering Education as a Background for Industrial Management,” 14 December 1953, 
AC4:199:13, 1. 
7 
Our technological age is based upon the concept of fundamental knowledge 
gained through scientific research together with the technique of applying this 
knowledge through managerial skill and inventiveness.  These technological 
developments have resulted in our great industries whose productivity and resul-
ting service in the public depend upon intelligent administration.  …  Our pro-
gram will be based on the conviction that industrial management is a profession 
which can be developed and taught.15 
To make conviction reality would pose nontrivial challenges.  Having rejected the 
low aspirations and paltry research base of most business schools, the SIM had to create 
itself de novo.  Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, its leaders had to develop syllabi, 
degree requirements, and even a faculty.  Yet they also had to decide what industrial 
management meant, as profession and field of study, and to what extent it was a science.  
They found ways to integrate both the physical and the social sciences into their educa-
tion and research, harbingers of the Ford and Carnegie Foundations’ prescriptions.  But 
they also found themselves clashing with Sloan and other external advisors on the pur-
pose of research, the nature of academic institutions, and the proper ways a management 
school should cooperate with industrial executives – clashes that may have helped drive 
the SIM too far toward academe, toward “scientific rigor [over] practical relevance.”16   
Thus a full-length study of the MIT SIM’s early years will serve a triple purpose.  It 
will illuminate the origins and development of a rare breed of institution: a major 
management school at an institute of technology and engineering.  It will explore that 
development – the timing, the goals, the choices by its early leaders – in the context of 
broader postwar developments in management education nationwide, to see how the SIM 
reflected, rebelled against, and even led that transformation.  And it will consider how the 																																																								
15 Press release, “RE: New School,” 4. 
16 Warren G. Bennis and James O’Toole, “How Business Schools Lost Their Way,” Harvard 
Business Review (on-line) (2005): 2.  
8 
SIM’s growth from 1950 to 1964 was shaped both by larger forces in American business 
and by growing confidence in scientific approaches to management.  The new American 
corporation demanded rational, analytical, scientifically trained managers.  MIT’s 
management school both fuelled and fulfilled that demand.   
Hiding in Plain Sight: MIT Sloan and the Existing Literature 
The story of the School’s early years is largely a tale untold, even by the School 
itself.  There are only four published histories of the MIT Sloan School of Management, 
two of them merely official highlights on the MIT Libraries and MIT Sloan websites.17  
Paula Cronin and her fellow authors did give the School the full-length, fiftieth-anni-
versary, coffee table-book treatment in 2002, much as Jeffrey Cruikshank had done for 
the Harvard Business School (HBS).  As Cronin has acknowledged, however, the book is 
largely devoted to photographs and oral history of the years after Howard W. Johnson’s 
deanship (1959–1966).  The SIM years get 42 pages, drawing very little from archival 
documents and making no effort to depict the School’s growth against the backdrop of 
business or business education history.  Similarly the School’s new history published in 
2014, on the centennial of Course XV, focuses not on origins (25 pages) but on disci-
plines – the School’s impact on finance and international entrepreneurship, for instance.18 																																																								
17 “About MIT Sloan: History,” MIT Sloan School of Management, accessed January 1, 2016, 
http://mitsloan.mit.edu/about-mit-sloan /history/; “Sloan School of Management,” MIT Libraries, 
accessed January 1, 2016, http://libraries.mit.edu/mithistory/research/schools-and-departments 
/sloan-school-of-management/;. 
18 Paula M. Cronin, A Work in Progress: The MIT Sloan School of Management 2002, Looking 
Back, Moving Forward (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, A Delicate 
Experiment: The Harvard Business School, 1908–1945 (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 
1987); Cronin, conversation with author, 13 December 2012; Tracey Palmer, ed., MIT Sloan: 
Celebrating Our Past, Inventing the Future (Cambridge, MA: Third Millennium Publishing, 
2014). 
9 
Even in histories of MIT as a whole, or at least MIT post-World War II, the School 
has received short shrift.  Philip Alexander offered considerable research into archives 
and letters yet ended in 1948 with the conclusion of Karl T. Compton’s presidency.  Both 
Samuel Prescott and then Julius Stratton and Loretta Mannix had the advantage of insider 
knowledge – Prescott was an MIT dean, Stratton its provost and president – but their 
books stop in 1870 and 1916 respectively.  David Kaiser did bring MIT’s history up to 
the present in time for the1861 sesquicentennial, but his essay on “postwar growing pains” 
does not mention the SIM.  Francis Wylie did for MIT what Cronin did for MIT Sloan: a 
“pictorial history” that features a single five-page chapter on the School’s first 25 years.19  
And although several historians of science and technology have published extensive 
studies drawing on MIT in the 1950s and 1960s, they have had no reason to focus on its 
business school.20 
If the literature on the SIM’s history is tiny, then that on American management 
education history is merely undersized.  True, before the postwar era a few academics 
were already reviewing the history and current state of the field.  By 1931, for instance, 																																																								
19 Philip N. Alexander, A Widening Sphere: Evolving Cultures at MIT (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2011); Samuel C. Prescott, When MIT Was “Boston Tech”: 1861–1916 (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2003); Julius A. Stratton and Loretta H. Mannix, Mind and Hand: The Birth of MIT 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); David I. Kaiser, “Elephant on the Charles: Postwar Growing 
Pains,” in Becoming MIT: Moments of Decision, ed. David I. Kaiser (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press); Francis E. Wylie, MIT in Perspective: A Pictorial History of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975). 
20 See for example Roger L. Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research 
Universities Since World War II (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993); Christophe 
Lécuyer, “The Making of a Science Based Technological University: Karl Compton, James 
Killian, and the Reform of MIT, 1930–1957,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological 
Sciences 23, no. 1 (1992), 153–180; Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The 
Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1992); Matthew Wisnioski, Engineers for Change: Competing Visions of Technology in 
1960s America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012). 
10 
there was a vociferous debate over the legitimacy of management education.  Abraham 
Flexner, having already triggered massive change in medical education, contended that 
most business schools were merely vocational colleges that sullied the good name of 
“university” because business was not a profession.  LeRossignol – perhaps biased by his 
role as dean of the University of Nebraska Business School – retorted that the professions 
had no exclusive right to graduate education.  Meanwhile other university faculty and 
deans were wrestling with the relationships between their business schools and their 
economics and engineering departments.  They agreed that although the divisions might 
usefully educate one another’s students, and although “the scientifically trained man … is 
the man who has come to the fore” among executives, the divisions themselves were best 
kept formally separate.21 
During the 1950–1964 period, however, most scholars seem not to have had the 
perspective or interest to study what was happening to management, much less 
management education.  Admittedly William Whyte’s The Organization Man is a classic, 
an ethnography of the 1950s American corporate system that depicts executives avoiding 
risk in order to maintain jobs for life.  Chandler and Redlich were more optimistic, 
applauding the structure and skill by which trained executives made rational decisions 
based on junior managers’ analyses.  They also reviewed how American business 
																																																								
21 Abraham Flexner, A Modern College, and a Modern School (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
Page, & Co., 1923); LeRossignol, 129–131; Ralph E. Heilman, E. L. Bogart, William H. 
Kiekhofer, C. O. Ruggles, and George W. Dowrie, “The Relationship between Departments of 
Economics and Collegiate Schools of Business,” American Economic Review 18, no. 1, 
supplement (Mar. 1928); W. J. Donald, “Co-operation between the University and Business in 
Training and Placing the College Man,” Journal of Business of the University of Chicago 3, no. 4, 
part 2 (Oct. 1930). 
11 
structures developed during 1850–1950, including discussing the methods developed at 
General Motors by SIM founder Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.  (Sloan would later get his own 
book-long, semi-hagiographical treatment by David Farber, who barely mentioned the 
SIM but depicted Sloan as a rationalist who believed the best society was the most 
productive society, the most productive companies the best-led companies, and therefore 
the best-trained executives society’s most important members.)22 
Meanwhile, within the world of management education the forces of revolution 
were gathering.  Early signs of the impending critique came from Thomas H. Carroll, in 
his capacity as head of the Ford Foundation’s Program in Economic Development and 
Administration.  In 1958, as he described the Foundation’s ongoing study of management 
education, he praised “one leading business school” – the Carnegie GSIA – for “down-to-
earth field study of actual decision-making processes in business organizations … [made] 
relevant for possible generalization and theory.”  The following year he used the Journal 
of the Academy of Management (one of the few respected, discipline-wide journals) to 
summarize the Program’s activities, particularly its $14.5 million in grants “to strengthen 
business education.”  One notable item: a five-year grant to the MIT SIM to develop what 
would become the field of system dynamics.23 
These were opening salvos for the major bombardment in 1959.  It was in that year 
																																																								
22 William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956); Chandler 
and Redlich, passim; David Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General 
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that the Ford and Carnegie Foundations published the aforementioned reports so often 
seen as a watershed in American management education.  Although the Ford version was 
the more severe, they shared similar themes.  Most business schools were little more than 
vocational academies, employing ill-trained faculty to teach inferior students in simplistic, 
unscientific methodologies that lacked both theoretical bases and managerial application.  
For most instructors, despite gnawing doubts about whom and what to teach, it was 
enough “to tell their students what business did yesterday and the day before.”  Fortu-
nately a few institutions had been “experimenting with new curricula designed to provide 
more rigorous professional training” and technical background.  Not coincidentally, these 
same institutions gave a “prime role” to “research which meets high scientific standards 
and is aimed at problems of general significance.”24  But these rare bright spots cast little 
light amid most business schools’ dark failure to prepare young managers for a vastly 
more complex world. 
The increasing complexity of the firm’s external environment has steadily added 
to the difficulties of the businessman’s task.  This is by now a familiar story: the 
increase in the power of organized labor and the steady upward pressure on 
wages; the expanding role of government; the Cold War and the precarious state 
of international relations; changes in the distribution of political and economic 
power and in the climate of public opinion; and so on.  …  One of the most 
pressing of contemporary needs is to produce a sufficient number of enterprising 
and competent leaders of industry and society, capable of facing up to the 
demands of the increasingly complex and science-based economy which we are 
now entering.25 
The Foundations’ criticisms, though pivotal, weren’t entirely new.  Donald David, 
as dean of HBS, had similarly (if more politely) contended that business schools needed 
more clinical data and more emphasis on the social sciences.  Over at the new GSIA, G. 																																																								
24 Gordon and Howell, 5, v; Pierson, xv. 
25 Gordon and Howell, 13–15. 
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Leland Bach was envisioning “the business school of tomorrow”: its fundamental princi-
ples, educational goals, MBA program structure, and insistence on research.  By 1959 
David was chairing the Ford Foundation’s executive board and Bach receiving the lion’s 
share of its grants.  Little surprise that its report lauded their schools and echoed their 
critiques.26 
Those critiques, and the revolution they incited, reverberate in modern histories of 
management education.  Henry Mintzberg, like Bennis and O’Toole, believed the 
transformation pushed the pendulum too far the other way: instead of teaching no science, 
modern B-schools teach too much, producing not management professionals but profes-
sional analysts.  J.-C. Spender considered these polemics wrong-headed, insisting that the 
entire focus on professionalism misses the point: “management is the very antithesis of a 
professionalised practice.”  Carter Daniel on the other hand tried to downplay the founda-
tions’ influence entirely.  In the first “full-scale attempt” at a history of American gradu-
ate business education, he claimed that the foundations’ “deflection was not permanent,” 
because (a) business education veered only temporarily away from the “quest for the 
golden mean … between academic theory and commercial practice,” (b) the bad publicity 
made a mountain out of a molehill, and (c) MBA programs continued to grow.  For him 
the 1950–1964 era was a temporary deviation in a triumphant march.27 
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Among these critiques and surveys the work of Rakesh Khurana stands out.  From 
Higher Aims to Hired Hands is the only book-length, thoroughly researched history of 
American management education.  Khurana essentially agreed with Mintzberg and others 
that starting in the 1950s and 1960s, business schools largely abandoned their taint of 
trade school orientation for a managerialist orientation, but only at the cost of graduating 
self-interested, analytically-minded executives more concerned about “shareholder value” 
than the social benefits of the large, well-run corporation.  Yet because he drew exten-
sively from previously unpublished documents in the archives of the Ford Foundation 
and some business schools (though not MIT Sloan), he could also argue that this was a 
failure not just of opportunity but of aspiration.  Before World War II leading deans, via 
the American Association of the Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), sought to turn 
management into a profession.  Immediately postwar this dream seemed to be within 
reach, particularly as American corporations called for more scientific, analytical execu-
tives.  But after the Foundations’ reports and the ensuing scramble for legitimacy, busi-
ness schools abandoned the purpose of rational management in favor of its techniques 
alone. 
Whereas Khurana and Daniel covered more than a century of management educa-
tion history, a few other accounts have narrowed the focus to particular schools, such as 
Wharton, the Harvard Business School, and Northwestern University’s Kellogg School.  
Those founded post-World War II have received shorter shrift, however, such as the 
University of Virginia’s Darden School (founded 1954).  That doesn’t mean the accounts 
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have drawn conclusions much different from Khurana’s.  Studying Harvard and 
Columbia, for instance, Susan Ariel Aaronson found that “at the same time that American 
business grew reliant on graduate business schools for their managerial pool, MBA 
students gained managerial training twice removed from real-world experience,” even 
before 1959.  True, some business schools were innovating before the 1960s; according 
to the work of Schlossman and Sedlak and of Gleeson and Schlossman, the years 1945–
1959 were “a period of conscious experimentalism in management education,” at least at 
UCLA, Michigan State, Kellogg, and Darden.  But unless a newer school was a 
protagonist in the grand narrative, it has barely received a speaking part.28 
The lion’s share of the lines have gone to the GSIA (founded in 1949), precisely 
because of its role in driving – some would say fomenting – the management education 
revolution.  Fourcade and Khurana used it to reflect on how the rise of “the 
multidivisional, diversified conglomerate” had grown out of the experience of managing 
the U.S. military infrastructure during World War II.  Many have invoked and praised the 
GSIA for pursuing quantitative rigor and management science before they were fashion-
able, although Gleeson and Schlossman thought it was mainly casting about for a way to 
differentiate itself.29  And Augier and Prietula suggested that quantitative comes with the 																																																								
28  Susan Ariel Aaronson, “Serving America’s Business?: Graduate Business Schools and 
American Business, 1945–60,” Business History 34, no. 1 (1992): 161; Steven Schlossman and 
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Management Admissions Council, 1994), 89. 
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Foundation and the Revolution in Business Education (Reston, VA: Graduate Management 
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territory when you’re an engineering school.  They even noted that “when MIT 
leadership first were in negotiations with Alfred Sloan to set up the school, they explicitly 
compared their mission to the early Carnegie school.”  Although Augier and Prietula got 
the author wrong – the cited memo was actually by the head of the Sloan Foundation – 
they’re right that Compton, Killian, and other MIT leaders considered the GSIA the 
closest thing to a model business school.30 
Augier and Prietula are rare in explicitly linking engineering education and manage-
ment education.  Yet long before the postwar era, faculty saw the connection between 
engineering education and management jobs.  W. E. Wickenden in 1926 congratulated 
institutions like MIT that provided “the humanistic side of education” in addition to the 
technical, because engineers need to organize people, estimate and calculate costs, and 
“discharge the broader obligations to society which are incumbent on a professional 
group.”  Dugald Jackson, himself an MIT electrical engineering professor, asserted as “a 
matter of commonplace observation” that engineering graduates by 1930 were routinely 
rising to “executive or developmental positions … where wise administration must be in 
command.”  Both John Rae and Andrew Gross would later draw a similar conclusion 
from more thorough surveys, arguing that engineering education was “an important 
source of administrative talent for American industry.”31   
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On most university campuses, however, the closest contact between engineering and 
management was not in teaching but in research, particularly in operations management 
(OM).  It wasn’t the easiest relationship.  Slack, Lewis, and Bates have argued that when 
management education and engineering education broadened in the 1950s to include 
principles of management science, OM was absorbed into industrial management and 
industrial engineering, forcing OM researchers in the direction of increasingly complex 
mathematical modeling, now known as operations research (OR).  Meanwhile at MIT, as 
William Thomas has documented, OM initially promised key research breakthroughs but 
foundered when scientists and managers couldn’t see eye to eye.32  The OM scientists 
claimed their work was novel and revolutionary; management faculty scoffed at the 
claim; OM ended up in a parallel Operations Research Center instead.  Although Prof. 
Philip Morse and other OM leaders eagerly espoused their “‘application of [the] 
methodology of physical science into problems of management,’” industrial managers 
and industrial management faculty wanted that science on their own terms.33 
What they meant by “science” and “scientific,” however, fluctuated throughout the 
1950s and 1960s.  “Scientific management” might imply rational management based on 
modern and rigorous research, or explicitly recall the principles of Frederick Winslow 
Taylor (1856–1915).  As Thomas has recently explored, in national policy “science” was 
a loaded term: the concept of “science” could connote progressive and rational thinking 																																																								
32 Nigel Slack, Michael Lewis, and Hilary Bates, “The Two Worlds of Operations Management 
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(often in the face of unenlightened resistance) or the increasingly dominant and sinister 
forces of modernity. Meanwhile major research universities gradually heightened the 
cultural status of basic science, partly to restrain themselves from becoming outsourced 
laboratories for government and industry partners, partly to ensure they didn’t step on the 
partners’ toes.  In the words of Rebecca Slayton, at MIT and elsewhere, “by privileging 
the basic over the applied, academic administrators sought a complementary rather than 
competitive relation to industry.”34  At the School of Industrial Management, however, 
the same impulse produced the opposite effect.  As the records of 1951–1954 
demonstrate, the more basic the research SIM academics proposed, the more doubtful the 
industry executives of its Advisory Committee that it would have any value at all.35 
Ambitions and Experiments: The Origins of MIT Sloan 
These arguments, along with scores of other conversations and reflections, worries 
and speeches, are preserved in extensive files at the MIT Institute Archives.  Some 
24 boxes of material remain from 1950–1964 alone.  Particularly rich are the files of 
E. Pennell Brooks, the SIM’s first dean, and of Compton and Killian – most notably their 
abundant correspondence with and about Mr. Sloan.  Together their letters, memoranda, 
and notes tell a remarkable tale, the tale of a world-renowned management school’s 
conception, birth, and first halting steps. 
What follows is an origin story, therefore, a narrative history in which the when and 
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where matter as much as the how.  In the 1950s, as many businesses became intricate 
conglomerates and business schools complacently filled their classes, MIT was motivated 
to do something more.  It saw an opportunity to bring new scientific techniques – many 
of them first developed at MIT – to bear upon the increasingly complex responsibilities 
and rigorous training of the modern, rational, industrial manager.  Motivated and funded 
by one of the most admired industrialists of the age, the Institute launched the School of 
Industrial Management to meet “‘the broad and exacting demands upon the industrial 
executive of today … [whose] executive decisions must be supported by a scientific 
appraisal of all related facts and circumstances.’”36  By the mid-1960s, the SIM’s handful 
of faculty had turned their vision of integrated, scientifically based research and teaching 
in industrial management (whatever that might be) into a school respected, if not always 
recognized, as a pioneer in management education’s revolutionary “new look.”  The 
stages of that transformation – the ambitions and experiments, the tensions and tri-
umphs – were never inevitable.  But they were absolutely characteristic of MIT. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
“The type of men Business wants” 
Management education at MIT did begin long before 1952.  Arguably it began at 
the beginning.  According to its 1861 charter, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
was incorporated as “a society of arts, a museum of arts, and a school of industrial 
science, and aiding generally … the advancement, development and practical application 
of science in connection with arts, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce.”1  How it 
took nine decades to bring “science” and “commerce” side by side is this chapter’s story. 
Its first champion is Francis Amasa Walker.  A celebrated political economist and 
statistician, a public servant who’d risen to brigadier general in 1865 at the age of 24, 
Walker joined MIT in 1881 as its third president.  He brought not only extraordinary 
energy but a strong interest in broadening Tech students’ learning, particularly in general 
education.  Just months after taking office Walker launched Course IX, soon named Gen-
eral Studies, and recommended it particularly for “young men whose purpose it is to 
become merchants, manufacturers, or bankers” and “who seek administrative positions in 
business.”2  In the words of historian Philip Alexander, “Course IX was Tech’s first 
attempt at a modern-day business school, with a technological twist.”3  It was an impulse 
the SIM founders would have recognized immediately. 
Gifted as both teacher and administrator, Walker soon added an equally talented 																																																								
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second-in-command.  In 1886 Davis R. Dewey, recently emerged from Johns Hopkins, 
began co-teaching Political Economy. Walker’s and Dewey’s class proved immensely 
popular among Institute undergraduates – even those with no intention of being mer-
chants, manufacturers, or bankers.  After Walker’s death in 1897 Dewey took over 
Course IX and piloted it through near-demise (the threatened absorption of Course and 
Institute by Harvard in 1902–1904) and into a new home in the Economics Department.  
As Economics chair, Dewey launched a series of business administration subjects, the 
products of both his career-long advocacy for the field and alumni’s unrelenting recom-
mendations.4  
By 1910 demand was clear: both demand by students for business classes (now 
among the most popular in the Institute) and demand by industry for two kinds of men, 
engineers trained in business and executives scientifically educated in industrial manage-
ment.  Dewey saw his opportunity.  Working with President Maclaurin and Professor 
Harold Pender of Electrical Engineering, Dewey lobbied for a new course, initially to be 
called Business Engineering.  He also instigated an ad hoc committee of the Alumni 
Council, whose 1913 report recommended a program “‘specially designed to train men to 
be competent managers of businesses that have much to do with engineering problems.’”5  
Presented with an alumni report and lobbied by the Alumni Council, the faculty were 
convinced.  On Wednesday, April 9, 1914, MIT’s senior leaders approved Course XV, 
Engineering Administration.  “When it was announced that he would head the program, it 																																																								
4 Palmer, 13–14; Cronin, 13–14.  On the multiple attempts to form a Harvard-MIT merger, see 
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was said that [Dewey] rose to his feet and exclaimed, ‘This is the happiest day of my 
life.’”6 
The next several years, though grim for the world, saw growth in Course XV.  Its 
subjects were still open only to third- and fourth-year undergraduates.  When its first 
class graduated in 1917, 24 of the 37 Course XV majors entered not industry but military 
service.  After World War I, however, the U.S. economy boomed and Course XV with it.  
In 1915 99 students entered Course XV; in 1922, 572.  Two years later, Course XV 
added a one-year Master of Science degree.  Even the Great Depression didn’t slow 
Course XV down, but only tightened its focus on producing (in President Samuel Strat-
ton’s words) “‘the type of men Business wants.’”7 
The best way to ensure that there’s focus is to make it someone’s job.  The logical 
choice was Erwin Schell.  Father figure, philosopher, passionate public speaker, Schell 
had been mentored by Dewey as both an academic and a teacher.  He was teaching the 
popular Business Management course, spending half his time consulting to industry, and 
merging those spheres by inviting businessmen to lecture in classes and students to 
observe in organizations.8  The combination was a key feature for the Course XV 
Visiting Committee, who recommended MIT make the Course a stand-alone department 
(no longer within Economics) and hire a director with “‘recognized standing in industry’ 
who could provide ‘contact with actual operating conditions which is so much to be 
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desired.’”9  In 1931, therefore, Schell was named director of the new department, retitled 
by adding two words: Business and Engineering Administration.   
The “and” mattered.  According to an MIT circular, this combined Course XV 
would emphasize “both scientific training and instruction in economics and business 
techniques,” because both were essential to developing the modern business executive. 
Successful administration in industry demands technical aptitude, business 
acumen and natural ability for leadership.  These attributes are enhanced by 
training which provides a background of science and engineering, and at the 
same time develops a facility in the analysis and solution of business problems.  
A definite technique of administration now in process of development is proving 
unusually effective in the hands of those who are fitted to apply the scientific 
method to business management. …  It has been found that careful analysis, rigid 
logic and painstaking adjustment of means to ends are almost indispensable in 
every phase of business management. 
Course XV, like MIT, had broadened its scope.  Just as the Institute should “‘produce 
leaders who would be able to handle the big and difficult problems of organization, 
production, and development,’” so should Course XV not merely expose engineers super-
ficially to administration, but also train men for “executive positions in industrial estab-
lishments.”10  It was the kind of training espoused by one of MIT’s most prominent 
graduates: Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. 
Course XV and Mr. Sloan, 1931–1946 
Sloan had made his mark at MIT early, graduating in 1895 at the age of 20 as presi-
dent and youngest member of his class.11  The following three decades saw him rise 
rapidly in industry.  Becoming president of Hyatt Roller Bearing in 1898, Sloan gradually 
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built the small firm into a successful supplier to General Motors.  After selling Hyatt to 
GM he became first a General Motors vice-president (1916) and then its president and 
chief executive (1923), a tribute in part to “his system of disciplined, professional 
management that provided for decentralized operations with coordinated centralized 
policy control.”  During the following decade General Motors would expand enormously, 
seizing the dominant share of the automobile industry’s sales and maintaining it for over 
70 years.12 
For 33 years, as president and later chairman, Sloan built an international reputation 
and daunting image as a business leader.  He was famous for both management innova-
tions (including planned obsolescence and decision-making through financial statistics) 
and memorable aphorisms, such as, “The business of business is business.”  Many per-
ceived him as cerebral, even detached and cold.  Contemplating Sloan’s autobiography 
My Years with General Motors, James O’Toole has noted that Sloan never referred to any 
“human” values.  “Freedom, equality, humanism, stability, community, tradition, religion, 
patriotism, family, love, virtue, nature – all are ignored.  …  His language is as 
calculating as that of the engineer-of-old working with calipers and slide rule, as cold as 
the steel he caused to be bent to form cars: economizing, utility, facts, objectivity, sys-
tems, rationality, maximizing – that is the stuff of his vocabulary.”  Even Sloan’s ap-
pearance impressed and intimidated.  As the New York Times remarked in his 1966 obitu-
ary, “a Sloan visit was not soon forgotten, for Mr. Sloan was 6 feet tall and weighed 130 
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pounds.  He arrived [at dealerships] dressed in what was then the height of fashion – a 
dark, double-breasted suit, a high starch collar, conservative tie fixed with a pearl stickpin, 
a handkerchief cascading out of his pocket and spats.  It was enough to awe any dealer.”13 
Formidable, hyper-rational, and plutocratic though he may have seemed, Sloan was 
also a committed philanthropist.  As early as the 1920s he stood out as an especially loyal 
son of “Technology,” whose donations to MIT included founding what would become 
the Sloan Automotive Laboratory.  As would be reported later, Sloan “regarded his gifts 
only as a part payment of a debt he owes MIT for the education it gave him.”14  Sloan 
was still three years away from creating the Sloan Foundation, through which he would 
annually give away 15 percent of his considerable wealth until his death in 1964.  Much 
of that wealth would end up at MIT.   
Thus in 1931 when Erwin Schell launched a new Course XV executive speaker 
series, Sloan was the obvious man to lead off.15  Around that time he also came to 
Schell’s office to talk about a problem: his engineers knew nothing about management.  
Like Dewey before him, Schell was a man who listened to alumni, and to opportunities.  
He had a suggestion: what if talented engineers, men who’d already shown aptitude as 
executives, could come to MIT for a business training program that built on their real-
world experiences?  And as an additional inducement, what if those men were funded by 
special graduate fellowships?  It was the outline of what would become the Sponsored 																																																								
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Fellowship program, funded initially by Sloan and other members of the Department’s 
Advisory Committee.  Competitively chosen from American industrial corporations, 
these fellows – initially just five or six each year – began coming to MIT for a rigorous, 
twelve-month, master’s-level program.  In Schell’s words, the Department was launching 
“‘a unique project in business education … setting out definitely to train a carefully selec-
ted group of engineering graduates for ultimate administrative positions in industry.’”  It 
was also the first experiment in what would come to be called “executive education.”16 
The project was unique, the timing unfortunate.  By the following year, even Sloan 
was no longer committing to pay for fellows from GM; during the Great Depression, 
$2,500 per fellowship was too much for a frugal corporation to afford.  But by 1938 
Sloan was back in, and with an even greater commitment.  He would fund the entire 
program, this time through the Sloan Foundation.  The newly renamed Sloan Fellowship 
program had begun.   
And then it stopped again.  World War II claimed another victim.  In 1942, MIT 
President Karl T. Compton had write a letter putting the Sloan Fellowships on hold.  
Course XV needed to focus largely on training for defense production, and potential 
fellows could not be taken from the war effort.  Course XV would continue, despite 
heavy war-related stress on departmental operations, but the eponymous Sloan program 
could not. 
Sloan himself was understanding.  It hadn’t hurt that the letter had come from 
Compton, whom Sloan greatly admired. They’d had a close professional relationship 
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since at least 1932, when Sloan accepted life membership in the MIT Corporation, and 
throughout the 1930s they’d exchanged a good deal of cordial correspondence.  In 1939 
Sloan invited “my dear Dr. Compton” to the National Automobile Show; in 1940 they 
compared views on preventing inflation; in 1941 Sloan sent Compton a copy of his 
Adventures of a White-Collar Man.17  At one point in 1940, after Compton observed how 
much Sloan – now Chairman of GM – had impressed MIT students at a recent dinner, 
Sloan replied giving credit more to position than to performance. 
I know when I was a young man at college and read about so-called important 
people in industry and business, I had the impression that they were quite differ-
ent from ordinary mortals. …  As I came to know these people better, I began to 
realize that they floundered around just like everybody else did and that their 
average some times was not so good, so to speak. In later years, as I have been 
able to analyze the matter further, I found that their importance and ability and 
their rank in the public mind is more a matter of successful publicity than it is 
constructive and intelligent effort.18 
Sloan meanwhile was growing convinced that he and MIT needed to do more.  In 
1945 he attended his 50th college reunion, where he discovered that despite their engi-
neering training, and despite his belief that that training gave graduates a special advan-
tage in industrial management, most of his classmates hadn’t been able to make the tran-
sition from engineer to executive.  In Sloan’s words, these discussions “helped him to 
realize that more needed to be done in the integration of science and technology with the 
study of management.”  Study meant research and teaching, and those meant faculty.  
And so in 1946 he endowed in the Economics department the Alfred P. Sloan Profes-
sorship of Industrial Management, first held by industrial relations expert Douglass 																																																								
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December 1940, AC4:199:8. 
18 APS to KTC and KTC to APS, 5 and 12 June 1940, AC4:199:8. 
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Brown.  Compton later called it the Institute’s “first adequately endowed chair.”19 
Meanwhile Course XV was struggling with its own questions of adequacy.  What 
should be its long-range goals post-World War II?  What had been learned by industry 
during the previous decade?  What would Course XV have to do to teach industry’s les-
sons and prepare its future managers?  These were the questions taken on by the Course 
XV Executive Committee during 1942–1945.  Chaired by E. Pennell Brooks ’16, a vice 
president at Sears Roebuck, the Committee had found itself working intensively, 
including surviving one “well-remembered meeting [that] lasted seven hours … fre-
quently commented on for its length and dryness.”  Undaunted but not unassisted – they 
borrowed the services of an AT&T assistant vice-president and an MIT professor promi-
nent in accounting – they had explored a broad range of fields, a situation one member 
described as “having a bear by the tail.”20 
The resulting 56-page report largely urged Schell and the Course XV faculty to 
carry on.  Successful graduates, high demand from both students and corporations: the 
track record had impressed the Committee considerably.  True, administration was still a 
“pioneering field” and MIT an unusually exacting school.21  But rather than reduce 
Course XV’s value, this combination argued for an even stronger Institute commitment to 
faculty research in business management.  It also argued for “more extensive association 
with industry,” but to inform research rather than determine it.  In this the Committee was 
entirely in line with Compton’s own approach.  As Christophe Lécuyer has described, 
																																																								
19 Minutes of SIM Advisory Council, 6 October 1953, AC336:1:1. 
20 Report of Course XV Executive Committee, 30 November 1945, AC336:1:10, 1 and 3. 
21 Report of Course XV Executive Committee, 4. 
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Compton and his vice president Vannevar Bush “considered service to industry central to 
the Institute’s mission, but they wanted industrial collaborations to advance, rather than 
hinder, the Institute’s other missions: teaching and research.”22 
Perhaps most important was what Course XV should not do.  Rather than train 
engineers to be executives, it should train executives who understood engineering.  Al-
though “the engineering and science work of the Institute form a uniquely valuable 
preparation for a career in administration, … administration should be the single objec-
tive of the department.”  Engineering and science should be treated as “especially fitted to 
this course,” as its foundation but not its responsibility – a view of integration with which 
Sloan would have concurred.  Economics and Social Science, meanwhile, the Committee 
considered vital elements of any industry man’s education.  They therefore recommended 
that those departments be included in “a new school of business … under its own dean.”23   
“Ambiguity of the Objectives”: Course XV, 1945–1950 
Underlying the report on Course XV was a debate on engineering education.  If 
Course XV was to train engineering- and science-knowledgeable executives, that was 
because industry needed them – and MIT graduates were ending up in those jobs anyway.  
But until now MIT had focused on developing the engineer, whom they also prepared for 
broader responsibility.  In his 1930 inaugural address Compton had lauded alumni “who 
start in as engineers [and] later become executives … builders of huge industries, 
																																																								
22 Report of Course XV Executive Committee, 4; Christophe Lécuyer, “Patrons and a Plan,” in 
Becoming MIT: Moments of Decision, ed. David I. Kaiser (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 74. 
23 Report of Course XV Executive Committee, 3–4.  Although as Committee chair Brooks had 
proved perceptive and far-thinking, he would have had to be extraordinarily prescient to realize 
that he was recommending what would be his own job title six years later. 
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organizers and executives of great companies … operating and developing the vast indus-
trial system which is the distinguishing feature of our present civilization.”  Therefore 
schools like MIT must build upon their engineering education “a broad and thorough 
training in fundamental principles [rather] than a training in details which may seldom be 
encountered in practice.”24  MIT electrical engineering professor Dugald Jackson, who 
led an MIT-General Electric cooperative engineering course from 1907 to 1932, consi-
dered it “a matter of commonplace observation” that so many leaders of industry are 
engineering graduates, particularly the ones “advancing these industries to greater service, 
influence and prosperity.”  He firmly believed that the “scientist or engineer can become 
a great merchant if he has the taste and will to be.”25  Some companies would have 
disagreed.  As Bernard Carlson has identified, Dugald’s and Compton’s exhortations 
were part of “an ongoing debate over the exact role that the college-trained engineer 
should play in American business: was he to be a factory supervisor, a highly paid techni-
cian, a scientifically trained engineer, or a corporate executive?”26 
MIT students didn’t know either.  On the one hand, according to a 1955 study, the 
majority of MIT graduates who rose to executive rank “were recruited into manage-
ment … precisely because they were engineers.”  On the other hand, most of this MIT 
“executive group” were not Course XV graduates, and “few … had chosen an 
engineering education with the conscious intention of preparing themselves for man-
																																																								
24 KTC, “Inaugural Address,” Science (New Series) 71, no. 1850 (1930): 594. 
25 Jackson, 638–639. 
26 W. Bernard Carlson, “Academic Entrepreneurship and Engineering Education: Dugald C. 
Jackson and the MIT-GE Cooperative Engineering Course, 1907–1932,” Technology and Culture 
29, no. 3 (1988): 541. 
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agement.”27  MIT alumni might shift from engineers into executives, but management 
had been neither the goal nor the education that got them there.  
Though engineering education might have been too indirect in preparing executives, 
management education was often too narrow.  As has been discussed in Chapter 1, 
business schools in 1945 had a mediocre reputation.  In the words of Bennis and O’Toole, 
“B schools were more akin to trade schools; most professors were good ole boys dispen-
sing war stories, cracker-barrel wisdom, and the occasional practical pointer.”28  Even its 
defenders admitted that business schools often had trouble providing general manage-
ment training rather than pushing its students too soon into specialized occupations, such 
as “accountancy, banking, meat packing, hotel management, and the like.”29  As Augier 
and March have chronicled, by spending the 1930s and 1940s making themselves “useful 
to business,” American business school leaders had won a Pyrrhic victory.  “It left North 
American business schools … with only modest legitimacy in academe.”30  Even Harvard 
Business School was scorned by several other Harvard departments, not to mention by 
non-Harvard academics.  Schools varied: HBS was more practical and business-oriented, 
Columbia more theoretical and analytical.31  But without faculty who had either hands-on 
business experience or deep research abilities, the leading schools could not advance 
business as either a discipline or a profession.  It was a cleft stick: too vocational for 
academia, too impractical for industry. 
																																																								
27 Rae, 73–74.  
28 Bennis and O’Toole, 2. 
29 LeRossignol, 137.   
30 Augier and March, 132. 
31 Aaronson, passim. 
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Around the time of the Course XV Committee report, however, reform movements 
were developing within two camps.  The first were social scientists, who had learned 
during World War II how to meet “ambitious wartime production targets [by] over-
coming diverse managerial hurdles – in materials planning, finance, distribution systems, 
transportation, raw materials purchasing, and human resource training and supervision – 
on a scale never even imagined by the world’s largest corporations.”  Several were emer-
ging from the war determined to turn this knowledge into a “scientifically grounded” cur-
riculum.  In the second camp were business school leaders themselves, particularly at 
Harvard and Stanford, who were not surprisingly tired of defending their institutions’ 
legitimacy.  In the coming Cold War years they would assert that management education 
was vital to national security.  By embracing the social scientists, they could trumpet their 
cutting-edge methods in mass-producing defense materiel, but also their techniques in 
achieving “internal social stability.”32  Such claims would form part of the backdrop to 
MIT’s commitment to management education in the early 1950s.   
In 1945, however, the Course XV Committee’s recommendation to create a busi-
ness school must have looked like a bridge too far.  Therefore when a few years later the 
Institute agreed, it was with only half the recommendation: create a new school, yet not 
of business but of humanities.  The decision was a direct consequence of a recommen-
dation to establish “a School of Humanities and Social Sciences … on an equal footing 
with the existing schools at MIT.”  Humanities would therefore become a fourth School, 
																																																								
32 Robert E. Gleeson and Steven Schlossman, “Introduction,” in The Beginnings of Graduate 
Management Education in the United States, ed. Steven Schlossman et al. (Santa Monica: 
Graduate Management Admissions Council, 1994): 9–10. 
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alongside those of Engineering, Science, and Architecture and Planning, which President 
Compton had established in 1932.  Humanities’ curricula would span undergraduate and 
graduate degrees and “include the present Courses in Business and Engineering Adminis-
tration and Economics and Engineering,” i.e., Courses XV and XIV.33 
Recommending the Fourth School was a bold step toward “a broader educational 
mission” by the Committee on Educational Survey.  Appointed by the Institute faculty in 
January 1947 and known by the name of its chairman, chemical engineering professor 
Warren K. Lewis, this committee had had much of the same motivation as its prede-
cessors in Course XV.  Now that the war was over, MIT had the opportunity and even the 
duty to re-examine its principles of education.  Educational mission and philosophy, pro-
fessional vs. general education, even the organization of the faculty: all these fell within 
the committee’s purview.34  Over nearly a century, and particularly since Compton had 
begun his presidency in 1930, MIT had evolved from an engineering training school into 
an internationally prominent university.  What that meant for teaching, research, and 
structure was for the committee to investigate. 
What they determined, and proclaimed forcefully in their December 1949 report, 
was that many of MIT’s graduates were gravely incomplete.  A competent professional 
was no longer enough.  MIT’s objective should be “the professional man who is an out-
standing citizen.”  It was a matter of both personal development and social responsibility. 
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34 MIT Libraries, “Committee on Educational Survey,” http://libraries.mit.edu/mithistory/institute 
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In our increasingly complex society, science and technology can no longer be 
segregated from their human and social consequences.  The most difficult and 
complicated problems confronting our generation are in the field of the 
humanities and social sciences; since they have resulted in large measure from 
the impact of science and technology upon society, they have an intimate rela-
tionship with the other aspects of the MIT program.  …  Our students today must 
wrestle with accumulations of knowledge and with complexities in the task of 
making a living far greater than those of their predecessors. Not only must they 
be trained for a vocation, but they must be made to recognize that the growth of 
science and technology has a profound impact on society at large.35 
Like Alfred P. Sloan and the Course XV Executive Committee before them, the 
Lewis Committee was arguing for integration, for science and technology taught not in a 
vacuum but in an “intimate relationship” with MIT’s other disciplines.  Yet the three 
arguments were not identical.  Sloan believed knowledge of science and engineering 
made better managers.  The Course XV Committee, focusing more specifically on an 
academic department, felt it made better manager instruction.  The Lewis Committee 
contended that the disciplines together – not in sequence or precedence – made better hu-
man beings.  Their perspective was broader, their claim grander: “education is prepara-
tion for life.”  That life might be one of technical achievement.  It might also be a career 
of administration, “in whatever professional field, [of] executive leadership in industry, 
government, and labor both in this country and abroad.”36  In either case, graduates 
would recognize the challenges posed by the ambiguity, social context, and ethical 
dimensions of what too often were deemed technical problems.  As an institute of techno-
logy and science, proclaimed the Lewis Report, MIT had “the opportunity to make a 
larger contribution to the solution of urgent social problems, the opportunity to help 
prospective scientists and engineers to understand better the forces that are molding 																																																								
35 Lewis Report, 42, 89. 
36 Lewis Report, 89, 132. 
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contemporary society, and the opportunity to give students of the social sciences and the 
humanities a better insight into the meanings and implications of science and technology.”  
Integration was to be bidirectional, education cumulative.37 
The Lewis Report would have a profound impact on MIT.  Just months after it was 
published, the Division of the Humanities did become the School of Humanities and 
Social Studies (SHSS).  This new School, led by John Ely Burchard as dean, both spear-
headed the new undergraduate general education requirement – a successor to the original 
Walker/Dewey Course IX – and granted its own degrees through three departments: 
English and History, Modern Languages, and Economics and Social Science.  Course XV 
remained within the latter.  Judging from the report of the Course XV Visiting Commit-
tee in 1949 – a follow-up to the 1942–45 group – they had essentially got what they wan-
ted.  Business and Engineering Administration was now in a full-fledged School, albeit 
not a school of business, and the Lewis Report had affirmed the importance of business 
and administration courses for well-rounded MIT graduates.  Course XV might still have 
work to do, particularly in closer associations with industry and in recruiting industry-
experienced faculty, but the Visiting Committee seemed largely content.38 
Meanwhile Alfred P. Sloan was doing his own part to connect industry to MIT, 
mostly by getting its graduates jobs.  Throughout 1948 and 1949 he, Compton, and the 
Alumni Placement Bureau exchanged multiple letters about executive searches.  In 
January 1948, for example, Sloan asked for suggestions for “an assistant to the president 
of a company.”  A vague request, perhaps, but Sloan knew what he was looking for: “a 																																																								
37 Lewis Report, 92, 38, 42. 
38 Visiting Committee for Course XV to JRK, report, 1 December 1949, AC20:1:38. 
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good executive, has good business judgment, is aggressive, and intelligent.”  Compton 
was able to give him five names with candid descriptions, ranging from “absolutely tops 
in every sense of the word” to “so aggressive and tenacious that it sometimes hurts.”39  
By late 1949, after Compton had been elected Chairman of the MIT Corporation and 
James R. Killian the president, Sloan was recognizing unabashedly his reliance on top 
MIT talent – and administrators – for executive placement: “I suppose you will think I 
am asking for some assistance in finding men for places, but I do so because I believe 
you are the best source for that sort of thing.”40  He also committed $1 million from the 
Sloan Foundation to the new Alfred P. Sloan Laboratory for Productive Processes, 
encouraged companies to donate to the MIT Development Program (of which he was 
Honorary Chairman), and even talked a non-MIT-graduate friend into giving the Institute 
600 shares of GM stock.41  The most recent Course XV Committee was advocating 
“more extensive association with industry and financial support for this purpose”; Sloan 
was doing something about it.42 
The Course XV faculty, however, were having less success.  On the plus side, 
1949–50 saw the revival of the Sloan Fellowship program, starting with 10 students and 
increasing to 14 the following year.  On the negative side, surviving correspondence sug-
gests the kind of “floundering around” that Sloan had observed in executives ten years 
before.  The files of Dean Burchard alone show him trying to launch a research program 
on Fundamental Marketing Problems, recruit senior executives to teach on 8- to 15-week 																																																								
39 APS to KTC and KTC to APS, 8 and 19 January 1948, AC4:199:8. 
40 APS to JRK, 4 November 1949, AC4:199:9. 
41 JRK to APS, 8 June 1949, AC4:199:9; APS to JRK, 19 December 1949, AC4:199:9. 
42 Visiting Committee for Course XV to JRK, report, 3. 
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company sabbaticals, and start a series of seminars and conferences similar to those of 
Harvard Business School.  None of these ideas panned out.43  Simultaneously, faculty in 
Economics (Course XIV) were identifying a similar “ambiguity of the objectives,” inclu-
ding preparing some people for graduate school and training others “for operating posi-
tions, primarily in business organizations, by adding to their basic engineering skills 
certain other skills which lie within the area of social science,” particularly industrial 
relations and human relations.44  Burchard was an energetic if high-handed man trying to 
respond to committees’ advice, but he and his colleagues weren’t making headway.  In 
the eyes of Compton and others, Course XV was “below par.”45  
The core difficulty was embodied (or masked) by the department’s name.  
Course XV was intended to bring together business, engineering, and administration.  In 
its 89-year history, MIT had made progress uniting the latter two.  From the earliest 
efforts of Course IX through the creation of Course XV and the School of Humanities 
and Social Studies, the Institute had gradually deepened its ability to develop both engi-
neers who understood the problems of administration and administrators who understood 
the challenges of engineering and science.  But in “business” progress had been slower.  
In 1950 MIT had achieved little in either management research or instruction by industry-
experienced faculty.  Connections to major corporations, notwithstanding the Sloan Fel-
lowship program and a few key alumni, remained sparse and unfocused.  At mid-century 
MIT was a technological institute that incorporated administration studies.  It did have a 
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department whose objective was “to supply the American economy with men who will 
become leaders in business and industry; to combine fundamental training in science and 
engineering with basic knowledge and facility in dealing with administrative prob-
lems.”46  But so long as it was purely education-oriented, this objective seemed destined 
to keep Business and Engineering Administration forever ancillary within the Institute.  
Transforming that destiny would require something dramatic: a letter from New York. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
“Nothing will be accomplished until we get started” 
Here’s some advice for university presidents.  When your most generous alumnus 
asks you to go to his office, go. 
It was on May 31, 1950, that Sloan sent Killian a brief letter acknowledging the 
success of the MIT Development Program, of which Sloan had been honorary chair.  
Sloan then went on in a new and mysterious vein. 
On my return from Europe early in July I shall be very glad indeed to see 
you.  …  I have been turning over in my mind a plan which I would like to 
discuss confidentially with you which might have some bearing later on.  I do not 
know whether it is sound or desirable or could be made effective, but in any 
event I think it worth mentioning it to you as I said before, on a completely “off 
the record” basis.1 
Killian didn’t know what to expect.  Over more than twenty years Sloan had given 
$7 million to a wide range of projects, from professorships to laboratories, and there was 
even talk of approaching him to help fund the new School of Humanities.2  But a 
confidential plan sounded more concrete than mere general generosity.  Opportunity was 
knocking. 
In an era of slow travel and long summer vacations, it took more than three months 
to answer the door.  Ultimately it was Compton who visited Sloan’s office on Septem-
ber 5.  When he returned two days later, he dictated five pages in dignified excitement.  
Sloan wanted to found a business school, and he wanted to found it at MIT. 
Choosing MIT was more than the default choice of a loyal Tech man.  Sloan “had 
for a long time been interested in the subject of management,” yet industrial management 																																																								
1 APS to JRK, 31 May 1950, AC4:199:10. 
2 MIT, press release, 21 December 1950, 4; Marshall B. Dalton to JRK, 7 July 1950, AC4:199:10. 
40 
remained an underdeveloped field despite the professorship he’d established in 1946.  
Meanwhile Sloan had the same bee in his bonnet as before: although in industrial 
management the engineers (from MIT and beyond) had a higher success rate than the 
non-technically trained men, they didn’t always succeed as senior executives.  If they 
were to get their management education earlier, then it ought to be at an institution like 
MIT.  And if MIT weren’t interested, Sloan would look elsewhere.3 
MIT was very interested.  Compton reassured Sloan that MIT was already “firmly 
committed” to strengthening Course XV, so his proposal couldn’t have been more 
fortuitous.  Nor more generous: $2.5 million over ten years, plus another $2.5 million up 
front for a dedicated building.  $5 million – the equivalent of nearly $50 million in 2015 – 
was both a princely sum and exactly what John D. Rockefeller, Jr. had given to Harvard 
Business School (HBS) the year before.  Sloan moreover felt that MIT’s school “would 
not be unduly duplicating” HBS and its ilk, because of “the emphasis on technological 
background,” and anyway “the field is so important that additional educational facilities 
are justified.”  And if there were competition, so be it: “competition has been stimulating 
to progress and [Sloan] himself has not done badly competitively.”4 
Compton’s position was clear: “I have no doubt of the desirability of this project 
and the wisdom of our undertaking it.”5  Compton’s enthusiasm for the project contrasted 
with his caution over some of the Lewis Committee’s farther-reaching recommendations, 																																																								
3 KTC to JRK and JAS, memorandum, “Proposal of Gift from Alfred Sloan,” 7 September 1950, 
AC4:202:1, 1–2. 
4 “Proposal of Gift from Alfred Sloan,” 2–3.  As Sloan said in his autobiography, “I believe in 
competition as an article of faith, a means of progress, and a way of life.” My Years with General 
Motors, xxii. 
5 “Proposal of Gift from Alfred Sloan,” 4. 
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which Compton believed could reduce MIT’s concentration on science and engineering. 
Sloan’s proposal, on the other hand, would deepen, not broaden.  Instead of taking the 
Institute into too many new directions, thought Compton, it would intensify MIT’s 
commitment to one of the most important and under-resourced of the old.6 
The platform for plumbing management education’s depths would remain Course 
XV, to which Compton suggested adding five- and six-year degrees.  But he also 
imagined a new kind of industrial management teaching, patterned on MIT’s chemical 
engineering practice schools, in which students would have part-time assignments in 
local industrial firms.  Meanwhile, visiting executives would present to students “a series 
of current management problems which could be described, analyzed, discussed, and 
followed.  This would be analogous to the case system of the Harvard Business School 
but would have the advantage of dealing with actual, live cases in process of being han-
dled.”  MIT would thus “emphasize industrial management and not try to cover the whole 
field of business management,” much as Sloan had suggested.  This would sit well with 
MIT – and with Compton’s fellow Sloan Foundation trustees, one of them a staunch HBS 
supporter.7 
For similar reasons, Compton wanted a name change.  Sloan had felt strongly about 
“the psychological value of a distinct entity, which might be called a ‘School of Business 
Administration.’”  Compton liked the former but not the latter, lest it “be too readily 
interpreted as duplication and competition with Harvard.”  Nor did he care for “School of 
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Business and Engineering Administration,” as this new Fifth School would be more than 
“simply a ‘blow-up’ of Course XV.”  Thus it was Compton, not Sloan, who proposed the 
name that stuck.  A School of Industrial Management “conforms to Sloan’s interest ex-
pressed through his professorship” and “implies a somewhat narrower specialization than 
the broad term ‘business.’”  Others could try to cover businesses of every size and de-
scription; MIT would focus on the large, complex enterprises of industrial management.8 
The bigger problems were structures, both physical and organizational.  $2.5 million, 
although substantial, wouldn’t be enough to erect a building from scratch.  All the money 
from the capital campaign had already been allocated, and the campus was running out of 
space.  And once space was found, either by expanding Hayden Library or bulldozing the 
tennis courts on the corner of Ames Street and Memorial Drive, Compton and Killian 
knew they’d have to figure out the Fifth School’s relationship with the Fourth.  The 
School of Humanities and Social Studies was in its earliest infancy – still using its 
prelaunch name of School of Human Relations – so perhaps the new school should 
absorb it.9  If not, then Economics could be a problem.  Most universities kept Economics 
and Business separate, but separation often led to feuds.  Yet if MIT took the economists 
out of SHSS, then Compton and Killian wondered what would be left.10 
As they grappled with these issues, Sloan grew impatient.  On September 21, little 																																																								
8 “Proposal of Gift from Alfred Sloan,” 2 and 5. 
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more than two weeks after the initial meeting, Sloan acknowledged that although he 
needn’t come to an MIT Executive Committee lunch, he did want the Committee to 
understand the significance for the Institute’s “horizontal expansion.”  Unlike the profes-
sorship, which MIT had readily absorbed, creating the new school would involve “a very 
broad acceptance of the principle of industrial management in the MIT scheme of 
things.”11  A month later, Sloan sounded distinctly restless.  Even though he hadn’t 
received a formal statement of interest, he still wanted to take the next step and come up 
to Cambridge for discussion, “in view of the fact that time is passing and nothing will be 
accomplished until we get started.”12  It was not the last time that the paces of industry 
and academia would clash. 
The formal statement did come, written by Killian on October 30, just three days 
before the Cambridge meeting.  To no one’s surprise, “the Executive Committee has 
indicated its grateful acceptance of Mr. Sloan’s offer.”  And they did so fully aware of the 
result: “a general deepening and widening of our total interest here at the Institute in the 
field of management,” though not in all of business.13 
The focus of the school should be on industrial management, rather than on the 
comprehensive field of business.  It should seek to benefit from the engineering 
and scientific resources of MIT and to achieve an effective combination of 
engineering and management.  There is clear evidence that this combination can 
produce an increasing number of our top-flight industrial managers and business 
executives, and we have a unique opportunity at MIT to exploit the partnership 
by concentrating on industrial management in this sense.14 
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That concentration meant both research and education.  In Killian’s judgment, no 
educational institution in the country “really delves into the immense know-how of 
American industry in this field.”  MIT would bring to bear not only engineering, planning, 
and the sciences, but also “its understanding of the research method” and “the growing 
effectiveness of our social sciences in the School of Human Relations.”  By building on 
the interdisciplinary collaboration on which MIT prided itself, “we could give a new di-
mension to management as an academic field.”15  MIT, like Sloan, was interested in the 
study of management.  Now it could turn interest into innovation. 
Objections from the Fourth School 
Most who saw Killian’s memo responded favorably, even with relief.  Five years 
before, the Course XV Committee had recommended creating a new school of business; 
now here was a school, or at least its funding, being handed to MIT on a plate.  One 
particularly detailed response came from Robert T. Haslam, former MIT chemical 
engineering professor and now senior executive at Standard Oil.  Although strongly 
supporting the emphasis on research, Haslam encouraged Killian to make sure it ad-
vanced “each ‘attribute’ of the graduating student.”  This begged the question.  To Has-
lam those attributes weren’t clear, because MIT needed to decide what kind of student it 
wanted to graduate: “a cracker-jack manager of a production unit” or “a broad gauge 
industrialist … to whom the nation could turn in times of emergency.”  The latter would 
require close physical and organizational proximity of “the Sloan School” (Haslam’s 
term) and the School of Human Relations, so that future industrialists would be “well 
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trained in the handling of people.”16 
Unfortunately, it was Human Relations that housed the loudest opposition.  Dean 
Burchard considered the Fifth School a knife in the back of the Fourth.  Over six triple-
level-outlined pages, Burchard contended that the new school should confine itself to 
graduate students and to faculty who teach “techniques” rather than “philosophy” – a 
distinction that would for example put production in the SIM but keep labor relations in 
SHSS.  Burchard harbored no ambitions to run the Fifth School and was “quite prepared 
to resign” if Killian did want a single dean of both schools, though he was “skeptical” 
that a business school dean would be “temperamentally or intellectually right for activi-
ties of [the] Fourth School.”17 
Burchard’s apprehensions went beyond intellectual snobbery.  Like Haslam, Sloan, 
and the authors of the Lewis Report, Burchard believed in developing leaders through 
“engineering training when supplemented by other kinds of training [emphasis his].”  But 
wherever that training extended beyond management techniques – to “the understanding 
of things which human beings hold dear” – Burchard didn’t trust business school faculty 
to provide it.  He decried business schools like HBS that “place nonentities on their facul-
ties, from economics et al., who would repeat the business line” rather than risk the wrath 
of industrialists by exposing students to Keynesian economics and other dangerous 
notions.  Future executives ought to develop their own views by intelligently considering 
a full spectrum of opinions, a responsibility that only the Fourth School – faculty intact – 
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could uphold.  “I am not emotional,” declared Burchard, “when I say that such a subject 
as labor relations placed in the environment of a Fifth School which would really please 
Mr. Sloan or almost any of our friends of the [MIT] Corporation would … cease to be ob-
jective.”18 
Others weren’t persuaded.  When for instance Julius Stratton, the university provost, 
received a copy of Burchard’s memo, he scribbled comments in the margins, probably 
preparing to talk Burchard down.  Alongside Burchard’s argument that business leaders 
must understand more than techniques, Stratton wrote, “This is why we need the 4th 
School.”  But when Burchard foretold “a killing frost” or “the death blow” if Human 
Relations were to lose Course XV undergraduates, any economics or labor relations 
faculty, or the full attention of fundraisers, Stratton commented, “Perhaps but I’m not 
convinced.”  Stratton, like Killian and Compton, had essentially decided to leave Course 
XIV (Economics) within Human Relations.  Therefore Fourth-School faculty would 
continue to teach future leaders and industrialists, and their thinking – just as Burchard 
had argued – would be “in no way conditioned by what the dean of the Fifth School 
thinks or what his supporters think.”19 
This wasn’t the last time Burchard would try to obstruct Fifth School expansion, nor 
the last time he’d fail.  In fact, even as he was dictating point II.g.7 of his memo (on “the 
true meaning of business”), Killian and Sloan were down the street making that 
expansion certain.  MIT had had a stroke of luck: they could buy rather than build.  Lever 
Brothers was abandoning its headquarters at 50 Memorial Drive – one long block east of 																																																								
18 Memorandum, “Sloan School,” 2 and 4. 
19 Memorandum, “Sloan School,” 2 and 5–6. 
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the imperiled tennis courts – to move to New York City.  Even more fortunately, one of 
the Lever Brothers directors, John Hancock, also sat on the MIT Corporation, and was 
able both to block an impending sale to the government and to knock the price down to 
the magic $2.5 million.20  In his autobiography Killian recalled, “I remember during these 
negotiations Mr. Sloan came to Cambridge and he, Dr. Compton, and I walked down 
Memorial Drive to have a look at the building as a possible home for the School.  Mr. 
Sloan’s reaction was immediate.  ‘What are we waiting for?’ he asked.”21 
Whether decisive or impatient, Sloan had been reassured by his Cambridge visit.  
The visit had convinced him that “it is a far more consequential project in magnitude, in 
organization and other ways, than I first realized.  But that is merely a problem of getting 
the thing done.”22  Sloan wanted action, though not direct involvement in administration.  
As Sloan would say to Erwin Schell later in November, “I shall look to you people to 
work out your problems and I will be glad if called upon, to give my advice with the 
expectation of being frequently vetoed.”  But for now he, Compton, and Killian were 
satisfied that the new school is “a constructive thing to do.”23 
Scanning the Landscape 
Consequential and constructive, perhaps, but also radical.  The institution would be 
handicapped by being a business school, which in academic circles was still a short step 
away from trade school.  True, MIT was coming at management from another direction: 																																																								
20 Originally Lever Brothers wanted $3.5 million, and until Hancock got involved wasn’t budging 
below $2.764 million. 
21 JRK, Education, 195.  Sloan may have been recalling his experience thirty years earlier buying 
up large swaths of Detroit; see APS, My Years, 25–26.  
22 APS to JRK, 13 November 1950, AC4:199:10. 
23 Erwin H. Schell to JRK, 27 November 1950, AC4:203:2, 5; APS to JRK, 13 November 1950. 
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as a school of technology.  But there the models were no better.  When Sloan asked 
Arnold Zurcher, the executive director of his foundation, to look at eleven technology 
schools’ management curricula, Zurcher returned shaking his head with disapproval.  
They might have departments of industrial management or industrial engineering, but 
they had “rarely, if ever, succeeded in achieving a synthesis of scientific and business 
training such as you have in mind.”  None used anything like the two-way, industry-stu-
dent visit approach Compton had outlined, and none tried “to interest experienced 
business men as consultants or as lecturers.”  (Since MIT was part of the study, Zurcher 
must have discounted guest speaker series like the one to which Schell had invited 
Sloan.)  Business schools might have too few researchers, but technological schools had 
too few real businessmen.  This Zurcher saw as an opportunity.  “By and large, these 
management curricula, offered by our technological schools, might just as well be offered 
by our regular schools of business administration where interest in science and techno-
logy is practically nil.  …  I am quite confident that, if the MIT people use a little origina-
lity and take advantage of the large financial resources you are offering them, they will be 
able to build a program in business management … which will be unique and which will 
make a real contribution to business education.”24 
But the next day Zurcher wrote again with late-breaking news.  He’d finally 
received information from one more school – the Carnegie Institute’s new Graduate 
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School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) – and it was by far the closest to Sloan’s 
vision.  Even its derivation was similar: a multimillion-dollar gift from a major industrial-
ist (William Larimer Mellon, Sr., the founder of Gulf Oil).  Barely a year old, the GSIA 
planned to accept students from both its parent Institute and from outside, and to confer 
upon graduates a Master of Science in Industrial Administration.25 
What struck Zurcher most was the Carnegie curriculum. 
In essence, it has three major elements: (1) administration economics; (2) sci-
ence-technology; (3) social sciences-humanities.  The first curricular element is 
designed to provide an understanding of the relation between the practical 
economics of a business enterprise and the state of the national economy.  The 
second element, namely, science-technology, seeks to provide an understanding 
of basic science and engineering problems so as to make it possible for future 
managers to understand and utilize the services of scientific and technical experts 
in the business.  The third curricular element, namely, social sciences-humanities, 
is designed to give the student some perspective as regards the place of his 
business and himself in society as a whole. 
Compared to other schools’ offerings, “the general idea of the program is sound.”26 
Sound, yet avant-garde.  The GSIA’s founders, scorning existing business and 
industrial management programs, had set out to revolutionize through science.  As one 
later recalled, “Accurately or not, we perceived American business education at that time 
as a wasteland of vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-based profes-
sionalism, as medicine and engineering had been transformed a generation or two 
earlier.”27  If Taylorism had launched scientific management forty years before, then the 
GSIA would try to bring that science at last into a management school.28   
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27 Herbert A. Simon, Models of My Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 138, as cited in 
Augier and March, 132. 
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For now the question was how much to learn from the nascent GSIA model.  
Zurcher hastily pointed out where Carnegie hadn’t gone far enough, such as not having a 
liaison to industry.  More importantly, “the faculty, in my opinion, inclines distinctly 
toward the academic side of the picture.  The Dean … [and] the remainder of the faculty 
[are] chiefly made up of professional economists.”29  Zurcher knew whereof he spoke, 
since he was himself a political scientist who had co-authored A Dictionary of Economics 
(1948) with Sloan’s brother Harold.30  Moreover, as Zurcher no doubt knew, Alfred 
Sloan had no great love for academic economists, who he believed didn’t understand how 
business really worked.  Sloan might grudgingly admit that managers had to “deal with 
economic problems,” yet suggest “some difference between theoretical economics and 
business economics.”31  For this reason if no other, said Zurcher, “we have a chance, up 
at MIT, to improve on what Carnegie has done.”32 
What Carnegie did or didn’t do is debatable, and will be reviewed in future chapters.  
But in key respects it paralleled or inspired what would become the MIT SIM approach.  
Like Carnegie, MIT would teach science and technology to managers, and indeed had 
been doing so since 1916.  It would also apply science to management.  Like the 
Carnegie GSIA (economists notwithstanding), MIT had social scientists, operations 
researchers, and even industrial psychologists.  At the SIM they would bring science and 
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Noble, 1948).  
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32 Zurcher to APS, 10 November 1950. 
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rationality to a field many considered embryonic and non-rigorous. 
But MIT sought to go further.   For one thing, industrial management – as an 
education and a discipline – had to be not just scientific but practical too.  The dean and 
some segment of the instructors (internal or external) ought to exemplify what Sloan 
himself called “the scientific approach to management – however that might be 
defined.”33  But how instruction was to lead to practice even Sloan wasn’t sure.  
My basic idea is very simple.  It is that the realities of industrial management are 
not of the sort that are written in books – I doubt if they can be.  …  In the 
teaching of law you have the published judges’ decisions and precedents to go by 
but in industry this is not true.  I believe that some way can be found to make 
students familiar with what executives really do.  …  Somehow we must, at least 
in part, substitute realistic education for experience.34 
A rational manager or education would not be enough.  It had to be realistic. 
Realistic didn’t mean restricted.  The target was even loftier: rational managers, yes, 
but statesmen too.  Bob Haslam had put his finger on the issue when he asked whether 
MIT was aiming for a “cracker-jack manager” or “broad gauge industrialist.”  The 
American Management Association was at the same time calling for business to be 
“interpreted as a service rather than as a means toward selfish ends,” based on “a 
profound understanding of the non-economic and non-rational behavior of men.” In Kil-
lian’s words, “the school should seek to train men with the broadest possible education 
and outlook, … men who have skills and knowledge and at the same time a sense of 
social responsibility, and who can make contributions to the public welfare.”35   
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It was an unprecedented goal, peculiar to MIT.  The SIM graduate would combine 
technological knowledge, scientific training, realistic education, and social responsibility: 
the industrialist that Haslam described and Sloan purportedly modeled.  For this the SIM 
man would need a broad curriculum – management and engineering and industry, yes, 
but also “strong courses in economics and the social sciences.”  Fortunately, said Killian, 
“one of the most distinguishing characteristics of MIT is its close internal coordination … 
its easy communication and its lack of emphasis on departmentalization.”  In his view, 
what would be impossible at any other business or technology school would be the 
crowning glory at the SIM.36 
Public Launch, National Significance 
Burchard saw matters differently.  Killian and Compton were proposing to move 
Economics (including Labor Relations) over to Lever House alongside the SIM faculty: 
separate departments, same building.  Burchard predicted doom.  The remaining Humani-
ties departments “might never expect to have graduate work and advanced instruction” at 
an institute like MIT, while the economists were “those who are the least interested in the 
general education program and with which we have to work hardest to maintain an 
integrated approach.  This is a fact and not a guess.”  Imagining a Fourth School 
relegated to being a gen ed backwater, Burchard proposed to Killian a “confidential and 
urgent” solution: put the SIM faculty in the Hayden Building, and fill Lever House with 
MIT’s central administration instead.  It’s not clear that he knew Sloan had earmarked 
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half his gift for a building, or that Killian ever responded.37 
In any case, Sloan, Killian, and Compton were moving forward.  The weeks fol-
lowing Thanksgiving 1950 were spent preparing documents and reassuring one another 
that everything would be secret until the Sloan Foundation trustees had formally ap-
proved the gift.  Around this time the amount rose to $5.25 million.  The extra quarter 
million, paid to the City of Cambridge over ten years, would keep the building off 
Cambridge’s tax rolls permanently.38 
Thus it was on December 6, 1950, that MIT sent to the Sloan Foundation the formal 
“Memorandum on the Organization and Program of a School of Industrial Management 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.”  Drawing heavily on the memo of October 
30th, the document describes a school distinguished – and differentiated – by its 
emphasis on industrial management. 
The management of industrial enterprises with all of their complex technology 
and human relationships would be the focus of the school.  …  One of the great 
achievements of our American society has been our great industrial complex, and 
a school such as the one envisioned by Mr. Sloan has a great opportunity and 
responsibility to educate men broadly for the management and further refinement 
of this great productive machine.  While the focus of the school would be on in-
dustrial management as distinct from finance or other types of business activities, 
its program, nevertheless, should be broad.  The school might be described as 
polarized around industrial management, but unlimited in the breadth and 
thoroughness with which it treats industrial management.39 
The Memorandum also underscored two interrelated themes: collaboration and 
research.  As Sloan had suggested from the beginning, collaboration with industry could 																																																								
37 Burchard to JRK, memorandum, 27 November 1950, AC4:202:9.  The Humanities departments 
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produce “effective cross-fertilization between men active in industry and the teaching and 
research personnel of the school.  The school should preferably be headed by a man who 
has had wide industrial experience.”  Moreover, “the Sloan School could provide the fo-
cus for collaborative programs” in research.  Automatic control and operations research, 
for instance, required “men with mathematical training and a scientific point of view, but 
[the] industrial applications must be developed collaboratively by scientists and by indus-
trial managers.”  Applied psychology too would benefit “from being in a scientific envi-
ronment and from association with the social sciences.”  By taking advantage of its home 
in an engineering institute, “the school might give a new dimension to management as an 
academic field.”  If American academics hadn’t advanced the field of industrial manage-
ment thus far, then MIT could make sure industry and technology did it with them.40 
Those advances were nearly delayed even further.  Just five days later, Sloan 
phoned Compton to say he “felt very pessimistic about the future” and suggest post-
poning the announcement.  The issue wasn’t the school but the Korean War, which had 
been going disastrously for the United Nations forces since the Chinese invasion two 
weeks earlier.  Compton talked him out of postponement, arguing they should push 
forward with the announcement even if operations had to be delayed.41  The U.S. needed 
effective industrial management, now more than ever.  As Killian wrote on December 15, 
although “the present international situation may affect the establishment of the school … 
the importance of this enterprise to the nation in emergency or in peace justifies our 
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starting plans for it at once.”42 
“This enterprise” meant more than the school.  Industrial management itself was at 
stake, and with it the nation’s security, progress, and way of life.  As MIT soon an-
nounced in two press releases, “the urgent need for the highest standards of management 
which can be developed in the industrial field is ever with us whether our nation is in a 
state of emergency or in a state of peaceful prosperity.  In fact, industrial management 
has been termed America’s most powerful ‘secret weapon.’”43  The press releases 
(December 20, 1950, and January 1951) drew a straight line: American research created 
American technology, which created “our great industries whose productivity and 
resulting service to the public depend upon intelligent administration.”  War thus made 
industry all the more essential.  “Our present national situation dramatizes a recognized 
fact; viz., that production is both a source of economic progress and the foundation of 
national security.”  And if the nation needed industrial production, then it needed its 
determining and “motivating force”: industrial management.44 
Not just any industrial management, however.  In the January 1951 press release, 
Compton and Killian proclaimed “our convictions as to the effectiveness of a scientific 
background as a foundation upon which to build a broad concept of management in this 
industrial age.”  Industrial management therefore depended on two senses of science: 
“scientifically acquired knowledge and the know-how of its application.”45  Perhaps 
business administration and business schools generally might endure without scienti-																																																								
42 JRK to the Sloan Foundation, 15 December 1950, AC4:199.10. 
43 MIT, press release, “RE: New School,” January 1951, AC4:202:2, 1–2.   
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fically trained expertise, and Killian had recently assured Harvard’s President Conant that 
MIT had no designs beyond industrial management.  But within the narrower field he and 
Compton asserted a claim and a calling, “the conviction that industrial management is a 
profession which can be developed and taught.”46 
Thus MIT aspired to develop industrial management to a “broader status and higher 
scientific level,” and thereby prepare future executives for the “‘intricate problems … in 
our technical enterprises.’”47  For Sloan this meant better men using better methods to 
make better decisions.  In words that would recur in multiple speeches throughout 1951, 
Sloan was quoted ascribing to scientifically trained executives the power to solve the 
problems science’s complexity created. 
Few realize the broad and exacting demands made upon the industrial executive 
of today, especially in large-scale enterprises.  While the exercise of sound 
business judgment will always be the keystone of a successful industrial 
executive and a progressive enterprise, yet to reach the highest level of 
effectiveness, executive decisions must be supported by a scientific appraisal of 
all related facts and circumstances.  …  Therefore, it seems entirely logical that a 
scientific background offers an unusually healthy climate for the development of 
the industrial executive of tomorrow.48 
Selections and Separations 
Amid all the logic and conviction, the announcements had kept one question vague: 
what to call the school.  It turned out Sloan didn’t want his name on it.  There’s no 
shortage of theories for this.  One author has suggested that Sloan didn’t think the school 
was finished without a library or dormitory, and that naming schools for their donors 
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wasn’t yet fashionable.49  Perhaps Sloan thought his name would deter other philanthro-
pists, who’d figure that Sloan would pony up all the necessary funding rather than see his 
namesake go bankrupt.  Maybe he was just hedging his bets: if the school failed, he 
didn’t want the failure to reflect on him. 
The simplest answer may be the one on record at the time.  On January 23, Killian 
noted that Sloan had “expressed reluctance” to have two Sloan projects at MIT at the 
same time, and his name was already on the Metals Processing Laboratory he’d endowed 
in 1949.50  Killian acquiesced to this, so long as the foundation and Sloan himself got 
credit somewhere.  The foundation was easy: put a statement on the school letterhead.  
For the man, Killian suggested renaming Lever House.  This idea Sloan liked, so long as 
it was spelled out as the Alfred P. Sloan Building – a semantic but useful distinction from 
the Sloan Lab, and a link to the professorship he’d endowed five years before.51  The 
school, however, would remain as Compton had proposed nearly four months before: The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Industrial Management.52 
More significant than a name was a dean.  As GM Chairman and former CEO, 
Sloan considered the chief executive essential: “‘Picking this man is the first job and 
should be done before other problems are approached.’” Easier said than done.  The dean 																																																								
49 Cronin, 91.  
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would have to be credible both within and without, in both academia and industry.  The 
most obvious candidate was the Sloan friend, former MIT professor, and current petro-
leum executive Bob Haslam.  Unfortunately, Haslam turned the post down so that he 
could “retain his health and vigor” long into his sixties.53 
Attention soon turned to E. Pennell Brooks.  Brooks had been part of the inner circle 
consulted before the December announcement.  In a letter to Killian he’d professed 
himself “delighted” to see that the draft charter emphasized research, because “we know 
so little about industrial management.”  Musing on the “practical” education Sloan had 
envisioned, Brooks wondered, “But what is practical?  The graduates must come out 
equipped for being useful in the general field of management,” so “the right kind of 
schooling will have much more in it than just practical management problems.”  Brooks 
closed by gushing, “What an opportunity the first head of this new school is going to 
have in laying the ground work for its future!  And what a contribution such a school can 
make to American industry!”54 
Foresighted words perhaps, but more likely disingenuous.  Brooks must have known 
he was on the short list, because of either his chairmanship of the 1942–45 Course XV 
Executive Committee or inside information from Course XV faculty who were endorsing 
him.  In his memoir Killian stated that Brooks was hard to persuade to leave Sears Roe-
buck, and that only “his abiding enthusiasm for Course XV and his admiration for Dr. 
Dewey” enabled MIT to convince him.55  But MIT’s records suggest at least some self-
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interest.  In a letter of February 26, 1951, Compton described Brooks as “an exceedingly 
competent and imaginative man, 56 years of age, and facing the statutory 60-year retire-
ment policy of Sears Roebuck (a policy which is applied rigorously to all except the 
General himself).”56 
The offer was made in mid-February, the deal sealed by mid-March.  The inevitable 
press release (April 6) rang many of the same chimes as those of December and January.  
It even repeated many of the same phrases, including “a broader status and higher scien-
tific level of industrial management,” and “‘intricate problems … in our technical enter-
prises.’”  Killian extolled Brooks’s “‘long and rich experience in manufacturing and pro-
duction,’” not to mention the fact that Brooks was literally (alphabetically) the first 
Course XV graduate.  He also praised Sloan’s “‘magnificent gift’” that created “‘unlimi-
ted opportunities.’”  If anything the language was even grander than before: the school 
“‘represents, we believe, the most advanced concept of education and research on the 
problems of administration in technical industry.’”57  Brooks in person was more down to 
earth, telling alumni in Chicago that “‘this was the first time Sears had ever been asked to 
ship a dean.’”58 
Responses to both the appointment and the concept were positive.  Laurence L. 
Waite ’29, vice president of North American Aviation, could hardly wait to get his hands 																																																																																																																																																																					
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on graduates of the new program.  To hear him tell it, his firm’s scientific personnel were 
so highly trained in “rigorous, logical thinking” that they could not apply their efforts to 
business, preferring instead to “expound at some length on a mathematically logical but 
usually unsound economic plan.”  Meanwhile business school students – Waite cited 
Stanford’s – “have had an excellent training, but fail to realize that the entire administra-
tive structure of any business cannot be completely recast to fit a theoretical organization 
outlined in the textbook.  This attitude immediately causes a conflict between them and 
the scientific type whose attitude, generally, is one of feeling that a professor in the field 
of business administration has never practiced what he teaches and would, undoubtedly, 
be incapable of doing so.”59 
Meanwhile Brooks had been receiving advice of his own.  His friend Lester Roth, 
vice president of AG Becher, wrote twice in February alone.  He recalled Brooks’s long-
standing interest in bringing the humanities into management education (“you wanted the 
MIT boys to know about Pericles etc. etc.”).  Now this new school would have to go 
beyond the technical to “be the liaison – the bridge – between the Humanities and 
Science.  It will study – and teach – Economic Humanism.”  Five days later he hastened 
to shove one group off that bridge.  Echoing Sloan’s own distaste, Roth urged Brooks to 
“please, for God’s sake, keep away from the Brilliant Young Economists.  Don’t let them 
in at all.  Don’t have any truck with them.”60 
Burchard would have been delighted.  He was still fighting a last-ditch battle to 
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keep Economics from moving to the Alfred P. Sloan Building, née Lever House.  His 
April 20 memo to Killian argued that although splitting up Economics would be “perilous 
and disruptive,” moving it to the Sloan Building and away from the Fourth School would 
“do irreparable damage to the general education program at MIT for at least the next 
decade.”  Instead he wondered what would be gained by having Economics and the Fifth 
School in adjoining offices.  Blithely Burchard asserted that the economists had increased 
their interest in general education “under precisely the influence of proximity,” and yet 
that “fundamental disagreement on economic theory … will not be changed by 
proximity.”  In other words, economists could get along with neighbors in philosophy or 
history, but not management.61 
Ultimately Economics did move to the Sloan Building.  Burchard grudgingly 
acquiesced, given the Economics chairman’s strong enthusiasm for the move, the 
promise of a campus-wide Faculty Club on the top floor, and the specter of duplicate 
libraries.  Judging from what survives in the MIT archives, he gave up on his lengthy 
fulminations against co-location, other than some petty complaints about furniture.62  
MIT had avoided what Killian later called “any weakening separation of economics from 
management.”63 
Burchard had predicted that if Fourth-School disciplines – specifically labor 
relations and economics – moved into the Fifth’s building then their faculty would “cease 
to be objective.”  There’s little evidence that today’s MIT labor economists, whether in 
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the Economics Department or MIT Sloan, have been brainwashed by Big Business.  Yet 
Burchard remains the first Cassandra of intellectual freedom for the SIM, the first to 
contend that business schools must ensure individual managers make up their own minds 
on political and economic questions, rather than blindly adopting a party line.  “The idea 
of most American citizens and of business managers about communism, for example, is 
naïve because they have sedulously protected themselves against reading the bibles [of] 
Marx-Leninism. …  The risk of seduction of a few is as nothing to the risk of every-
body’s whistling along past the graveyard with his eyes shut.”  Little did he know that his 
point would soon be strengthened by the SIM founder himself.64 
The Red Menace 
On January 12, 1951, just weeks after the public announcement, Sloan wrote to 
Compton with an air of unease. 
I am concerned, as many people are, with the infiltration into our Universities 
and Colleges and other educational institutions of those who teach and believe in 
a regimented society – perhaps socialism – as distinguished from free society 
which has been the American way up to now.  Speaking frankly, I never would 
have established the school at the University of Chicago, simply because I would 
question whether my school would be teaching socialism or some other “ism” as 
against the system of free enterprise.  I feel quite differently at MIT because, 
being a scientific institution, I think that they approach matters somewhat 
differently.  At the same time we are embarking upon a scheme of indefinite 
length.  You, Dr. Killian, myself and others, who are working on the plan and 
believe in a certain thing, will be passing out in due course of time.  Then what is 
going to happen?65 
What prompted the letter isn’t known.  Sloan mentioned the MIT-Sloan Foundation 
contract currently in the works, though he also implied he’d been “thinking this matter 
over” for a while.  More intriguing is his mysterious reference to “a certain thing [that] 																																																								
64 Burchard, “Sloan School,” 2. 
65 APS to KTC, 12 January 1951, AC4:199:11, 1. 
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has been called to my attention which … raises the question anew in my mind.”  At this 
point on Compton’s copy someone wrote “?” in the margin.  Most likely it was Compton, 
who didn’t know what Sloan meant. 
His reaction to Sloan’s proposal, however, is easier to imagine.  Sloan wanted his 
foundation to screen all SIM faculty candidates.  By amending the contract, the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation and trustees “would have a right to submit to MIT its point of view 
regarding the eligibility of such personnel” prior to appointment.  Sloan imagined a 
scenario in which the SIM wanted to appoint an “ism” candidate and the Institute 
leadership couldn’t find justification to overrule.  In that case, although the foundation 
“would not have the right of veto,” the central administration would be able to “take the 
position that a negative comment would have to be respected providing there was 
reasonable justification for same … for the simple reason that the School itself was 
created by the Foundation.”  In other words, without injecting “any set rules and 
regulations,” Sloan wanted to give Compton’s and Killian’s successors an external 
excuse to throw out undesirables.  Otherwise the SIM could be in real if not imminent 
danger, “and, frankly, I hate to see my accumulation of wealth used to destroy the very 
system that made the wealth possible.”66 
The Communist menace was looming large in Sloan’s mind.  Perhaps it was 
inevitable, given both the era and the Korean invasion by Red China.  Moreover, business 
schools were already seen as “mighty weapons in the war against Communism.”67  As 
Fourcade and Khurana have noted, HBS dean Donald K. David two years before had 																																																								
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67 Daniel, 140. 
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claimed an essential role for effective management in capitalism’s fight against commu-
nism.  “‘In this conflict of systems, the best way to preserve our system is to make it 
work.  To me the brightest ray of hope in these troubled times is my firm belief that the 
business men can and will measure up to the task.’”68  Just as industrial management 
drove American productivity, so did management education build a bulwark to defend 
American values.  And if that bulwark were breached, then how insidiously it could 
subvert America itself. 
So for Sloan to lose sleep over communism in the SIM isn’t surprising.  What’s 
striking is that he thought MIT less vulnerable because it was a “scientific institution.”  
At other universities scientists were suspected of disloyalty, “ideological espionage,” and 
inbuilt tendencies toward Marxian political philosophies.  Perhaps Sloan reassured 
himself that MIT was an institute primarily of engineering, not science, and particularly 
not of theoretical science.  As David Kaiser has noted, the early 1950s was a period when 
a “scientific mind” led to leftist thinking, and a federal judge could call “‘the younger 
generation of pure scientists … a fertile field for Communist propaganda.’”  Engineers, 
chemists, and other practical men were less susceptible because they were more down-to-
earth (and out of shape).69 
As Sloan knew, Compton (a physicist) shared his apprehensions about the threat of 
communism to the country, perhaps even to universities.  But his reply on January 16 – 
no doubt written after consulting with Killian, who’d written a presidential policy state-
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ment on the subject70 – neatly split the ends from the means.  However justified the 
concern might be, controlling or influencing by “this very direct method” would raise 
hackles in the university.  “I would anticipate a feeling of suspicion and perhaps of 
resentment,” not because faculty believed in socialism but because they believed in uni-
versity independence.  “An educational institution should be just as careful to maintain its 
freedom from domination by private financial interests as from government or any other 
group.”  Moreover, the clause could be just as damaging for the Foundation if it were 
misinterpreted.  “I fear that an unfriendly critic could read too many kinds of things into a 
contract between the Foundation and MIT which gave the Foundation a contractual right 
to influence educational policy.”71 
Compton proposed two alternatives.  In the first, Sloan would write a letter separate 
from the contract to “set forth your hopes and your concerns with reference to the new 
School.”  (Sloan had called it his school.  Compton never did.)  Kept on file with the 
contract, it would express the wishes of the donor without binding MIT to do more than 
“make every reasonable attempt” to follow them.  Even this approach, however, “might 
be subject to some misunderstanding and criticism.”72 
Compton preferred the second approach: an Advisory Committee.  MIT would 
establish a “fairly large” Committee, which would always include at least two members 																																																								
70 “The Institute is unequivocally opposed to Communism; it is also sternly opposed to the 
Communistic method of dictating to scholars the opinions they must have and the doctrines they 
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from the Sloan Foundation board of trustees.  The Committee would then be asked “for 
comment and advice on all major decisions which may affect the policies and procedures 
of the School,” including selection of the dean and tenured faculty, “a general outline of 
curriculum,” and any special projects.  In Compton’s view, this alternative “would be 
more natural and more generally acceptable, since it would simply mean that the Institute 
was calling on the Foundation, among others, to give it expert advice in the field” of 
industrial management.73 
Sloan conceded quickly.  Replying to Compton the following day, he selected 
Proposal 1.  He insisted that he’d originally dismissed the matter, and had only suggested 
this direct and formal approach because of his business background.  “Being schooled in 
business … my approach naturally is to take what position seemed desirable as an 
objective and then get the objective.”  Not unlike three months before, Sloan sounded 
impatient with the roundabout methods of academia.  Universities “perhaps can not work 
directly as business can, especially in the present state of the arts, I might add.”74 
In light of this impatience, it’s puzzling that – for reasons unrecorded – Sloan and 
MIT ended up going forward with Proposal 2 instead.  By May 8, during the final rounds 
of contract revision, Sloan was referring back to the January letters and the Advisory 
Committee’s Sloan Foundation representation, which he’d bumped from two people to 
twenty percent.75  Two days later Killian responded with a formal letter he’d reviewed 
with Compton.  In this formulation, the newly named Advisory Council would have no 
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more than 25 members, four of whom the Sloan Foundation would nominate from its 
trustees or elsewhere.  “The purpose of the Advisory Council will be as its name suggests, 
to advise the Institute and the Dean of the School of Industrial Management in regard to 
major policies and plans for the school … including the selection of senior faculty 
appointments.”  Although the Institute would be “most anxious to secure the advice and 
counsel of the Advisory Council on these matters,” the Executive Committee of the 
Corporation would retain final decision rights.  Sloan agreed on May 17 that this 
arrangement was “entirely satisfactory to me in all particulars.”76  
Today these interchanges may look like pettifogging squabbling.  But the Advisory 
Council would prove unexpectedly significant during the first years of the SIM: not in 
whom it hired but in what they studied.  On the surface, an Advisory Council was at 
worst harmless, at best exactly the sort of industry connection that Compton, Killian, and 
Sloan had been discussing since the beginning.  As the final Deed of Gift and Agreement 
would state, “The Institute agrees to promote the closest possible collaboration between 
the School and industry, bring the intangibles of business judgment and experience to 
bear upon the School’s teaching and research programs, and promote intellectual cross-
fertilization between men active in business and the School’s research and teaching 
personnel.  To achieve these ends the Institute agrees to invite leading business execu-
tives and managerial experts to form a Management Advisory Council for the School.” 77  
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By 1952, however, those executives and experts wouldn’t be satisfied acting as advisors.  
What they’d really want to do was direct. 
Economic Statesmanship: Launching the MIT SIM 
Sloan signed the Deed of Gift on 19 May 1951, nearly a year to the day since he’d 
first written to Killian about his confidential plan.  The goal was the same: to create an 
MIT School that would be “a great center of research and education in the field of 
industrial management.”  It would “embrace an extensive program of scientific research 
into the problems connected with the management of industrial enterprises.”  Its faculty 
would meanwhile – assisted by both their research and industry collaboration – educate 
men “for the management and further refinement of the great productive machine in 
competitive enterprise which is an essential part of our American society.”  Scientific 
research at a scientific institution to teach scientific management of industry: that was 
what the nation needed, and what the Institute was uniquely qualified to deliver.78 
Sloan had made a similar if more sweeping exhortation two weeks before.  At the 
MIT Development Fund’s Victory Dinner, he’d called for MIT’s leadership in “the sci-
ence of industrial management,” just as he’d demanded leadership from industrial mana-
gers themselves. 
The structure of our economy is becoming more and more complex, through 
evolution.  It is the sequel of the industrial age.  …  Out of these facts and 
circumstances has evolved a new concept of the responsibilities of management 
in a free society.  Management recognizes that it can no longer limit the horizon 
of responsibility to the mere production and distribution of goods and services – 
no matter how efficiently that may be done.  It must broaden its scope of 
leadership.  It must assume the role of economic statesmanship.  …  All this must 
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be done without fear or favor in recognition of management’s great responsibility 
for the protection and perpetuation of a free society.79 
Professional manager and economic statesman: Sloan and MIT expected that dual 
role for all the nation’s industrial executives, and especially for the graduates of the 
School of Industrial Management.  It was a standard of management for which science – 
the “scientific appraisal of facts,” “scientifically acquired knowledge,” the “scientific 
approach to management” – was fundamental.  In Sloan’s words, “industrial management 
has passed through a long process of development as our industrial age has evolved.  
Today it has become in every sense of the word, a matter of science.”80 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“We are now pioneers in a new field” 
Once the dust of the deed-signing had cleared, all eyes turned to Brooks.  Sloan 
largely receded during the summer of 1951, other than providing the requisite four Sloan 
Foundation nominees to the Advisory Committee.  As he’d said to Erwin Schell in 
November, “‘I don’t want to get into any operating relationship whatsoever with the 
project.  I am too old for this sort of thing.’”1  He did agree to have his portrait painted, 
but only reluctantly, as “I do not go in much for publicity, believing that accomplishment 
is the thing.”2  Nonetheless he ultimately stood for a portrait by Belgian-born artist Alfred 
Jonniaux, who after prolonged squabbling about the size, frame, and location would 
eventually deliver the painting in December 1952, in the final days of the SIM’s first 
semester.3 
Brooks, meanwhile, spent his first months as an MIT employee receiving advice.  
His bosses, for instance, weighed in during August and September 1951 on matters both 
structural and curricular.  Killian, the MIT president and fellow Course XV man, jumped 
in first with a laundry list of immediate actions and long-term “procedures and plans” 
leading to the SIM opening in the fall of 1952.  He proposed that Brooks move quickly to 
find an associate dean, appoint the Advisory Council, and visit peer schools, not to 
mention publicly announce a status for Schell that would “permit him to complete his 
career here with dignity … having been the principal architect of Course XV.”  He also 																																																								
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asked Brooks to consider whether to award PhDs, create non-degree executive education 
programs, and devise “cooperative mechanisms” to work with the Economics 
Department, who are “most anxious to help.”  Killian hastily underscored that these were 
merely suggestions, for he was “anxious that you have the widest possible latitude in 
formulating your own plans.”4 
Latitude notwithstanding, President Killian, Chairman Compton, and Provost 
Stratton were anxious too to wrestle with basic strategy: choosing what the SIM would do 
and what it wouldn’t.  As Killian noted, it was time to shift out of the “general terms” in 
the speeches and press releases and into “more detailed examination” of “the basic con-
cept of the school and the delimiting of its boundaries.”5  Stratton would take the point 
even further in his own letter a month later.  Just three days after Compton emphasized 
“increasing the effectiveness of education for industrial management,” Stratton reminded 
Brooks that “we are now pioneers in a new field.”6 
The task of this Committee is to create a plan for professional education in the 
field of industrial management.  I believe that there is a new concept here that 
must evolve in the course of our discussions, a concept that all of us have grasped 
intuitively but that we have as yet failed to express with clarity in terms that 
everyone can understand.  …  Now almost everyone has a fairly concrete idea of 
what we mean by science or by engineering; very few people have a clear 
understanding of what we mean by industrial management.7 
Killian and Stratton saw the ambiguity’s implications differently, though not 
oppositely.  Believing that “one of the principal problems is going to be to keep the 
school sharply focused,” Killian wanted “a careful set of specifications” so as not to 																																																								
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amass faculty or material that should have been outside the field.8  Stratton seemed more 
interested in listing what was inside: production organization, labor relations, technology 
development, increased efficiency linked to company type and size, and similar problems 
constituting “a field of professional activity quite as concrete and tangible as engineering.”  
Industrial management needed to be defined and refined not just as an occupation or 
academic discipline but as a profession, one best served by professional education.  Just 
as MIT’s engineering education gave a student engineering vocabulary, orientation to the 
world, and analytical techniques for complex problems, so must the SIM prepare its 
students not just with specific tools but with the full-spectrum education expected in a 
profession.  In the words of Stratton (himself an electrical engineer), “I should be sorry to 
see the idea get abroad that the sole function of our new School of Industrial 
Management is the production of a supply of managers.”9 
Despite differences of emphasis, Killian, Compton, and Stratton agreed on three 
principles, principles that would echo throughout the SIM discussions of 1951–52 and 
beyond.  First, the relationship with industry would be critical.  Industry could provide 
visit sites, internships, and even guest professors, all potential “departures from or addi-
tion[s] to the conventional types of education in this field.”10  Second, the school should 
take advantage of MIT’s prestige and faculty in engineering and science.  Although inter-
departmental projects and teaching always produced coordination costs, Killian identified 
faculty who’d already expressed interest in joint activities in operations analysis, automa-
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tic control, and mechanical engineering.11  And third, the school needed more faculty – 
but only the right ones.  Killian suggested that “finding the right people is more important 
than moving with speed,” just as Stratton hastened “to warn against precipitous action 
wherever it can be avoided.”  Developing the SIM in the public mind and as a 
continuation of MIT commitment to science and technology could be achieved in “only 
one possible way and that is the development of a faculty of outstanding intellectual 
stature.”  In MIT leaders’ eyes, “what a man teaches is in no way as important as what he 
is.”12 
Their views on faculty were shared by the faculty themselves.  Douglass Brown, the 
Sloan Professor of Industrial Management, considered the department “badly under-
staffed,” with particular gaps in finance, law, and production.  But these gaps could only 
be filled by the best.  For the first two he wanted people who would teach at the broad 
conceptual level: explaining interest rate movements rather than corporate finance, for 
instance, and governmental process in law rather than how to write a contract.  The third 
area looked trickier, since “production … seems to mean different things to different 
people.”  Again preferring focus on the forest rather than the trees, Brown hoped they 
could find a senior man with industry experience.  That alone posed a challenge.  They’d 
have to make sure he wasn’t the “practical man” who felt he had to “out-philosophize the 
philosophers,” nor the one “who believes that each problem is unique and no 
generalizations are possible.  This is a tough problem, but it may not be insuperable.  (I 																																																								
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pass over the equally tough problem of getting a good man to sacrifice a lucrative 
industrial position.)”13 
Seeking Counsel: The SIM School Committee 
Awash in advice, Brooks in late September 1951 formed a School Committee.  He 
chose Stratton, Schell, and Brown, as well as economists Ralph E. Freeman and W. Ru-
pert Maclaurin.  Freeman was the Economics Department chairman and had already gone 
out of his way to offer his support for the infant School.  (In the words of economist 
Morris Adelman, “a more sweet-tempered man you couldn’t hope to meet.”)  Maclaurin 
too was ideal for the School Committee: not only had he earned an MBA from the com-
petition (HBS), but he’d also taught at MIT since 1936 and served as the Industrial Rela-
tions section’s first director.14  Around this time Brooks also convinced Ronald H. Rob-
nett to serve as the SIM’s first associate dean.  “Doc” Robnett was a professor of ac-
counting admired throughout the Institute, who’d proved willing to help despite heart 
trouble that would ultimately end his life three years later at the age of 49.15 
Like Killian, Compton, and Stratton before them, most of these men now wrote their 
own thoughts on the direction and emphases of the school.  Robnett addressed the SIM’s 
graduate education “with particular reference to its natural competitive advantages with 
the Harvard Business School.”  Robnett identified five, such as the master’s thesis, the 																																																								
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Sloan Fellowship program, and “the intimacy of relationship between staff and stu-
dents” – all functions not just of MIT’s culture but of HBS’s decision to pack in large, 
often young classes “because of the economics of the situation.”  Moreover, like his pre-
decessors, Robnett stressed integration with science and engineering and with Economics.  
For the former he recommended that the SIM, like Course XV before it, admit only those 
who’d majored in engineering or science, thus helping to cement a special and distinctive 
reputation.  As for Economics, Robnett affirmed Burchard’s view that “often Schools of 
Business are at swords point with their colleagues in Economics,” whereas the SIM 
School Committee alone was half-full of economists.  HBS might have narrowed its task 
to teaching only graduate students, but in Robnett’s opinion it had narrowed its pedagogy 
as well. 
Maclaurin, Freeman, and Brown answered at greater length but shared Robnett’s 
view: the SIM graduates, and therefore the SIM curriculum, needed the social and phy-
sical sciences.  Maclaurin for instance insisted that Economics and other social sciences 
should play “a vital role” in the SIM.16  Freeman, thinking not just of differentiators but 
of overall objectives, expected SIM men to study “the social role of business” to under-
stand that “profits are not ends in themselves but are means of measuring the contribution 
of the businessman to the wellbeing of the community.”  Therefore the SIM should 
“stress the human aspects of management as approached through the Social Sciences” – 
history, political science, psychology, and economics – “to see the industrial enterprise as 
a part of the industry to which it belongs and as a part of the economy of the nation and 																																																								
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Management at MIT,” 2 October 1951, AC336:1:15, 1. 
76 
the world.”17  Brown considered the social sciences critical both to students and to 
research, and paused wryly for a “special word about economics.” 
As an economist, I know how little we know.  But we do know … many of the 
forces which are among the most important parameters of the activities of any 
organization.  At the very least, any school of management should know – and 
impart to its students – how to find something out about economic movements.  I 
am appalled at the reliance put upon the profundities of the daily financial 
columnist or upon a telephone call to a buddy in Oshkosh.  (For the time being, 
however, we might be wise to impart to our students that everybody else will rely 
upon such sources.)18 
The School Committee similarly agreed with Robnett on the importance of science 
and engineering.  And like Robnett, they spoke not of teaching a science but of integra-
ting with those who did.  Maclaurin, who kept his thirteen “preliminary thoughts” fairly 
general, imagined science and engineering resources “integrally interwoven into the 
curriculum.”19  Easier said than done, thought Freeman.  Students would first receive 
“basic training” in math, science, and engineering and then apply that training to study 
management, yet “how such integration can best be effected is one of the School’s most 
challenging problems.”20  Freeman was firmly convinced of “the dominant role of 
science and engineering in our industrial life.  The manager … must be able to think in 
mathematical terms, to talk the language of the engineer, and to see the elements involved 
in engineering problems.”  But rather than assert that industrial management was itself a 
science, Freeman regarded it as relying on science and scientific habits of thinking.  The 
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SIM’s “most distinctive contribution” would be “to establish its program upon a scienti-
fic-engineering base … justified also by the educational value of scientific and engi-
neering studies.”  Freeman would have concurred with Sloan’s notion of executive deci-
sions “supported by a scientific appraisal of all related facts and circumstances”; he him-
self spoke of “habits of careful observation and objective analysis that are indispensable 
in reaching sound management decisions.”  Scientific though those habits might be, Free-
man stopped short of calling them scientific management.21 
Between these letters’ lines sounded three calls for focus: focus on selection in 
activities, principles in the classroom, and experiences in industry.  Maclaurin did offer 
ambitious – and detail-free – thoughts about making “a unique contribution to the 
advancement of knowledge” and “raising the standard and content of living throughout 
the world.”  But even he stressed that the school should offer “a wide variety of fields … 
but no attempt at total coverage.” 22   Brown agreed: “‘Coverage’ of the field of 
management seems less essential than training in ways of isolating and identifying 
problems.”  They recommended curbing not just the scale of the SIM’s activities but also 
its scope – in Freeman’s words, to “limit its effort to those educational functions which it 
is especially fitted to perform.”23  Brown even hesitated to add more graduate students.  
In the spring of 1951 the Course XV department had tentatively concluded that the school 
should offer three master’s programs: Sloan Fellows of roughly ten years of experience, a 
“sponsored program for employed engineering or science graduates” with three to five 
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years of experience, and an immediately post-undergraduate program.  Now, six months 
later, Brown was arguing against both the second and third groups, as “I do not feel we 
have much to offer the inexperienced graduate student.”24 
 Brown went even further: he wanted to de-emphasize teaching.  Asserting that the 
SIM should develop insight into “successful management” in an organization, he 
maintained that the most important insights would span multiple organizational functions, 
an approach rarely taken thus far in the nascent field of industrial management.  Brown 
then derived two conclusions.  First, the faculty should “get on with our learning job” by 
focusing primarily on research, keeping “the teaching and other public relations activities 
in the near future limited to those which are necessary.”  This would free up the few 
faculty for researching “matters that cut across conventional lines,” such as negotiation, 
“ways of discovering people’s attitudes,” and “operations research – which, as I 
understand it, is simply a means of identifying problems.”  (Brooks, who probably knew 
more than Brown about OR, wrote a question mark in the margin.)  Brown even 
suggested a study on gambling, though “for public relations reasons this might have to be 
described as ‘Advanced Aleatory Analysis.’”25 
Brown may have been a lone voice in this first conclusion, but the second appeared 
in all the advice memos: emphasize principles over techniques.26  It was a conclusion 
entirely in keeping with Freeman’s insistence on scientific habits and thinking, and his 
recognition that since “the specific techniques of management can be learned more 																																																								
24 Ronald H. Robnett to EPB, memorandum, 14 November 1951, AC336:1:15; “Thoughts on the 
SIM,” 4. 
25 “Thoughts on the SIM,” 1–3. 
26 “Thoughts on the SIM,” 1, 4. 
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effectively on the job than in the classroom,” studying them should be mostly postponed 
to “later years.”  Here too MIT could distinguish itself from other business schools, as 
“many of them devote too much time to detailed business procedures … in accounting, 
marketing, etc.”27  As Maclaurin noted, “the educational philosophy … of learning by 
doing” – the MIT mens et manus motto – still required them to focus on principles.  
Theory had to inform practice, and real practice would happen on the job.28 
That emphasis still left a role for industry, something easier to prize than realize.  
Maclaurin proposed a lofty goal: to make the school a place “which far-sighted industrial 
leaders will come to recognize as an ideal training ground for young men equipped to 
succeed them – a place, therefore, where they would like their sons to go.”  Freeman 
stayed closer to earth.  Like Killian, Freeman considered industry a source of student 
visits and internships but also of faculty relevance: using business leaders as instructors 
and businesses as sites where younger faculty could “study industrial operations through 
actual participation,” lest their knowledge grow out of date.29  Brown, meanwhile, 
cautioned that industry provided material more often for “observation or experimentation” 
than for experience.  Because a student lacked the “motivation and responsibility” of an 
actual employee, he could only appreciate the active executive’s role vicariously.  
Moreover, warned Brown, the executive probably had less than the professor to offer.  
“The apprentice cannot learn from the master more than the master knows.  If our school 
																																																								
27 “SIM Objectives and Program,” 1; “Memorandum on the SIM,” 2. 
28 “Preliminary Thoughts on a SIM at MIT,” 1. 
29  “Preliminary Thoughts on a SIM at MIT,” 2; “SIM Objectives and Program,” 4; 
“Memorandum on the SIM,” 3. 
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is to amount to anything it must know more than the master knows.”30 
It would also have to decide what it was.  Looking over his advisors’ thoughts, 
Brooks would have seen a full plate of questions.  What was industrial management – as 
a field, a profession, perhaps even a science?  How ought the SIM to work with industry, 
and what would laboratory teaching in industrial management look like?  What would be 
its connection to engineering and science faculty and curricula?  What about integration 
with the social sciences, particularly economics?  Whom should the SIM teach, and what 
degrees should it offer?  How could it stay focused on research and on principles over 
techniques – particularly when peer schools had often gone in the opposite direction?  In 
a November 19 speech, probably to the MIT Corporation, Brooks added several more, 
ranging from admissions requirements to summer courses to larger-scale research.  As he 
pointed out, he and the faculty were still trying to “determine what we want our graduates 
to be, the role they will play in their industrial life, and how we can shape our curriculum 
to prepare them for their position.”31  Five months had passed since the signing of the 
deed, and the stack of issues was growing every day. 
To Brown the mountain seemed almost too high to climb.  On November 26, rough-
ly two months after his last memo, Brown followed up with a handwritten letter.  After 
Freeman had come to chat with him, Brown had decided “that somebody should play the 
Cassandra or wet-blanket role, and that that somebody should probably be me.”  It was a 
matter of manpower.  Four full-time faculty had exited, only two part-timers had entered, 
																																																								
30 “Thoughts on the SIM,” 5–6. 
31 EPB, speech, “A School of Industrial Management,” 19 November 1951, AC336:1:5, 1–2. 
81 
and other younger faculty were likely to leave for financial reasons.  Therefore Brown 
“bluntly” cautioned against “any grandiose ideas or new developments” in the short term. 
We need a year or two of feverish recruitment of manpower at all levels simply 
to stay on the treadmill.  Until and unless the underpinning is shored up, I would 
venture the prediction that ambitious new developments will fall flat on their face.  
The moral – to me – is that we should be extremely cautious in our thinking 
about immediate new developments and, above all, in any announcements we 
might make about such ideas. 
Brown recommended adding six more faculty in addition to the major appointments in fi-
nance and production, and limiting graduate students to the Sloan Fellows and perhaps a 
few more “who are clearly first-rate.”  Until then, Brooks and the SIM should “soft-pedal 
any but the most non-committal generalities in any announcement of what we are going 
to do.”32 
Sears had trained Brooks well.  Generalities were his forte.  One week after Brown’s 
letter, Brooks gave a speech (audience unknown) that suggested the Cassandra had been 
heeded after all.  He spoke at length about the SIM’s “concept” of industrial management, 
but largely in terms of attitudes, precepts, and management of intangibles “to meet the 
intricacies and complexities of the modern age.”  After some capitalism-and-apple-pie 
affirmation of “the good that American industry does” and “economic society built on the 
profit concept,” Brooks did make a few commitments.  There would be a four-year 
undergraduate program that was two-thirds science and engineering – in other words, the 
same as before.  There would be a graduate program that emphasized fundamentals rather 
than techniques.  There would be research to advance the field of management.  There 																																																								
32 Douglass V. Brown to EPB, 26 November 1951, AC336:1:15.  At the time the dozen or so 
Sloan Fellows represented roughly two-fifths of the Course XV graduate student body.  Gerald B. 
Tallman to EPB, 8 October 1951, AC4:201:4. 
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would be collaboration with industry for learning through doing.  And lastly, “the new 
School of Industrial Management will be set up to serve our time.”  Brown must have 
been relieved.33 
Brooks was keeping his announcements general but his actions specific.  He set up 
two task forces, one on social sciences and the other on science and technology, to chan-
nel general notions of integration into specialized courses and collaborative research.  He 
wrote to colleges and universities advertising the SIM and its graduate program for “men 
who have backgrounds or interests in science and engineering and who show promise of 
executive ability.”34  He even took a trip to New York to meet with the former deans of 
Wharton and Columbia.  Neither was encouraging about the state of management educa-
tion.  Joseph H. Willits of Wharton thought the field merited a Flexner-style study but 
“saw no one competent to do the kind of job needed.”  Robert De Blois Calkins, whose 
experience inaugurating Columbia’s MBA degree had lowered his opinion of both stu-
dents and faculties, said that “something is needed which does not exist.  …  He along 
with many others was watching [MIT’s] program with intense interest.”  As Brooks 
reflected to his friend A. T. Kearney, the SIM team faced a “lack of bench marks to guide 
us.  …  Can’t we build on the shoulders of those who have gone before[?]”35 
Radical Rationality: Carnegie GSIA and the MIT SIM 
Brooks knew how weak those shoulders really were.  As has been discussed, most 
business schools had low aspirations and lower standards.  The American Association of 
																																																								
33 EPB, speech, 3 December 1951, AC336:1:5. 
34 EPB, January 1952, AC4:202:8. 
35 EPB to A. T. Kearney, 2 January 1952, AC336:1:9, 2.   
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Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) had given up its professionalization campaign 
after World War II began.  Even after the war, when corporations were accepting 
business schools’ legitimacy, the schools didn’t know “‘what to do with their victory.’”36  
A few leading schools – Harvard, Stanford, Dartmouth, Cornell, and soon Columbia – 
sought to establish selectivity, exclusivity, and scientific rigor in management education 
by confining themselves to graduate education.37  Among the leaders only Wharton was 
maintaining an undergraduate program, and now its ex-dean had told Brooks how little 
that implied. 
The one maverick in the mix, the Carnegie GSIA, presented three challenges as a 
model.  One, it didn’t accept undergraduates either.  Two, it was only a year older than 
the SIM.  And three, it was chock-full of economists.  As Rakesh Khurana has described, 
the GSIA had been founded (with Mellon money) by economists G. Leland Bach and 
future Nobel prizewinner Hebert Simon, as an antidote not only to most business schools’ 
mediocrity but also to the Harvard Business School – “an institution that the GSIA 
founders admired but of which they intended GSIA to be the antithesis.”38  They would 
lean heavily on economics, which Bach claimed was essential for the businessman as 
citizen, civic leader, and managerial decision maker.39   The GSIA was a radical, 
graduate-only rookie; little wonder that the MIT archives show no sign that Brooks ever 
visited. 																																																								
36 Peter Drucker, “The Graduate Business School,” Fortune 42 (August 1950), 92, as cited in 
Khurana, 196. 
37 Fourcade and Khurana, 7; D. M. Fouquet, “Business School’s Prestige Grows as David Enters 
10th Year as Dean,” Harvard Crimson, September 12, 1951. 
38 Khurana, 254. 
39 Fourcade and Khurana, 16. 
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It’s a pity, because the GSIA and SIM had much in common.  Like the SIM, the 
GSIA concentrated on “‘the growing need in American industry for potential executives 
trained in both engineering and management,’” and Bach had himself been deeply 
influenced by MIT’s engineering professionalization.40  Moreover, the GSIA and SIM 
had come to the same conclusion: because they were new, they could ignore traditional 
disciplinary boundaries.  They could be “decisively technical and methods-oriented” 
rather than practitioner- or case-dominated.  They could turn a shortage of dedicated 
faculty into an opportunity to recruit from throughout academe: “economists, sociologists, 
applied mathematicians, computer scientists,” and “institutional mavericks with a 
background in operations research.”  They could even develop curricula with similar core 
elements: organizational behavior, economic analysis, interrelationship with business and 
society, and most of all quantitative management science.41 
Thus the GSIA and SIM took a similar path for similar reasons, but in almost com-
plete isolation from one another.  The result at both schools was what Fourcade and 
Khurana have called the “scientization of the business disciplines.”  As later chapters will 
discuss, the GSIA would prove more overtly influential among business schools, thanks 
to its breakthroughs in economic theory and Bach’s ability to curry favor with the Ford 
Foundation.  But from their earliest days both schools marched in the vanguard of 
“increasingly successful claims of social scientists on business education and the growing 
appeal, in the 1950s, of ‘scientific’ approaches to decision-making and management.  …  																																																								
40 Carnegie GSIA, “Fact Sheet: Official Dedication” (1952), cited in Fourcade and Khurana, 15; 
Khurana, 252. 
41 Fourcade and Khurana, 5, 15–16; William F. Pounds, “Intended Consequences” (unpublished 
manuscript, 2006), paper copy. 
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Rationality was the new modus operandi.”42  At MIT, this rational, scientific bent was 
already having a profound effect on the SIM’s design. 
That design put its faith in the power of ideas – in the power of disciplined 
thought and analysis – and in the import which the generation and dissemination 
of ideas deduced from such disciplined analysis could have for the practice of 
management and, indeed, of our lives.  We did not seek to replicate worldly 
experience in the classrooms but to build on and prepare for more of it by trying 
to analyze it scientifically.  The strategy was clearly influenced by the then 
prevalent descriptor of MIT as a “university polarized around a core of 
science.”43 
Disciplined analysis was already a strength among the leading SIM faculty.  Worldly 
experience was not.  For that Brooks hoped to rely on a different set of advisors: the 
Advisory Council. 
Industry Influence: Creating the Advisory Council and the Research Fund 
The Council may have been Compton’s idea, but Sloan had adopted it thoroughly.  
As Killian wrote to Brooks in August 1951, “the early appointment of the Advisory 
Council would please and encourage Mr. Sloan.”44  It would take nearly six months to 
assemble, however, while Sloan and MIT decided on the number, term length, and 
character of members before inviting them.  They pondered for instance whether to 
include someone from organized labor, eventually agreeing that unless the person were 
“a statesman, there is the question if he could be regarded only as a partisan.”45   
Ultimately letters went out to “about twenty-five leading industrialists.”  Most were 
men Sloan and Brooks already knew well, chairmen and presidents at firms like 
Westinghouse Electric, United Aircraft, AT&T, Plymouth Cordage, Chicopee Mills, and 																																																								
42 Fourcade and Khurana, 5, 8. 
43 JRK, Education, 198–199, citing Abraham Siegel, dean of MIT Sloan from 1980 to 1987. 
44 JRK to EPB, 16 August 1951, 2. 
45 EPB, memorandum, “Interview with Mr. Sloan,” 2 October 1951, AC336:1:3, 1.  
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Sears, Roebuck, not to mention the Sloan Foundation and the Sloan-Kettering Institute.  
The invitation, written over Sloan’s signature, deliberately adopted the language of 
industry.  “Dr. Compton and his associates feel strongly, as I do, that the focal point in 
the efficiency of the School will center around its ability to bring the intangibles of 
industrial management into the educational processing of our future industrial leaders.”  
Therefore they asked these industry leaders to help “to implant an effective program of 
industrial management upon the present scientific activities of the Institute.  And on a 
level of comparable competence.”  Most accepted.46 
Sloan had already provided his Sloan Foundation nominees in July.  Three were the 
usual suspects.  Sloan had consulted during the 1950–1951 conception phase with GM 
director John L. Pratt and Standard Oil of New Jersey consultant Frank A. Howard, so he 
naturally put them on the list.  Also inevitable was Arnold Zurcher, still the Sloan 
Foundation’s executive director.  Zurcher appears throughout the MIT records as a Sloan 
catspaw, someone who could be counted on to speak in Sloan’s voice without his name. 
The fourth nominee, also a trusted counselor, would play a significant role in the 
SIM’s early years.  Waddill Catchings (1879–1967) was a respected former Goldman 
Sachs investment banker and director of multiple industrial firms.  He was also a pub-
lished but non-faculty economist in the underconsumptionist tradition, co-author of such 
popular books as Profits, Business without a Buyer, and The Road to Plenty.  According 
to his New York Times obituary, Catchings “stressed the close interrelationships of a 
dynamic industrial economy.”  Apparently he’d decided as a Harvard undergraduate that 
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professors spoke blithely of the long term even though most people were concerned with 
the short.  “So I made up my mind that as soon as I had enough money I would set about 
reconciling these two phases of business – theory and practice.”47 
“Industrial economy,” “theory and practice”: on the face of it Catchings was ideal 
for the Advisory Council, and indeed he would prove to be an active and engaged 
participant.48  But he was also part of Sloan’s efforts – conscious or not – to pack the 
Council with opponents to what Brooks’s friend had called the Brilliant Young 
Economists.  Catchings was just four years way from publishing his final book, Do 
Economists Understand Business?  (He thought no.)49  Zurcher meanwhile was lobbying 
to protect the SIM from dangerous economic thinking.  In September 1951 he urged 
Brooks to ensure that the School controlled what its students were taught, even by faculty 
from “some other department or school.  He particularly emphasized the matter of 
instruction in economics without naming anyone.  He said he thought there were sections 
of the industrial community which would not approve certain of the instructors in the 
department.”50  Sloan himself made no effort to hide his strong views on right and wrong 
economists.  Delighted that classical liberal economist John Jewkes of Oxford would visit 
the SIM for November 1952, he commended him as “a strong advocate of a competitive 																																																								
47 “Waddill Catchings, Economist and Investment Banker, Dead,” New York Times (January 1, 
1968), 15.  See also “Waddill Catchings,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Waddill_Catchings. 
48 See Chapter 6 below. 
49 Waddill Catchings, Do Economists Understand Business? (New York: self-published, 1955).  
See for example (p. 5): “The theories and conclusions of the [economists] go directly counter to 
the knowledge and experience of the businessmen who actually operate our economic machine.  
It is this sharp conflict between theory and practice which threatens to bring about a momentous 
change in the conduct of American business, and thus affect the economic welfare not only of the 
United States but the rest of the free world as well.” 
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88 
system of free enterprise – nothing in the nature of a regimented economy or that sort of 
thing that so many Professors of Economics and others in academic circles believe in, 
would get passed [sic] him.”  Were the SIM to hire him permanently, “I have great 
confidence that we would have a sentinel at all times on guard at the School against what 
I consider false economic theories.”51  Sloan might have backed away from screening 
faculty candidates for the SIM, but he still wanted to prevent undesirables from teaching 
or researching there. 
For research had never been far from Sloan’s mind.  From the start he’d contended 
that the field of industrial management demanded rigorous research, research that would 
be crucial to the school he founded.  So when he came up to Cambridge on October 10, 
1951, to discuss “research matters and the affairs of the School,” no one would have been 
surprised.  True, Brooks put research at the bottom of the agenda, but that probably 
reflected how little was happening rather than how little he cared.52 
Sloan had a way to kick action into high gear: a research fund.  He proposed to 
make a new, separate, million-dollar gift, exclusively for SIM research.  As elaborated in 
a Compton letter of December 28, the fund would initiate a “vigorous research program” 
that would also attract, retain, and keep up to date “the strongest possible faculty.”  Both 
interest and principal could fund research fellowships, projects, travel expenses, even 
dedicated staff resources.  Writing implicitly for the Sloan Foundation trustees who’d 
have to approve the gift, Compton stressed speed: the fund would ensure that “we move 
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ahead as rapidly as possible” and “get the school off to a flying start.”53  Sloan soon 
affirmed that the board had approved the grant and that he considered the fund “an 
essential component” of the school.  “I have felt from the very beginning … that the 
Research Fund was perhaps more significant in its potential contribution to the objectives 
we have in mind than the building in which the School is to be housed.”54 
But the greater the significance, the greater the control.  Sloan had already learned 
what happened when he tried to influence the choice of faculty.  Now he wanted to 
influence their choice of topics.  In January 1952 he suggested that “half a dozen” 
members of the Advisory Council be picked as a “study group or Executive Committee” 
of the Research Fund.  Moreover, he set strict limits on what would be within the dean’s 
discretion.  The Research Fund deed of 20 February stated that the dean could indepen-
dently authorize expenditures of no more than $10,000 per project and no more than 
$50,000 per year (approximately $451,000 in 2015 dollars).  “Major research projects, 
that is, those which require an appropriation in excess of $10,000 per project must be 
approved by the President of the Institute and the Chairman of the Advisory Council.”55  
Sensible financial controls, no doubt.  Yet Sloan was also guaranteeing a say in what the 
SIM would study.  He and Compton had affirmed that the Research Fund would “accele-
rate the service which the school can render to American industry … [by] tackling a 
number of problems the solution of which can be of value to industry.”  Sloan and the 
rest of the Executive Committee – including Catchings and Zurcher – would soon express 																																																								
53 KTC to APS, 28 December 1951, AC4:199:11, 1–3. 
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strong opinions on what constituted “value to industry.”56 
For now, however, the point was moot: the school didn’t have enough faculty to 
teach, much less to launch major research projects.  By May 1952 however the situation 
had improved considerably.  MIT had hired seven new junior faculty, and more 
importantly – addressing Stratton’s and Brown’s longing for “a big name in finance” – 
had recruited Eli Shapiro from the University of Chicago.  Shapiro would go on to be the 
principal intellectual architect of the school, a distinguished, bowtie-clad academic who 
would succeed Robnett as associate dean and recruit many of the school’s foremost 
faculty.  He also adopted early the SIM leaders’ principle (not prevalent at the University 
of Chicago) of interdisciplinary research.  “It was my view that management education 
was a synthetic product.  …  You build a faculty by taking people from various disci-
plines who have an interest in applying those disciplines to solve management problems.  
MIT was science and engineering, so that’s where we turned.”57 
Interdisciplinary interests were all very well, but in a still-embryonic field they only 
made the focus problem worse.  Killian in August 1951 had questioned “the basic 
concept of the school and the delimiting of its boundaries.”  Four months later, when 
Compton solicited research ideas from the faculty, his nineteen-point “partial list” 
implied that the boundaries were no closer together.  The topics ranged widely across 
disciplines and functions, from the narrow to the general, from the immediately 
applicable to the speculative and even philosophical. 
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Incentives: Especially non-financial incentives applicable to company execu-
tives.  … 
Finance: Recent shifts in methods of financing business with a consideration of 
where these trends are leading, and what business should do about it. 
Productivity: What the concept means and its relation to prices, wage 
determination, etc. 
Operations Research: Since this involves application of the theory of probability, 
statisticians in the Economics Department would be interested, and 
mathematicians at the Institute could make an important contribution. … 
Can We Identify Communication Patterns: Which make for “good” or “bad” 
organization and why are these patterns important. … 
Production and Administration: Management control structures and their opera-
tion.  Techniques and objectives of directorships.  Inter-racial relationships as a 
management problem.  Principles and their application in organization work.58 
This was brainstorming: individual faculty suggesting topics they personally found 
appealing.  Dean Brooks, however, felt in April 1952 that it took more than “a man 
profoundly interested in pushing forward the boundaries of knowledge” to warrant 
funding.  Again focus mattered.  “There should be, it seems to me, two or three major 
areas of research along with such other projects as appear to be worthy of support.  
Unless such selection is determined upon I feel our shots will become scattered and our 
efforts will not be commensurate with the million dollar fund nor with the School of 
Industrial Management.”  And since that selection wasn’t coming from the faculty, “I 
have the conviction that we of the management of the School must give broad direction 
to the program.”  By “management” he didn’t mean the School Committee faculty or the 
MIT leadership.  He meant “my ‘inner circle’” on the Advisory Council, men like Has-
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lam, Kearney, and the ineluctable Zurcher.59  
Brooks was searching for balance.  He’d had ten months of advice: on the scope of 
the school and the field; on the primacy of principles over techniques; on the sorry state 
of management education and the revitalizing role of engineering and sciences, including 
the social sciences.  He’d even been advised time and again about the importance of 
involving industry in the School of Industrial Management.  But virtually none of the 
advice had come from industry.  Apart from Sloan and Brooks’s own pals, all the 
advisors had been current and former academics.  Now, by reaching out to the Council of 
industrialists and executives, Brooks could redress the inequity. 
When you suddenly drop a weight on one side of the scales, you have to expect it to 
seesaw violently.  So far Brooks had found his advisors largely unanimous – precisely 
because the men had been so homogeneous and the issues so intangible.  Sloan, 
Catchings, and others hadn’t yet tried to push the School’s research in their own 
directions, though that day soon would come.  For now, so long as no one talked too 
loudly about economists, harmony had reigned.  It wouldn’t last. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
“We have got to inject business into the School” 
By summer 1952 the SIM building was humming with activity.  The faculty ranks 
were increasing, reaching 25 by start of term.  Students were enrolling: not only 238 
undergraduates, but also 28 master’s and 18 Sloan Fellowship students.1  MIT leaders 
were particularly proud of the Sloan Fellows program (the new shorthand term), which 
Killian considered “one of the major contributions of education to management training.”  
Mr. Sloan thought so too – so much so that he wanted to double it.  Rather than let a 
single group of these mid-career executives grow too large, he suggested MIT “create a 
second group handled as a second unit,” perhaps matriculating in January rather than 
June.2  Planning proceeded apace, and by summer’s end Sloan was committing to 
increasing his funding.  The SIM was on its way to Sloan’s and Killian’s vision of the 
“impact and … quality that would put our graduate program in a very strong position” by 
achieving an unprecedented annual enrollment of 34.3 
The School of Industrial Management was thus progressing towards its eponymous 
aim: education and research in the management of industrial enterprises.  But though the 
SIM might now have the men, it wasn’t sure what they should do.  Even if research focus 
were put aside, the problem of boundaries continued: what fell inside or outside industrial 
management, and which disciplines, courses, and knowledge belonged in the SIM 																																																								
1 Minutes of the SIM Advisory Committee (convened 27 April 1953), n.d., AC4:202:6. 
2 JRK to EPB, 14 July 1952, AC4:201:4. 
3 See Ronald H. Robnett to Gerald B. Tallman, memorandum, 21 July 1952, AC336:1:9; Arnold 
Zurcher to EPB, 15 July 1952, AC4:201:4.  The doubled class, in two simultaneous but separate 
cohorts, began in Fall 1953.  Six decades later, the MIT Sloan Fellows Class of 2013 would 
matriculate 120.  
94 
curricula. Even a field like marketing, which today represents roughly five percent of the 
MIT Sloan faculty, didn’t indisputably belong.  Brooks found he had to set up a task 
force of faculty and executives just to determine what role “marketing and distribution” 
would play in the School’s research and education – and to confirm that it had one at all.4 
In part such issues reflected the “lack of bench marks” Brooks had rued in January.  
But they also sprang from the specific intentions of the MIT SIM.  It was all very well to 
assert, as Brooks would do in September, that the School would “confine itself to the 
field of industry as distinguished from service organizations, trades, or professions.”5  
But when American industrial organizations and functions were multiplying so rapidly 
this was hardly a limiting constraint.  Business Week was even predicting “‘the day of the 
truly professional general management man … trained for management in general, rather 
than in any one phase of business.’”  If that were the case – as the SIM leaders believed – 
then the training would have to de-emphasize phase- and firm-specific knowledge in 
favor of “the structure and process of management decision-making.”6  Sloan himself 
believed that the professional manager “manages through the force of facts and not 
through the force of personality.  ‘Bedside manners … is no substitute for the right 
diagnosis.’”7  Thus for the men the SIM taught, technical courses on production wouldn’t 
suffice.  “The most important content in the curriculum has to do with human beings.”8  
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Social Sciences in the SIM: The Morison Report and the Worthy Memo 
So declared the Committee to Consider the Place of the Social Sciences in the 
School of Industrial Management.  Convened by Penn Brooks in December 1951 and led 
by Elting Morison, historian of technology and editor of The Letters of Theodore Roose-
velt, the Committee had spent six months deliberating on a role for history, economics, 
and other social sciences in the SIM.  The School had already staked its claim to a special 
managerial education based on “the close inter-relationship of science, engineering and 
administration.”9   Now Morison and the four others on the Committee, including 
neoclassical economist Paul Samuelson, were insisting on “an essential place” for the 
social sciences too.  The so-called Morison Report, delivered to Brooks on June 16, 1952, 
argued that “the professional courses – especially those dealing with administration, 
production and distribution – should make full use of the findings and interpretations of 
social science.”  Moreover, social sciences should loom large in the core curriculum, in 
such courses as Interpersonal Relations, Economics and Public Policy, and Psychology of 
Groups and Organizations.  The influence should be vital even when not in the title.  
According to “very definite … testimony of our witnesses … [a] feeling for perspective, 
which is the sense of history, should work throughout the curriculum.”10 
Much the same conclusion appears in the Worthy Memo, a document Brooks 
received the following day.  The timing seems to have been coincidental.  Brooks had 
sent an external report on management education (now lost) to his old boss at Sears.  
General Wood had passed it along for comments to James C. Worthy, a rising leader in 																																																								
9 Press release, 21 December 1950, AC4.199.10, 6; Morison Report, 1. 
10 Morison Report, 3, 11–12. 
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the Personnel department.  Worthy would later go on to a distinguished career in industry, 
public service, and management education, ranging from Vice President at Sears, to 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, to professor at Northwestern’s Kellogg Graduate 
School of Management.11   
Worthy paralleled the Morison Report in asserting that history provided the future 
businessman with important perspective.  Where they differed was on the consequences.  
The Report called ignorance of history “innocent.”12  Worthy considered it “dangerous.” 
One aspect of the too-frequent tendency of the schools of business to emphasize 
the static rather than the dynamic aspects of business and society is their failure 
to appreciate the importance of history.  … The failure of businessmen to appre-
ciate – indeed, to even be aware of – the history of their own institution is poten-
tially dangerous because no leadership group can survive for long without the 
sure touch and sense of direction that comes from awareness and knowledge of 
its own history.  … The businessman needs a more acute sense of where business 
is going and he cannot have that in proper degree without knowing where it has 
been.13 
Worthy probably didn’t feel more strongly about history than Morison, but he did 
take the implications further.  Rather than focus on specific disciplines in a single school, 
the Worthy Memo adopted a wider brief: a critique of American business education.  As 
Worthy pointed out, education for “the future leaders of business” was “a subject of 
special significance to Sears,” since colleges alone had not been “sufficient to meet the 
almost insatiable demand for promotable people.”  Unfortunately, the reasons why Sears 
relied on business schools – closer matches with candidates’ intentions, better-organized 																																																								
11 Northwestern University Library, “Guide to the James C. Worthy (1910–1998) Papers,” 
http://findingaids.library.northwestern.edu/catalog/inu-ead-nua-archon-1063.  For the role of 
Wood rather than Brooks in sponsoring the Memo, see EPB to Robert E. Wood, 1 July 1952, 
AC336:1:12. 
12 Morison Report, 11. 
13 James C. Worthy to Robert E. Wood, 17 July 1952, AC4:202:5, 6–7.  Hereafter referred to as 
the Worthy Memo. 
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placement offices – had nothing to do with what the students were learning.  “In fact, we 
have some definite reservations on that score.  There are exceptions, of course, but it has 
been our experience that by and large what people learn in business school is of little 
value to them in business – often quite the contrary.”  Morison and his colleagues wanted 
business education to be better at MIT.  Worthy and Sears needed it to be better 
everywhere.14 
The documents differed in emphasis, not direction.  Both insisted on a general rather 
than specialist education, preparing “the modern administrator” for “an environment de-
termined by economic, political and human influences, and by the influence of the 
past.”15  Business schools too often developed “many ‘experts’ but few ‘statesmen,’ … 
“staff and technical people but not top people.”  Worthy identified a destructive rein-
forcing loop: as organizations had grown more systematized, they had demanded more 
people with specialized and compartmentalized training, which business schools had then 
“too slavishly” rushed to provide.16  According to the Committee, the SIM needed to 
break that loop with a sound, theoretically based, and above all general education. 
It places the general above the specific, speculation before practice, and seeks the 
development of understanding rather than training in special skills.  It is not, in 
the narrow meaning of the phrase, a practical education.  On the other hand … it 
is the most practical way to begin the education of young men who are to deal 
with the major problems of management.  In this connection the School must 
make perfectly clear to the students that they do not go out wise and experienced 
executives; they go out to begin at the beginning in industry, where they will 
continue their education.17 
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It was an echo of the Fall 1951 memos, when Brown, Freeman, and Maclaurin had 
stressed principles over techniques.  Now the social sciences committee was underscoring 
that those principles compelled the School to “establish and nourish a pervasive spirit of 
investigation and speculation.”  True, by focusing on management the SIM was focusing 
on both a field and a profession that depended on “knowledge of the feelings and 
behavior of human beings conditioned by their environment” – knowledge peculiarly 
difficult to acquire or arrange theoretically.  On the other hand, focusing on “a known 
objective” – education for administration in industry – gave the SIM an advantage over 
other business schools or liberal arts institutions.  “With such an education students, 
while acquiring the necessary data and learning useful procedures, may come to 
understand the meaning of their work.”18 
Given its assignment – “to consider the place of the social sciences in the School of 
Industrial Management” – the Committee almost inevitably focused more narrowly than 
Worthy.  Whereas Worthy had an entire educational system to critique, the Committee 
needed to concentrate on such matters as recommending proportions for engineering and 
science, professional skills, and social sciences.  (Roughly equal, though with more of the 
first in Year 1.)  The Report built a foundation for SIM’s graduate education: rigor, small 
class sizes, emphasis on writing and speaking (traditionally more honored in the breach 
than the observance), and teaching students to organize disparate facts and establish “a 
principle or satisfying generalization.”19  Morison and his colleagues wanted to develop 
students “for active, effective life in the management of industrial enterprise,” much as 																																																								
18 Morison Report, 5–6. 
19 Morison Report, i, 3–4, 7. 
99 
the Lewis Committee had promoted “the professional man who is an outstanding citizen” 
and many Cold War intellectuals espoused “open-minded autonomy, a hallmark of 
American virtue” in order to reinforce social cohesion and oppose communism.  The 
SIM’s graduates were thus to be thoughtful, reflective men who would “administer the 
industrial affairs of our society.”20 
Worthy’s critique made two broader points.  One, he demanded high expectations of 
businessmen as social and national leaders.  The businessman must not merely administer 
but lead, act “not only in terms of his responsibility to his particular business but also in 
terms of his responsibility to the society in which business plays so crucial a role.”  
Worthy expected “social and not merely technical leadership,” because American social 
and economic welfare depended on business leaders’ “wisdom and skill.”21  Worthy was 
echoing contemporary thinking about business as a profession.  In the words of Frank W. 
Abrams, Advisory Council member and Standard Oil chairman, business management 
“which has developed a good social sense as well as a good business sense … 
is acquiring more and more the characteristics of a profession.  The hallmark of a profes-
sion is its sense of duty.”22 
Two, Worthy insisted that instilling that duty was business schools’ responsibility.  
Most had failed.  “They are good at teaching business methods but not in preparing men 
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for leadership.”23  Worthy would have applauded the Morison Report for stressing the 
rigorous and the reflective; indeed, when he read it six weeks later he declared himself 
“heartily in agreement.”24  But he might have thought its aspirations too limited. 
The proper function of the schools of business should be conceived as developing 
the future members of one of the key – perhaps the key – leadership groups of 
modern American society.  This will require a program which will be far more 
educational and much less vocational than that of the typical schools of busi-
ness … above all, a program that will emphasize the crucial responsibilities of 
leadership, because only through understanding and accepting – and effectively 
executing – its responsibilities can any leadership group long survive.25 
Essential, not incidental, to such a program was research.  Worthy and the 
Committee agreed wholeheartedly on the importance of “meaningful and creative” 
research to a business school: its “vitality and inquiry,” its courses’ content, even its own 
“professional status and leadership potential.”  Both deplored research that leaned on 
mere description and tabulation; Worthy sniffed that “many examples of what currently 
passes for research … [are] extremely limited in concept and highly inept in method.”  
Both considered that the best hope for analytical, far-reaching research lay in the 
combined forces of social sciences and management.  And as the Morison Report pointed 
out, at an Institute like MIT researchers could go even further.  “The new School has an 
unparalleled opportunity to discover ways of deriving maximum industrial and social 
benefits from the advances in science and technology.”  Research would be key to the 
future of the SIM, and of the industrial society it served.26 
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Thus on research, as on most elements of management education, Worthy and the 
Committee concurred.  Much of their thinking would echo throughout the SIM’s early 
years.  The belief in general over specialized education, the pivotal role for social 
sciences, the preparation for management and leadership in complex industrial organiza-
tions: none was obvious or common at most business schools, and all would be hallmarks 
of the MIT approach. 
The Memo and Report prescribed.  They also foreshadowed.  Within the documents 
one can see battle lines being drawn around research and the role of industry.  In essence, 
Worthy claimed that academics didn’t understand business, the Committee that 
businesspeople didn’t understand research.  To Worthy, the “aridity” of most 
management research “reflects a fundamental and far reaching ignorance on the parts of 
many business school faculties as to the real nature and problems of business.”  
Fortunately, “American business tends to be singularly research-minded.”  Therefore 
Worthy predicted industry would assist and even fund academic researchers, “provided 
the research projects are properly conceived and provided the business community has 
sufficient confidence in and respect for the institution sponsoring the research.”  Both 
conception and confidence would be hotly debated over the coming year.27 
Meanwhile the Morison Report was articulating a three-point position on research 
independence.  One, the SIM should favor individual research and initiative, not “a 
planned program within which the members of the staff must find their place.”  Two, 
although it should hire (and fund) faculty whose research areas most closely related to 
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industrial management issues, what mattered was “the importance of the potential results 
to problems of management,” not their immediacy.28  And three, the School must closely 
protect its researchers’ intellectual freedom.  According to the Committee, in a school of 
industrial management this would be dangerously difficult to do. 
There will inevitably be those who feel that any investigation into the nature of 
the industrial or social environment will represent a questioning of “unarguable” 
assumptions.  They will feel that any open-minded search into or any speculation 
about such matters as the government’s part in the regulation of industry, the 
appropriate size for industrial organizations, or the nature of businessmen’s 
ethical systems, will undermine the belief of students in their life work.  Yet on 
the other hand, the School must proceed in the belief that an understanding of 
industrial society is necessary for young men who are going into it, and that 
understanding waits upon open-minded search and free inquiry.  If this School 
ever yields to the pressure of any who wish to confine its intellectual life within a 
prescribed doctrine, whatever that doctrine may be, it will fail. 
Independence might have its limits.  The Report hastened to deplore those who might use 
the School’s freedom “as a shelter for their own irresponsibility.”  But Morison and his 
colleagues were unwavering in their conviction: to further the growth of industry and the 
nation, “to prepare young men to become wise and successful leaders in our economy,” 
the SIM must brook no intrusion on its research faculty’s individual initiative, long-term 
focus, or intellectual freedom.29 
Executives’ Reactions 
From Penn Brooks’s point of view, intrusion was the least of the problems.  Having 
received two substantial documents of advice in as many days, Brooks responded by 
getting more.  He soon arranged for copies to be distributed to the Advisory Council, then 
his closest faculty advisors, then eventually all the SIM and Economics faculty.  In the 
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meantime he commended Worthy on “a great paper,” sent him the Morison Report for 
comments, and suggested he meet with the MIT faculty “to help us with the way we can 
accomplish these goals in the classroom.  That is the difficulty.”  Provost Stratton was 
even more complimentary, asking Brooks, “Who’s James Worthy and how do we bring 
him to MIT?  …  I should be grateful to you for the opportunity to meet this man.”  
Nothing in the records suggests that either meeting came to pass.30 
If Brooks is to be believed, he and the SIM faculty had already reached many of the 
same conclusions before Worthy came along.  “We too have tried to understand why the 
business schools have so generally failed to measure up to the promise they held when 
they sprang into existence in large numbers some thirty or forty years ago.”  They too 
disliked “‘compartmentizing’ of the business process” (which Worthy called “over-
specialization and emphasis on techniques”) and sought a more “dynamic approach” to 
education than the case system.  Struck by Worthy’s insistence on a role for “the so-
called social sciences,” Brooks sent General Wood a copy of the Morison Report.  At the 
MIT SIM, he insisted, these fields wouldn’t be merely “‘added on’ for their supposed 
‘broadening’ effect” but be “at the foundation for later work in organization, industrial 
relations, and even distribution.  In other words, these are the tap roots on which 
management studies should be built.”31 
As the summer of 1952 progressed, responses from Council members trickled in.  
Most approved.  One praised both documents’ emphasis on “broad education, the devel-																																																								
30 EPB to James C. Worthy, 1 July 1952, AC336:1:12; letter, JAS to EPB, 14 July 1952, 
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opment of that very uncommon quality of common sense” which genuine educational in-
stitutions taught and vocational schools did not.  A second applauded the focus on “‘ge-
neral intellectual structures’ useful for practical situations,” rather than narrow and rapid-
ly outdated methods.32  A third, an MIT alumnus and CEO of the Plymouth Cordage 
Company, was encouraged that the two reports so frequently agreed.  “There isn’t any 
question about the need for the kind of work the School contemplates.  Good manage-
ment is so vital to the welfare of the country that anything which can be found out about 
what makes it good, and as to how its average quality can be improved, will be a contri-
bution which just can’t be valued.”  He also amplified the Committee’s call for education 
in communication, composition, and expression – not always MIT students’ strongest suit.  
As undergraduates, “what little we had, we thought was a nuisance, and extraneous.  As I 
heard it said, the feeling was that ‘us engineers don’t need no English.’”33 
Others agreed but added caveats.  Zurcher pronounced Worthy’s memo “a master-
piece,” yet wondered whether he overstated business education’s reach and understated 
the barriers to “promoting liberal education in a professional school.”  Bob Wilson of 
Standard Oil (Indiana) wished the Morison Report had recommended that economics 
courses explain the “lingo of left-wing economics” – oligopoly, oligopsony, monopolistic 
competition, etc. – so that businessmen would be in a position to retort.  Frank Howard 
wanted the Morison Report to be more specific: “recommendations for new types of 
courses in the sociological field” that industrial managers could use, rather than “a new 																																																								
32 “Extracts from Letters from Members of the Advisory Council after Reading the Morison and 
Worthy Reports,” August 1952, AC336:1:12; Frank W. Adams to EPB, 23 July 1952, 
AC336:1:12. 
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consideration of the old problem of how best to develop true wisdom through academic 
teaching.”  Morison himself found these and other comments “very gratifying,” but he 
warned of manpower constraints.  The SIM didn’t yet have its own social scientists.  If 
“the business community is not only willing to follow in the direction our report 
describes but is anxious to push us hard in that direction,” then the School would need its 
own social sciences faculty, its own “informal research group,” and the development of 
its own social science ideas.34 
It’s a pity that Morison didn’t respond to some of the suggestions specifically, par-
ticularly those pertaining to research.  A. T. Kearney for instance first said he agreed with 
everything in the Morison Report, then recommended a high priority be “the basic view-
point of administration and faculty with respect to the role of business in our whole soci-
ety.  …  Perhaps this point can be illustrated by asking the question as to whether a busi-
ness school operates in the atmosphere in which business success is looked upon as being 
questionable from a social point of view, or with the viewpoint that success is com-
mendable if it is not out of harmony with the public interest.”35  Kearney didn’t comment 
on whether his illustration qualified as “a questioning of ‘unarguable’ assumptions” (q.v.). 
Hitting closer to home – since the author was a former MIT professor – was a letter 
from Bob Haslam.  Much of it took issue with the Morison Report on intellectual 
freedom.  Haslam considered the concern a red herring: “I doubt very much if this is a 
real worry in a school in which research (which is to seek the truth) plays a prominent 																																																								
34 Arnold J. Zurcher to EPB, 21 July 1952, AC336:1:12; Robert E. Wilson to EPB, 4 August 1952, 
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part.”  Yet he did anticipate issues if executives thought researchers were seeking “data 
for a pre-conceived concept” or choosing inappropriate “yardsticks … to judge these 
problems.”  In assessing government regulation, should the metric be maximum produc-
tion or maximum human development?  If a researcher were studying corporation size in 
wartime, should he measure based on employment security or maximum contribution to 
the nation?  For Haslam these weren’t issues of intellectual freedom. 
It is not the choice of problems that will cause controversy between academicians 
and industry.  In my opinion, controversy is more apt to arise either through the 
way in which research is carried out or in the selection of the yardstick used to 
judge what is most desirable.  Personally, I have been critical of the Institute’s 
position regarding the issue of Communism and Academic Freedom.  In this 
report, I seem to detect ideas that bear on this conflict.36 
Haslam’s letter arrived two days after Morison’s.  We’ll never know whether Morison 
would have thought Haslam was arguing with his point or proving it. 
Intellectual freedom notwithstanding, Haslam apparently agreed with the Morison 
Report’s major recommendations.  Thus on September 13–14, when he chaired the 
Marketing Task Force of executives and faculty, they came to similar conclusions.  The 
Task Force ranged widely: they seem to have been concerned as much with marketing of 
the School as with marketing in its curriculum.  They took it upon themselves to consider 
the SIM’s “basic objectives at the graduate level” by refining the scope and reach.  
Back in December 1950 and January 1951 when announcing the SIM, President 
Killian had emphasized training executives, using a heavy dose of science, technology, 
and (later) social sciences, for the complexities of industrial management.  Now, after 
nearly two years of discussion, the Task Force declared a more detailed “concept.” 																																																								
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To teach a limited number of carefully selected young men in such a way as to 
contribute, to the maximum degree possible, to their ultimate success in top-level 
management of industry.  In this limited field the School will seek to excel.  It 
will confine itself to the field of industry as distinguished from service organi-
zations, trades, or professions.  It will seek to train managers rather than technical 
specialists, “statesmen rather than experts.”  Its goal will be quality rather than 
quantity.  Its size will be limited by its ability to gather an outstanding faculty. … 
To take the leadership in an effort to give professional status to the industrial 
manager.  To develop a philosophy of business and a recognition of the place and 
responsibility of creative management in society as a whole.  To develop 
standards, principles and points of view which will enable the industrial manager 
to take his place beside other recognized professions.37 
This concept ratified, not revolutionized.  The language and ideas deliberately 
recalled the Morison and Worthy documents.  Small class size: that was the Morison 
Committee’s entreaty.  Leadership in the field: Worthy’s call to arms.  “Industry” (later 
changed to “manufacturing industry”), top-level management, “statesmen rather than 
experts”: common themes for both.  The Task Force did take a new step of making 
professionalism part of the objectives, but even there they were turning implication into 
aspiration.  Arguably they did try to give that aspiration a lift.  When the Task Force 
handed the objectives over to Brooks for the SIM faculty, they’d made one slight edit: 
“give professional status to the industrial manager” had become “develop professional 
industrial management.”  Maybe as Brooks’s advisors they wanted a loftier goal; maybe 
they just liked the wording.38 
Brooks’s most important executive advisor was of course Sloan himself.  Like many 
on the Council, Sloan appreciated the Committee’s “special report on the humanities.”  
(If Brooks saw a difference between the humanities and social sciences, he apparently 																																																								
37 “Report of the Marketing Task Force,” 14 September 1952, AC4:202:11, 3–4. 
38 Compare “Report of the Marketing Task Force,” 4, to EPB to SIM Faculty, memorandum, 
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had the tact not to say so.)  But it was the Worthy Memo that really wowed him.  
“Frankly, I think that ought to be our ‘bible’ and be referred to at times of doubt or 
uncertainty in order to keep us on the straight and narrow, or the beam, as we call it in 
modern language.”  Sloan even wanted to consider adding Worthy to the Advisory 
Council – provided that the Council ever met.39 
Convening the Council 
Getting the Council off the ground was proving complicated.  It faced the same 
problems as many large boards: conflicting schedules and infrequent input.  Therefore in 
June Sloan had suggested to Brooks that there be a smaller Steering Committee “which 
could deal more directly with the problems in a more intimate way and on a more 
methodical basis.”  Sloan proposed a quartet: himself, his brother Raymond, Waddill 
Catchings, and the inevitable Arnold Zurcher.  Offering to come to Cambridge once a 
month, Sloan wanted “to particularly emphasize that the responsibility for the 
development and success of the School must lie with you and your associates at MIT.  
Under no stretch of the imagination does it belong anywhere else.”  Brooks quickly 
replied with enthusiasm for the idea, mentioning that he’d already set up his own group 
of certain Council members, such as Haslam, Howard, and Kearney.40 
That was at the beginning of July.  Two months later the monthly meetings still 
hadn’t begun. When Brooks eventually invited Sloan to campus for September, Sloan 
responded confirming September 24 and saying he’d bring along Catchings (at least).  He 
also sounded a little irritated.  “In view of the fact that we know nothing whatsoever 																																																								
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about the organization effort of the School so far and, as a matter of fact, know very little 
about the organization of Schools like this in general, I hope you will arrange to give us a 
complete briefing as point one on the agenda so that we have some understanding of what 
the problem is and how we have gone about it so far.”41 
Any irritation shouldn’t have come as a surprise.  Although the School of Industrial 
Management had officially opened its doors, its dean had barely told its founder what 
was going on.  Yet had Brooks shared what he was writing for the annual MIT Report to 
the President, Sloan would have seen much to be proud of.  The building had been fully 
renovated and occupation completed, including the SIM and Economics faculty, the 
Dewey Library, and the MIT Faculty Club.  The SIM faculty offered four degree 
programs: the Course XV undergraduate program (still headed by Schell), a two-year 
master’s program for engineering or science graduates, the expanded Sloan Fellows, and 
a one-year (short-lived) sequence for graduates of Course XV-like programs at other 
universities.  The Report would also emphasize research, specifically Sloan’s million-
dollar grant “to be devoted in both principal and interest to ‘research, experimentation, 
and education in the broad field of management.’”  Noting too the industry executives 
who had given multiple lectures and seminars, Brooks would declare the School “greatly 
indebted … to the willingness of busy men to make a serious and time-consuming 
commitment to the welfare of the program.”42 
It’s not clear which of those men came to Cambridge on September 24.  Sloan 
himself sounded surprised by the participants: “I thought we had agreed on who should 																																																								
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belong to the Steering Committee, but perhaps we had not.”  He re-suggested Catchings, 
Zurcher, and himself, dropped his brother, and proposed Worthy and Haslam, plus a 
faculty member as secretary and Killian and Brooks ex officio.  Brooks soon replied 
wanting to add three friends from his own Spring 1952 group.  The quartet was turning 
into an orchestra.43 
The orchestra still had no name.  Brooks thought “‘Steering Committee … might 
carry the wrong understanding.’  I suggest either ‘Advisory Committee’ or ‘Advisory 
Group.’”  Sloan remarked that “you do not like the word ‘Steering.’  I imagine because it 
carries an implication of directions perhaps.”  Since Sloan considered Advisory Council 
and Advisory Group synonymous, “how would it be if we called [the new group] ‘Sub-
Committee of the Advisory Group’?  That is about what it is, as a matter of fact.”44 
Whatever it was, it met in new and expanded form on October 23.  Much of the 
discussion focused on how to give SIM students a sufficient grounding in engineering 
and science.  Perhaps the Course XV undergraduates’ engineering content needed 
broadening.  Perhaps a common technical core could make the education more efficient.  
Perhaps the SIM should focus on giving “a hard core of scientific knowledge” to any of 
its graduate students who came from liberal arts – in other words, ensuring that all SIM 
men graduated with the “background of science and engineering” that Sloan had long 
considered the ne plus ultra of industrial executives.  Judging from Associate Dean 
Robnett’s notes, Council/Committee/Sub-Committee members proved themselves eager 
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to engage and advise.45 
Perhaps too eager.  An October 27 letter implies that after the meeting Killian wrote 
to Sloan warning against vehemence.  Sloan played it down.  “I feel that the meetings of 
the Sub-Committee can be made helpful, but I think it is important for you and Dean 
Brooks to appreciate that what we say, is very definitely confined to the area of advice.  
And at times when perhaps some of us, particularly myself, speak rather aggressively on 
a subject it does not mean that that has any bearing on the decision of the School 
administration except as to what we may say carries weight on its merits.”  Though they 
might speak loudly, the executives carried a small stick.46 
It wasn’t the curriculum that was causing arguments.  It was research.  Like James 
Worthy five months before, executives were questioning how much faculty really knew 
about industrial problems, or at least which ones mattered.  And if the faculty didn’t 
know what was important, then they would need guidance.  “It was suggested that 
industrial managers were in an ideal position because of their intimate knowledge of 
industrial problems to make worthwhile suggestions on research projects and that, in 
some cases, they might have a better sense of what is important than could be expected of 
faculty members.”47 
The Problem of Research: Relevance, Creativity, and Control 
The problem hadn’t changed since April.  Everyone agreed research was important; 
few agreed on what made some topics more important than others.  The Marketing Task 																																																								
45 Minutes of the SIM Advisory Committee (23 October 1952), submitted 27 October 1952, 
AC4:202:5; press release, “RE: New School of Industrial Management at MIT,” 2.   
46 APS to JRK, 27 October 1952, AC4:199:12. 
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Force wanted the SIM “to stimulate and encourage creative research, both fundamental 
and applied, in any field which has a reasonable relationship to the broad subject of 
management.”  The Morison Committee emphasized research based on “importance of 
the potential results to problems of management.”  The Principles of the new Sloan 
Research Fund insisted that to be funded, research “must seek to develop new knowledge 
on one or more of the tangible or intangible elements in the management of industrial 
enterprises and must give promise to developing such knowledge.”  No one wanted to 
prevent or prescribe.48 
On the other hand, no one wanted to see time or money frittered away.  That’s why 
Sloan had inserted authorization clauses and an advisory board into the governance of the 
Research Fund.  And that’s why, with his eye on the calendar, Sloan suggested that the 
next “Sub-Committee” meeting discuss research.  The advisory group for the School was 
becoming the advisory board for the Fund.49 
Yet what Sloan envisioned was more than merely advisory.  The Fund Principles 
described a board “available to the Dean for the review of research proposals and for the 
evaluation of research in progress.”  But now Sloan proposed that the Advisory 
Committee (the eventual name) consider “whether research projects should originate 
within the faculty, the advisory group, or both.”  For now he favored both: “we should 
aggressively solicit suggestions from both groups and we should then screen them and 
decide what seems to be the most pertinent, recognizing that there is only a limited 																																																								
48  “Report of the Marketing Task Force,” 2; Morison Report, 15; “Outline of Principles 
Governing the Operation of the Sloan Research Fund, School of Industrial Management, MIT,” 1 
October 1952, AC4:203:1, 1. 
49 APS to EPB, 24 October 1952, AC4:199:12. 
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number of projects that we can deal with.”50 
“Screen” was the mot juste.  Sloan wanted a say in both projects and people.  In 
particular, he continued to caution against MIT economists and their potentially 
dangerous effect on SIM students.  He considered “academic economists” a wholly 
different breed from “business economists”: overcomplicated, impractical, and 
disconnected from business realities.  He and other businessmen “pay no attention 
whatsoever in the exercises of business judgment, in the operations of any enterprise, to 
the teachings or belief of academic economists.  If they do, they would probably go 
broke.”51  Like many in the business community, Sloan believed “academic” economists 
espoused Keynesianism, government intervention, and the diminution or destruction of 
private enterprise – tantamount to communism.52   
Most prominent among these academic economists was the nearest at hand: MIT’s 
own Paul Samuelson.  It was Samuelson Sloan had had in mind when he’d praised John 
Jewkes as a “sentinel … against what I consider false economic theories.”  It was 
Samuelson he wanted to take “into the realities of the motor car industry and let him see 
it as it is – not as he thinks it is from the confines of his office by academic reasoning.”53  
It was Samuelson whose Economics (1948) textbook Sloan would in November castigate 
at length and in December urge be counterbalanced by economists “with a business 
slant.”54  One can imagine MIT leaders’ relief the next month when Jewkes, of all people, 
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52 Fourcade and Khurana, 14. 
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would write to Brooks praising Economics as brilliant and “absolutely fair in all the con-
troversial matters it raises.”  Killian urged Brooks to send Sloan a copy of the letter as 
“an antidote to other comments which he has received.”  There’s no evidence that Sloan 
replied.55 
In any case the point had been made: Sloan had definite convictions about who 
should serve on the SIM faculty and what they should research.  In January 1951, when 
Sloan had expected a direct role in the former, Compton had had to step in.  Now it was 
Killian’s turn on behalf of the latter.  His Memorandum on Research Policies (November 
1952) returned to the same theme as Compton’s: independence.  “An educational institu-
tion is effective in basic research because it provides a special environment for the 
scholar.”  He argued that although an institution like MIT might take on programmatic 
work, “in the long run the most important creative work is accomplished by the uncom-
mitted scholar.”  Moreover, he reminded the reader – primarily the Advisory Commit-
tee – that in academic research “we do not operate on a line-of-authority basis” but give 
“maximum responsibility on the part of each individual to plan his own activities.”56 
Against this backdrop Killian set the short-term special conditions of the SIM.  Not 
only did the School lack the experienced research faculty and squadrons of doctoral stu-
dents found elsewhere in MIT, but research in the science of management was itself so 
new that no one knew what approaches would be fruitful.  Therefore the School would 
need projects in which its faculty could develop research competence, and “we should at 
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the present time seek from management itself proposals for important research pro-
jects” – in other words, ask industry for both topics and programmatic work.  Further-
more, “I suggest that the Advisory Committee give special attention to specific research 
problems which in its judgment should be undertaken to meet present needs of industry.”  
Longer-term, however, “the kind of research which an educational institution does best is 
the more basic and fundamental research, which is not normally undertaken by industry.”  
Though industrial management was by nature an applied field, in conducting applied 
research its faculty and leaders must not ignore the fundamental, from which “new 
concepts and new ideas” would flow.57 
Killian’s Solomonic stance pleased everybody.  Sloan considered the memo “a most 
excellent exposé of the whole problem.”58  The Advisory Committee, meeting on 
November 25, agreed to work toward building a faculty “so competent that their 
individual creative interests would contribute to the producing of important ideas for 
research in the same way as is done so well by the MIT staff in the physical sciences.”  
At the same time, recognizing that business leaders would be “an additional and con-
tinuing source of fruitful ideas,” the executives committed to go off and develop their 
own individual project priority lists.  Before they left, Sloan proposed a two-part “general 
guide” to defining research objectives: (1) “Research that enables the industrial executive 
to do a better job of facing and solving the problems with which he is concerned”; and 
(2) “Research that enables the industrial executive to better understand the economic 
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environment in which industry operates.”  The Committee concurred.59 
Thanks to the combined efforts of faculty and executives over five months and more, 
the SIM now had a clearer idea what to teach.  But what to research was still vague, and 
potentially controversial.  Had the Committee included any research faculty the 
discussion might have heated up.  Sloan’s “general guide” rested on a significant 
assumption: that the beneficiary of management research is the executive.  If the execu-
tive can do a better job because of it, then it’s good research.  Good research is useful, 
useful specifically to the industrial executive. 
Thus Sloan and the Advisory Committee were tapping into core issues of manage-
ment research, an issue that shows no signs of going away six decades later.  In the 1967 
words of Carnegie GSIA scholar and Nobel prizewinner Herbert Simon, “the sometimes 
explicit premise that utility is the only touchstone of relevance for knowledge in the 
professional school, and the sometimes implicit premise that inutility is the only touch-
stone of relevance in the disciplines, are mischievous doctrines that have caused untold 
harm to education in both professions and disciplines.”60  Some argue that academics and 
businesspeople cannot – and should not – agree to each other’s world view.  Augier and 
March have described an atmosphere of distrust: faculty think executives are trying to 
turn them into research consultants; executives think faculty take industry’s money but 
“pursue their own agendas of irrelevant research.”  Back in 1956 William Whyte would 
have considered that distrust healthy.  “Between the academic and the business world  																																																								
59 Minutes of the Advisory Committee (convened 25 November 1952), 10 December 1952, 
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there must be some conflict of interests, and a running fire of criticism  is a cross that 
business  can well afford to put up with.”61  Haslam may have insisted that “it is not the 
choice of problems that will cause controversy,” but he was thinking too narrowly.  In the 
months ahead, when executives disparaged the SIM’s research, they wouldn’t call it 
dangerous.  They’d call it trivial. 
“A Constructive Piece of Research”: The GM Wage Escalator Project 
Sloan had biases of his own.  He was deeply committed to research, both 
intellectually and financially, but wary and even scornful of the researchers.  At the 
November 1952 meeting he agreed with Killian’s memo that “our faculty members must 
learn to creep before they walk and to walk before they run.”62  Yet according to Killian, 
Sloan never entirely reconciled himself to faculty at any speed. 
Sloan had some baffling notions about “professors” except those, fortunately, at 
MIT and a few other institutions who had won his respect. He assigned strange 
characteristics to this professional tribe. They never really worked hard, he 
thought. During the period that Warren Weaver served as an adviser to the Sloan 
Foundation, he asked Sloan how he could hold such views about academics and 
still so greatly admire that academic institution, MIT. His reply to Weaver was: 
“MIT is not an academic institution! It is a technological institute!”63 
If the School had been able to hire faculty who’d already been corporate executives, 
perhaps Sloan would have found kindred spirits.  Unfortunately it hadn’t succeeded.  
Brooks admitted that he’d started out thinking he could draw heavily from “‘doers’ … 
men at or about the age of retirement from industry.”  He soon found – as he’d been 
warned by Dean David of HBS – that “they turned out to be preachers instead of 																																																								
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teachers.  …  A businessman does an excellent job in drawing the lessons of his own 
business and from his own experience.  But – he quickly runs out of gas when he is asked 
to spread himself generally over a subject.”  Brooks admitted he himself had fallen into 
exactly these traps the one and only time he’d taught a class.  “I did not realize I had to 
go to work – and work it is, to dig up material, organize it, and study the best way of 
presenting it for good classroom practice.”64 
Brooks did manage to recruit the occasional exception.  As summer 1953 
approached he secured Mason Smith, a 20-year corporate executive and management 
consultant (working for Brooks’s old friend A. T. Kearney) who had previously taught at 
four universities.  But overall, as Brooks later wrote to Sloan, “businessmen were very 
poor at teaching in spite of the fact that students welcomed the views of industrialists.  If 
this view of theirs stands up under further investigation it suggests the need of weaving in 
businessmen into the regular classes presided over by trained teachers.”65  Sloan was 
unsurprised, and undeterred in his conviction that the School needed “business thinking.” 
I do not know as we should be much disturbed if we accept the premise that 
businessmen are not good teachers.  I do not know exactly why they necessarily 
should be because one is quite different from the other.  I think it is an excee-
dingly important point to recognize in a School like ours because if businessmen 
are not good teachers, then the fact remains that we still have got to have busi-
nessmen, or inject business thinking into the School or it fails, to some extent, to 
measure up to its responsibility.  Therefore it seems to me we not only have to 
teach the students but teach businessmen how, in turn, to teach the students.66 
On one point everyone agreed: the SIM needed faculty, particularly in the social sci-
ences, and only outstanding faculty would do.  Brooks had tried to recruit Herbert Simon, 																																																								
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the political scientist, economist, and co-founder of the Carnegie GSIA, but Simon had 
chosen to stay at the institution that would remain his home until his death in 2001.  
Brooks had therefore activated a Finder’s Committee of colleagues at other universities to 
recruit specialists in “human behavior.”  The SIM was casting its net wide, recognizing 
that currently its only social scientists were economists, yet “inevitably the area of human 
behavior will occupy an increasingly important place in the work of the School.”  To 
Killian Brooks emphasized that these would be academic appointments, men who would 
command the respect of fellow academics.  Moreover, a top candidate “need not be, and 
quite possibly should not be, interested merely in human behavior in industry.  …  A 
currently established reputation in industry is not a necessary prerequisite.”67 
Industry experience, if not a requirement, might still have come in handy during 
May through July 1953.  It was in those months that the research issues, and the 
underlying industry-academia divide, would come to a head.  Each side would see the 
other as self-absorbed, resistant to advice, and ignorant of the other’s world.  Had the key 
players – Sloan, Killian, and Compton – not held each other in such esteem, the battle 
could have been far more bruising.  Even Brooks, despite his unique role as a dean and 
former executive, would end up shoved to the side in the debate. 
The questions were not new: what constituted an important research project, who 
decided the topics, and which priorities made sense for the short term versus the long.  
All three were exacerbated by youth: the youth not just of the School but of the field.  
Sloan underscored the point at the Advisory Committee meeting of May 28, 1953.  Citing 
																																																								
67 EPB to JRK, memorandum, 18 November 1952, AC4:202:8. 
120 
a published round-table discussion from the Carnegie GSIA’s dedication, “he indicated 
that the proceedings of this meeting made clear the nebulous nature of the present status 
of research in industrial management, the relative difficulties involved in getting 
programs started, and the desirability of sharing of ideas between interested executives 
and faculty members in the ultimate formulation of sound fundamental research.”  
Nothing to dispute there; one can imagine a chorus of “hear, hear.”68 
And then the meeting got sticky.  The Committee went on to review nine represen-
tative research projects submitted by faculty.  According to Robnett’s notes, some 
Committee members favored projects dealing with “basic fundamentals, unpredictable as 
to success, ‘wild eyed’ as to scope, as a means of focusing on new frontiers which might 
have an ultimate effect on industrial management thinking.”  Others favored research that 
“would be of some connection and direct use to industrial management” and thought 
some of these projects therefore wouldn’t be productive.69 
It’s obvious where Sloan stood.  Four days after the meeting, he wrote to Brooks 
with copies to Compton and Killian, declaring that many of the nine projects were too 
superficial to interest or stimulate “most of us on the business end.”  Although he 
acknowledged that “we have got to flounder around a little on this research thing” before 
the SIM got into a pattern that satisfied everyone, these projects seemed like a waste of 
(his) money.  In Sloan’s opinion, the faculty shouldn’t get to make a research project out 
of whatever happened to interest them. 
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If we are trying to inject the business atmosphere into the School – and I think 
the success or failure of the School depends upon our ability to do that – then we 
have got to inject business into the School, so to speak.  And the research area is 
an exceedingly [important] part of that procedure.  … Really what I am talking 
about merely brings up the point that I have raised in the School activity from the 
very beginning and that is, the difficulty of injecting business experience and 
background into an academic institution.  That is the problem right before us at 
the moment.70 
It’s easy to complain about the fruit you’re given, harder to pick it yourself.  But 
Sloan then went further: he offered an actual research project.  General Motors wanted “a 
constructive piece of research done” on wage escalator clauses in union contracts, 
specifically in the automotive industry.  Such clauses granted workers annual, CPI-based, 
cost-of-living adjustments, a labor negotiations practice that had increased dramatically 
in the early 1950s.71  Unlike the SIM-proposed projects, about which Sloan declared 
himself “very negative,” this one would address an actual (if vague) business need.  Sloan 
had been thinking of “putting it up to Dean David at Harvard School of Business,” which 
had the competence and would get it done, but “of course I would much rather have the 
School of Industrial Management at MIT do it.”  On the other hand, “I do not feel secure 
as yet of their interest in the matter and I feel pressed to have the job completed by 
competent people.”72 
MIT jumped at the offer.  Not only did they want to prove to Sloan that the faculty 
knew what they were doing, but the project seemed to fall into a special category of capa-																																																								
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city-building.  In the November 1952 “Memorandum on Research Policies,” even as Kil-
lian had consigned “programmatic” research to a lesser bucket than “uncommitted scho-
larship,” he’d deliberately left a loophole for the short term.  So long as the management 
faculty were still developing competence and the management field developing 
procedures, Killian had suggested “that the Advisory Committee give special attention to 
specific research problems which in its judgment should be undertaken to meet present 
needs of industry.”73  Now the Committee’s chairman had dropped such a problem in 
their lap, and cold-shouldered Harvard to boot.  It looked like manna from heaven. 
Brooks immediately brought two faculty on board, George Shultz and Charles 
Myers, whom Compton dubbed “two of our best.”  Compton also took time to write five 
pages on the fundamental issues raised by the topic of wage escalator formulas, agreeing 
that it deserved “a really comprehensive study.”  Here again is evidence of the respect 
Compton and Sloan had for each other, respect that had gained Compton a seat on the 
GM board and helped position him, a research chemist, to analyze the problems of 
organized labor.  It also smoothed the way for Compton’s gentle reminder that the study 
had to be objective.  “We must not get into a position of being ‘industrial attorneys’ for 
any organization, and least of all for General Motors.”74 
Sloan shrugged the reminder off.  “Everything that you say about the economics and 
principles involved, I subscribe to 100%.”  He of course preferred MIT over institutions 
in which he had “a purely perfunctory interest”; his only hesitation had been over its 
faculty’s time and skills.  Impressed by Myers and Shultz, however, “I am willing to go 																																																								
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ahead and we will place our dependence upon MIT.”   The project could go forward, 
expecting data by the end of 1954.75 
In the meantime Killian stepped in – again – to ask Sloan to simmer down.  In 
October 1952 he’d warned him against seeming to tell the School what to do.  Now it was 
June 1953 and the advice was the same.  Echoing his “Memorandum on Research 
Policies” and adopting the language of business, Killian emphasized the fundamental 
“management problem”: the School “must be basically an educational institution and not 
a business organization.” 
Educational institutions, as I am you sure you know, have certain peculiar 
characteristics.  They operate most effectively if there is a minimum of line orga-
nization.  The people who make good teachers and good research personnel have 
a deep-seated conviction that they must pursue their research in their own way 
and not in a manner that is prescribed for them.  …  There is already some res-
tiveness in the staff because of an apprehension that they may be told what to do.  
I think that any formal statement of policy that some portion of the research of 
the School will be selected by a group outside of the faculty itself will have 
disasterous [sic] effects. 
Therefore the Advisory Committee, as the prime outside group, needed to persuade rather 
than direct, to couch its suggestions in a “relationship of teamwork and mutual interest” 
with the faculty.  “We have got to stake them and their work even though some of the 
things that they are doing have no apparent great usefulness at the present time.  This is 
the way that fundamental research normally progresses.”76 
Sloan responded, as before, by claiming his tone had drowned out his meaning: “I 
fear the point I have been trying to make as to the type of research, has perhaps been too 
greatly emphasized because of my intense interest in the problem.”  Yet he stuck by his 																																																								
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underlying point: that business knows better than academia what matters to business.  
Killian had said that faculty should not pursue research “in a manner that is prescribed for 
them.”  Sloan thought that was precisely the point: the manner of research should be 
entirely the faculty’s choice, but the topics should be selected jointly with industry, i.e., 
the Advisory Committee.  These topics “should be research problems in which business 
is vitally interested because they are problems of today which affect current operations.”  
To Sloan’s mind, this joint selection process would “inject into the School activities – 
research and otherwise – the practical problems of business,” bridging between “the 
different worlds in which business and education lives [sic].”77 
Sloan’s response didn’t resolve anything.  As Brooks pointed out to Bob Haslam at 
the time, even if one accepted that without industry guidance faculty might too often 
choose minor topics, “there is no uniformity of opinion as to what is minor and what is 
major.”78  Furthermore, judging from a recent lunch in New York, Sloan’s notion of joint 
selection wasn’t truly fifty-fifty.  Sloan and Waddill Catchings had felt that “the principal 
source of ideas for research should come from the outside and that some formula must be 
found to determine the percentage of research ideas originating within and without the 
School.”  Brooks asserted to Compton that only “years in undirected research of the 
man’s own choosing” could enable an academic to produce vital new research.  “Mr. 
Sloan to some extent, and Mr. Catchings particularly, regard us as some kind of a 
research institute to which industry may bring its complex and often controversial 
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economic problems.”  Brooks was not including the GM project, which he seems to have 
embraced eagerly.79 
It was time for MIT to wheel out the big gun: Karl Compton.  In June 1953 as in 
January 1951, Compton was the one to guide Sloan off his high horse and down to earth.  
Thus his June 18 letter – specifically designed to be “constructive and not irritating” – did 
cover the same ground as Killian had on June 5.  Yet he invoked two sources he knew 
Sloan would find persuasive: formal procedure and General Motors. 
On the procedural side, Compton addressed the question Sloan had raised on June 1, 
“‘whether the research projects undertaken by the School in line with the fund … are to 
be selected by the Faculty, by business as represented by the Advisory group, or in some 
other way?’”  Compton’s answer was straightforward: the fund’s Deed of Gift already 
gave that power to the faculty.  So long as projects didn’t individually exceed $10,000 or 
collectively $50,000, they “may be authorized from time to time as the Institute may 
decide.”  Enclosing the relevant page with his letter, Compton acknowledged that “this 
formal procedure is not in itself sufficient to solve the problem because, as you say, there 
must be a good deal of give and take.”  Compton was adopting a classic technique to 
handle major donors: if you have to say no, parrot back wherever you can say yes.80 
Meanwhile Compton was also disagreeing with Sloan about the research projects 
themselves.  “I was rather dismayed at the quick and summary way in which the 
proposals which Dean Brooks presented on behalf of his staff were characterized as 																																																								
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‘inconsequential’ from the standpoint of management, and that this was apparently done 
without real consideration or investigation of just what was intended and why.”  As a 
specific example, Compton chose the first on the list, regarding inventory controls and 
the Last In First Out (LIFO) method of inventory accounting.  Far from inconsequential, 
this issue was preoccupying the boards of two firms Compton knew well, plus “one 
nationally known industrial executive,” plus many of the companies contributing to 
MIT’s Industrial Liaison Office.  Moreover – and one can imagine Compton’s smirk – 
“we have evidence that the problem is of considerable interest to General Motors.”  MIT 
staff from mathematics, physics, and other departments had already talked with GM 
leaders multiple times.  “In one case a planeload of executives was flown here from 
Detroit for a conference on the possible applications of the new operational research 
methods to the inventory problem.”  Compton didn’t mention these examples “for the 
purpose of being argumentative” but to make a point about industrial management.  In 
such a heterogeneous field, one man’s trivia was another’s trial.81 
Compton closed with what can only be read as advice.  Echoing Killian’s comments 
about educational institutions, he reminded Sloan that faculty have to be asked but never 
told what to do.  “If they wanted a job in which they would take orders, they would go 
with some ‘line organization’ like an industrial organization where their remuneration 
would be considerably greater.”  Therefore he, like Killian, urged Sloan to keep his 
enthusiasms from sounding like edicts. 
President Killian, Dean Brooks, and I understand your interest in and concern 
with the matter and your wise statesmanship in handling large affairs.  …  I do 																																																								
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feel however that if some of the comments which were made at our recent Advi-
sory Committee meeting had been made in the presence of a considerable 
number of our staff, there would have been a rather disastrous result because I 
think that they might not understand, as well as we do, the intense interest and 
the very great frankness with which you are accustomed to operate.  …  The 
handling of the human relations factor with our staff does really require some 
finesse. 
Compton ended “with cordial personal regards,” expressing “great appreciation” for the 
work of Sloan and of “Mr. Catchings and the others.  … My only plea is not to push too 
hard from the outside, and to give appropriate consideration to the value of the 
spontaneous enthusiasm of the members of our own staff.”82 
Compton’s counsel hit the target.  When Sloan replied on July 8, he admitted he’d 
forgotten all about the agreement in the Deed of Gift, and upon reminder thought it 
should be followed.  He still considered the LIFO inventory issue less substantial, 
declaring that GM’s vice president of finance had been startled (and displeased) to hear 
that GM executives had flown to MIT over it.  But overall Sloan backed down, saying he 
was interested only in the project topics, never in their administration.  And as for telling 
the faculty what to do and giving them orders, Sloan claimed that wasn’t his style.  “In 
over twenty-five years experience in General Motors in an important capacity, I do not 
remember giving a single order on anything.  I always looked upon such things as a 
selling job.”  Myers and Schulz would go ahead with the GM wage escalator project, 
other faculty with projects of their own devising – everyone would be happy.83 
It was not to be.  One week later Sloan wrote again, this time in a new tone: meek 
regret.  The GM project had collapsed.  General Motors had decided it wanted a broader 																																																								
82 KTC to APS with cc to JRK and EPB, 18 June 1953, 4–6. 
83 APS to KTC with cc to JRK and EPB, 8 July 1953, AC4:199:13. 
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study of the whole industry that wouldn’t entail MIT academics interviewing GM and 
union personnel.  In Sloan’s opinion, “I think that the best way to clear the matter is to re-
cognize that I made a mistake in bringing MIT into it, and that the best way to correct a 
mistake is to correct it by elimination.”  GM did have serious issues and would have 
benefited from more information, but if it chose to do without, then that was its 
prerogative.84 
It was a particular debacle that taught a general lesson.  Sloan, Catchings, and others 
had argued for research that “would be of some connection and direct use to industrial 
management.”  But direct use could not mean direct authority.  As Myers noted, “some of 
the General Motors people in Detroit, particularly [economist] Mr. DuBrul, did not really 
want an objective study.  …  We had the clear impression that he wanted to run the whole 
project himself and use us as part of a combined General Motors-MIT project.”85  Sloan, 
like Myers and Shultz, considered that approach “unsound and undesirable,” since “the 
research should be conducted exclusively under [MIT’s] own auspices” and yet entirely 
with GM’s cooperation.  If MIT wouldn’t have both independence and access, then the 
project wasn’t worth doing.86   
“I am very, very sorry that the thing has come out the way it has,” said Sloan.87  
Perhaps he was chastened by the experience, for he never again pushed so adamantly for 
industry to determine the SIM’s research projects.  Seeking “to inject business into the 
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86 APS to KTC with cc to JRK and EPB, 15 July 1953, 1; Robert H. Robnett to EPB, 
memorandum, 21 July 1953, AC4:203:2, 1. 
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School,” Sloan had arguably pushed industry input to the brink of industry control.  It 
could have been worse: Compton’s June 18 letter spoke of other universities where 
trustees had tried to exert jurisdiction over the faculty in their own fields, “and in every 
case it has resulted in an explosion” leading to mass resignations.88  Nonetheless, the 
events of summer 1953 suggested a moral.  It was still true, as the founding memo had 
stated, that the School of Industrial Management “should be marked by the closest 
possible collaboration with industry for the purpose of achieving cross-fertilization 
between men active in industry and the teaching and research personnel of the school.”89  
But that collaboration had to respect the integrity of the school and the boundaries of 
academic freedom. 
At the time the wage escalator project looked as it if were worth reviving.  Myers 
still thought it sound, and considered that Shultz had “conducted himself admirably and 
handled this whole affair very well indeed.”90  Catchings thought it so strong that for a 
while he advocated pursuing it without GM’s cooperation.  Talked out of that approach 
by Associate Dean Robnett, Catchings commented, “‘I had hoped that this project would 
go forward, not only because of its nature, but as a matter of developing a research staff 
																																																								
88 KTC to APS with cc to JRK and EPB, 18 June 1953, 4. 
89 JRK, “Memorandum on the Organization and Program of a School of Industrial Management at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,” 6 December 1950, AC4:202:1, 3. 
90 Charles A. Myers to KTC with cc to JRK and EPB.  Both Myers and Shultz survived the matter 
unscathed.  Myers (1913–2000) continued to hold a dual Economics and SIM/Sloan appointment 
for the remainder of his 39-year career, retiring in 1978 as Sloan Fellows Professor of 
Management.  Shultz (b. 1920) would become Dean of the University of Chicago Graduate 
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in the School.  Now, we will have to think of another one to accomplish this purpose.’”91  
That development would consume much of the SIM’s energies over the next ten years – 
and of its leaders’ next ten months. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
“The problems of technical management in our industrial society” 
A year had passed since the SIM’s doors had opened.  Dean Brooks took care to 
stress continuity and caution.  Noting that 1952–53 marked “the first year in which MIT’s 
long-standing interest in management” had been conducted under the new SIM name, he 
described a year of “continuing studies as to how best do our task.”1  In a speech to the 
Advisory Committee he commended the “well-established” Course XV, which had 
brought into the new School not only successful undergraduates and alumni but also 
“much experience and a nucleus of competent personnel to build on.”  Brooks never 
missed a chance to highlight the shortage of strong faculty.  His typed speech draft shows 
he’d added “a nucleus of” by hand shortly before delivery.2 
Thus far these “continuing studies” had borne fruit, at least in the form of students.  
By May 1953 MIT’s Academic Council had formally approved an increase in the SIM’s 
“graduate student quota” from 45 to 100, commending the SIM for admitting not just 
from MIT but from roughly 40 different engineering schools.  Brooks expected to 
approach that 100 mark in the next academic year, approximately evenly split among 
first-year, second-year, and Sloan Fellowship students.3  Meanwhile the SIM’s under-
																																																								
1 MIT Annual Report (1953), 93. 
2  EPB, draft of speech to the SIM Advisory Committee (convened 6 October 1953), 29 
September 1953, AC4:202:8, 3. 
3 KTC, memorandum, 7 May 1953, AC4:202:2; EPB to JAS, memorandum, 13 May 1953, 
AC132:7; JAS to EPB, 18 May 1953, AC132:7.  The ending of World War II and the onset of the 
Korean War had increased demand for admission throughout the Institute.  The provost and 
Academic Council, having set firm quotas (ceilings) during the war, found themselves revising 
those quotas throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, particularly for graduate students.  By 
1951, “the graduate enrollment would increase substantially if strict quota controls were not 
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graduate population continued to hover between ten and eleven percent of the total MIT 
undergraduate body, making Course XV the third-largest program in the Institute.  
(Course head Erwin Schell was hoping to knock enrollment down a bit so as not to 
displace “the Big Three”: II Mechanical Engineering, VI Electrical Engineering, and 
X Chemical Engineering.4)  Reviewing such statistics in April 1953, Sloan declared 
himself very satisfied by “the tangible progress that is apparently being made,” whatever 
its cause.  “I am quite convinced that, whether we planned it that way or not – and I do 
not know as we can say we did – the combination of the School per se, the Sloan Fellow-
ships, the Research Fund and the Summer Programs altogether form a very comprehen-
sive package which … ought to develop the same leadership in industrial management as 
MIT has in its more scientific activities.”5 
For Sloan this was exactly the point.  The School was an extension of the Institute; 
its leadership in the field would grow from the Institute’s preeminence.  At the Advisory 
Committee of October 6, 1953, “Mr. Sloan (1) restated his belief in the validity of 
combining science and engineering with the study of management; (2) expressed the 
conviction that the establishment of the School was a logical step for MIT in becoming a 
limited university polarized around science and engineering; (3) stressed the necessity for 
combining soundly the necessary emphasis on practical business and practical manage-
ment, with the skills and experience of professional educators in industrial management.”  
																																																																																																																																																																					
maintained for most Departments.”  MIT Annual Report (1951), 48.  See also MIT Annual Report 
(1946), 9 and elsewhere; files from Course XV, 1946–1951, AC156:11:1. 
4 Erwin H. Schell to SIM Advisory Committee, “Report on Undergraduate Course,” 22 April 
1953, AC336:1:3. 
5 APS to EPB with cc to KTC and JRK, 24 April 1953, AC4:199:13. 
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In his opinion, “the problems of technical management in our industrial society” deman-
ded executives trained in science and engineering and in management studies that inte-
grated with them.  In MIT terms, they warranted a Fifth School.6 
The MIT that Sloan envisioned wasn’t “limited” or “polarized” in a pejorative sense.  
He was applauding focus, not decrying narrowness.  MIT didn’t do everything (even 
today it has no medical school or law school, for instance) and what it did stood on a 
foundation of science, engineering, and technology.  On this Sloan was in sync with 
MIT’s senior leaders.  President Killian had a comparable vision for MIT as “a modern 
university” that provided “a new type of liberal education polarized about science, uni-
fied by professional requirements, and relevant to the needs of our technological soci-
ety.”7  The elements of MIT would be complementary, not comprehensive. 
Killian definitely included the SIM in this vision.  Recently he’d been quizzed by an 
alumnus who’d confessed himself “unable to discern any real difference between the 
contemplated curricula and that now available at the Harvard Business School and like 
universities.”8  Killian had taken a firm stand: “Our objective is not to establish another 
business school.”  The SIM had the “more limited” objective of “concentrating on 
education and research related to the management of technological industry.”  That 
objective, arising from the nature of MIT itself, continued to drive key choices.  The SIM 
would not touch non-industrial fields (“banking, insurance, and so on”) except inci-
																																																								
6 Notes from the SIM Visiting Committee and Advisory Committee (convened 6 October 1953), 
AC336:1:1, 1–2. 
7 JRK, “The Shortage Re-examined: Some Elements of a Grand Strategy for Augmenting Our 
Scientific and Engineering Manpower Resources,” American Scientist 44, no. 2 (1956), 124. 
8 D. R. Wadleigh to JRK, 27 March 1953, AC4:203:3. 
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dentally.  It provided or required a science and engineering education for its students.  It 
also insisted that “many of the arts of management can be explored and studied effec-
tively in the atmosphere of a scientific institution,” including fostering “a productive 
working arrangement between the scientist and the social scientist.”  In Killian’s opinion, 
except for the Carnegie GSIA, no other business schools had these “special characteris-
tics” and “different orientation.”9 
As Brooks had explained to the MIT Corporation, distinguishing the SIM from 
business schools was vital.  Although nearly 700 U.S. business schools, colleges, and 
engineering schools gave degrees or courses in business, “one hardly feels that these 
schools, even the best of them, are as effective … as are the great schools of law, 
medicine, and engineering in their respective fields.”  Business schools had mushroomed 
over the last thirty or forty years, but as a field business education had not earned “a 
position of full stature in the eyes of industry … through its actions and the stature and 
performance of its product.”10  Like Worthy, the Morison Committee, and Sloan himself, 
Brooks believed the SIM had to do more, to be more, than its competitors.  “If this 
School of Industrial Management of ours is to accomplish its objectives and thereby 
achieve distinction in this field, it will come, not from a percentage improvement … but 
rather from a better approach, a better understanding of what management is and what 
training for it should be.”11 
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10 EPB, draft of speech to the Advisory Committee, 2–3. 
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Changing World, Complacent Competition 
Brooks was right: there were many business schools, few of them good.  In part this 
was the natural result of high demand.  Business degree enrollments – undergraduate and 
graduate – had tripled between 1945 and 1950; in the 1950s they would rise again by 
more than 50 and 80 percent respectively.  The MBA was migrating from a fifth-year 
degree to a more robust, stand-alone master’s program.12  It wasn’t only the returning 
veterans who wanted the MBA; younger men and corporate recruiters coveted it too. 
Riding the wave of applicants, most business schools felt no pressure to innovate or 
improve.  Few did research.  Few hired researchers; even Wharton, HBS, and Stanford 
often recruited and tenured narrow specialists and former executives who had no doc-
torates or publications.  Pioneers in management education retired from deanships and 
were replaced by custodians.13  Even at renowned institutions like Columbia, New York 
University, and the University of Michigan the educational strategy was job-specific and 
vocational, featuring courses in secretarial science, advertising typography, and elemen-
tary bookkeeping.  In one historian’s words, Columbia Business School “prepared stu-
dents for specific real world jobs such as personnel manager or accountant, rather than 
the generic profession of manager,” largely due to its “long-term devotion to faculty spe-
cialisation.”14  Meanwhile the AACSB was embracing only a fraction of the schools: 108 
members in 1952, 112 in 1957 (the 112th was MIT).  In 1955, 587 institutions granted 
business degrees, but only 187 had graduate programs.  Of those, less than half (81) “met 
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13 Khurana, 197, 223–224. 
14 Khurana, 224; Aaronson, 163. 
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the AACSB’s modest accreditation standards, with the rest failing mainly because their 
faculty lacked the necessary academic credentials.”15  Sometimes a rising tide swamps all 
boats. 
Business schools might have changed course if employers had rejected the products.  
But if anything employers did the opposite.  Between 1945 and 1960 corporations grew 
increasingly dependent on the schools, at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, to 
generate their management staff and fill their management training programs.  Even 
though MBA students tended to score lower on standardized tests than did other graduate 
and professional students, corporate recruiters pursued them anyway.  In 1949–50 at HBS, 
for instance – admittedly one of the most prestigious business schools in the world – 
“more than 200 companies, with some 900 positions to fill, vigorously recruited among 
[its] 500 graduating MBA students.”  Little wonder that most schools saw no reason to 
change.16 
This self-satisfied conservatism begs the question: if the business schools were so 
mediocre, why did demand grow?  Business education historian Rakesh Khurana has 
pointed to “broad, interrelated social changes,” two of them particularly relevant for the 
School of Industrial Management.  One, the industrial: Americans came to accept and 
admire big companies.  Whereas during the Great Depression they blamed corporations 
for destroying the world, after World War II they praised them for saving it.  They 
accepted the belief, espoused by Peter Drucker and others, that the Allied victory demon-																																																								
15 Charles J. Dirksen and Lawrence C. Lockley, “Development of Collegiate Schools of Business 
and Activities of AACSB,” in American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business, 1916–
1966 (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), 1–18; Khurana, 196. 
16 Aaronson, 160; Khurana, 196–197. 
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strated “America’s organizational and managerial prowess,” specifically large organiza-
tions’ ability to direct massive operations of manufacturing, logistics, and technology.  
Moreover, since millions of young men and women had served in the military and the 
factories, they entered the postwar working world fully habituated to the huge bureau-
cracies, clear lines of authority, and well-defined rules and career paths industrial firms 
offered.  Big companies – the ones recruiting so heavily at business schools – even pro-
mised to strengthen society against Communism, social tensions, and other threats to the 
American way of life.17  Meanwhile the postwar boom in consumer demand was fueling 
the growth of diversified, multifunctional industrial enterprises, which in turn staffed that 
growth by employing future consumers.  It was the rise of the organizational society, the 
emergence of the Organization Man, “‘a revolution for which no flags were raised.’”18 
Two, the management: if Americans admired large firms, they revered even more 
the men who led them.  As Sloan’s and Brooks’s speeches have already suggested, 
“statesman” had become common parlance for the wise executive trusted to lead: lead not 
merely a firm but the economy too, and with it the nation’s political and social order 
amid the Cold War.  The victory of America and capitalism (the two were synonymous) 
depended on effective managers.  And according to educational leaders like Harvard’s 
president James Conant, those managers would have to be trained in schools, to be 
prepared “to appreciate the responsibilities of business” prior to starting work.  “‘Such 
men must understand not only the practical workings of business organizations, but also 
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the economic and social climate in which business operates; they must be as well trained 
as our professional men in law and medicine.’”19 
It’s not surprising that university leaders recommended university education.  
What’s surprising is that they didn’t alter that education to create the new “professional 
man.”  Even while flocking to recruit from business schools that hadn’t changed curricula 
in decades, corporations were asking for “a new, more rational conception of manage-
ment,” in which “an expert manager [was] able to bring rational analysis and a body of 
sophisticated technical knowledge to bear on a firm’s problems.”  He would use the 
quantitative tools of the new management sciences invented during the war – statistical 
sampling, systems analysis, computer simulations, cost accounting, and more – that 
almost no business schools taught.20  “Planning, forecasting, and controlling were to be 
the manager’s watchwords,” drawn from the fledgling field of operations research (OR).  
Moreover, because industrial enterprises needed an executive to make complex decisions 
spanning a diversified organization, they advocated general skill over specialist know-
ledge and rational analysis over personal charisma – useless in any case when a manager 
was responsible for thousands of employees he never saw.  An executive should be a 
statesman, not a politician.21 
Hence the problem Dean Brooks had identified.  Companies large and small wanted 
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to perpetuate their institutions “through the development of men capable of carrying on”: 
rational, scientific managers who understood and accepted the obligations of the execu-
tive.  Increasingly the companies depended on business schools to supply these men.  
Men even entered the schools willingly, eager to join the executive ranks.  And yet the 
schools had done nothing to equip these future managers any differently than they had in 
the 1930s and before.  In Brooks’s words, institutions had “failed to accomplish the ambi-
tions held for them when most of them were established some 30 to 40 years ago.”  The 
more management changed, the more management education stayed the same.22 
The Early Curriculum: “Planning the Educational Program” 
Therefore MIT strode forward.  Dean Brooks and his colleagues had chosen “to pre-
pare men to enter the field of management and there begin the climb to wise leadership in 
industry.” 23  Though Brooks couldn’t precisely define “industrial management” or decide 
whether “professional managers” had developed management into a genuine profession, 
he proudly declared the importance of both.24 
Today management is expected to look after the welfare not only of its stock-
holders, but of its customers and employees as well.  In addition to be considered 
“successful,” management must take steps to perpetuate the institution it directs.  
Our industrial enterprises – be they giants, large companies, or even small com-
panies – have come to play a very important public-service role.  …  It is the re-
sponsibility of successful industrial management to perpetuate the institutions 
that play this vital role in virtually every area of American life – economic, 
social – and even spiritual. 
And if companies were to obtain such management, then “as faulty as our knowledge is, 
nevertheless there is a contribution that education can make.  …  On it, in my opinion, 																																																								
22 EPB, draft of speech to the Advisory Committee, 2–3. 
23 MIT Annual Report (1953), 93. 
24 EPB, speech to the MIT Club of Washington, D.C., “MIT’s Role in Industrial Management of 
the Future,” 28 January 1954, AC336:1:5, 1. 
140 
will rest the success or failure of our American civilization.”25 
Thus far Brooks sounded like Conant and other advocates of management education.  
Yet like Killian, Brooks insisted on the power of founding that education in engineering 
and science.  In part the SIM was responding to the times: because American industries 
had grown increasingly or wholly technical, they demanded “executives who understand 
the language of the scientist and the engineer.”  But if vocabulary alone were the issue, 
then the SIM could have taught technical communication as a course, like a foreign lan-
guage requirement.  So why make engineering and science a prerequisite?  “Because 
study of these subjects develops in young minds a system of thought, an appreciation of 
the importance of facts, and the putting of facts together correctly.  It is a mental disci-
pline in the great tradition of the classic disciplines.”  And if this was the case, then MIT 
already had a leg up.26 
That said, the science of management – and education therefor – did not depend on 
engineering and natural sciences alone.  The SIM had “recognized the necessity of the 
social sciences” too, and took pride in its unusually close relationship with the Economics 
Department.  Both were vital to meet “a crying need” and clear mandate from industri-
alists: “‘Give us men who know how to get things done through people.’”27  Just as the 
Morison Committee had recommended, the SIM was instilling the social sciences in the 
walls and wells of the school, “not as things tacked on to the right and left as broadening 
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influences, but deep down in the program just as physics is deep down in the program.”28  
Similarly the SIM required coursework in industrial history, to ensure that students 
understood its dynamic evolution, since “it isn’t the ‘x’ and ‘y’ of our position on the 
curve that is significant rather it is the ‘dxdt’ of our position.”  Brooks added other “guide 
posts” too: understanding “the sweep of change,” management as synthesis, and “our 
American enterprise system and the significance of profits.”  The School would con-
centrate not on students’ first job out of school but on obligations they wouldn’t have 
until they reached “their years of responsibility.”  If critics would accuse faculty of giving 
students too few immediate practice skills, so be it.29 
Brooks wasn’t suggesting that the SIM education had no technical work.  His many 
counselors had stressed for instance the “extreme value” of accounting and statistics and 
management tools.  “Measurement has always characterized the movement from an art to 
a science, and as management becomes more scientific, measurement, be it of costs, 
movement, or time, will become necessarily important.”  Moreover, this area had “a 
semblance of tangibility” that helped make its teaching both “comprehensive and practi-
cal.”  Plus, accounting was something many business schools did well; it would be 
embarrassing for the SIM to lag behind.30   
Nonetheless, in multiple speeches and documents Brooks did what most schools 
couldn’t have done even if they’d tried.  Others would have had to prove their approach 
was scientific.  Brooks, with the weight of MIT behind him, could declare that the SIM’s 
																																																								
28 EPB, speech to the Independent Schools Association, 30 April 1953, AC336:1:5, 9. 
29 EPB, speech to the MIT Corporation, 4; EPB, draft of speech to the Advisory Committee, 5–7. 
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was scientific and more.  Though too conservative to use the term, Brooks and the faculty 
considered their methods revolutionary, comparable only to that of the Carnegie GSIA.  
Instead of a mishmash of war stories and practical techniques, the SIM drew principles 
from social science, management science, and well-grounded financial and business 
practices.  The SIM education was an integrated composite of the human and the techni-
cal, just like management itself. 
By December 1953, therefore, Brooks could tell Killian that “we now feel confident 
in planning the educational program” according to three beliefs.  One, teach small classes.  
Two, base the education on “two main streams … one based on the disciplines of the 
natural sciences and engineering, and the other on the study of man himself inasmuch as 
management depends so largely on getting things done through people.”  Three, build the 
professional subjects on these streams, and ensure they are taught not by merely studying 
existing practices but by relying on underlying principles and (as far as possible) on “the 
atmosphere of a living situation.”  Brooks considered these beliefs to be guiding 
principles, not epiphanies.  “The conclusions reached in some instances seem rather trite, 
but they have been come by laboriously.  In other areas I think we shall blaze trails.”31 
His notion of the “educational program” was expansive, for Brooks had become a 
strong advocate for executive education.  Not only had he seized the opportunity to 
double the Sloan Fellowship Program – “the Rhodes Scholarships for management 
training in this country” – but he’d also thrown his support behind early efforts at shorter-
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format, non-degree courses for experienced managers.  In the summer of 1953, “in 
response to the request from industry for a development program less than twelve months 
long,” the School had offered a three-week, 25-person course on Control Problems of the 
Executive.  As in the master’s programs, the course prepared managers (often technical 
experts from engineering, production, etc.) to “begin the climb to wise leadership in 
industry.”  In this case the focus was accounting: not a mere recitation of rules, but rigor-
ously analytical tools for the rising executive.32 
The course was successful enough to repeat the following summer.  Brooks foresaw 
a future abounding in executive development programs.  He even drew an analogy to 
military institutions, which require promising leaders both to get field experience and to 
return periodically to school “to equip themselves for the higher commands.”  Likewise, 
industrial firms should expect its rising executives to grow both from responsible 
positions and postgraduate education.  Moreover, “the evidence is very impressive that 
men from industry gain much from attending school after they have had more experience.  
Put in another way, a competent faculty is more effective with students who have had 
experience than when they work with students who have not had such experience.”  
Experience feeds education, and vice versa.33 
Experienced educators, however, were hard to come by, and the SIM continued to 
feel the pinch.  SIM’s few dozen faculty were dwarfed by those of established peers like 
Columbia (68), Harvard (88), and Wharton (149).  When Brooks argued for growth of 
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“adult education,” faculty wondered where they’d get high-quality faculty and students, 
not to mention sufficient facilities. Teaching courses shorter than a semester might free 
up classroom and dining space, but Brooks was the first to admit that “any increase in the 
number of students will approach an overload on our staff.”34 
Even less certain were the plans for research and for balancing it with the demands 
of teaching.  Elting Morison, for instance, repeatedly worried that there weren’t enough 
faculty, everyone was overworked, and no one had time to follow up on all the good 
research ideas the school was generating, which just discouraged everyone.  “We are 
trying by work and legerdemain to keep a show on the road – if we continue to do it with 
the present small cast, we may not ever make Broadway.”35  As he’d argued during and 
since the Morison Report, the SIM’s future depended on research and on research faculty.  
“We are in part a school to teach students administration, but we must also become in 
equal part a research institute for the investigation of the nature and problems of indus-
trial society if our teaching is to reach its full usefulness.”36  Experience may feed educa-
tion, but the educator must also cook up his own research.  And as events of 1953–54 
were to prove, the cooking is far more complicated when industrialists try to set the menu. 
“Constructive” Research Redux: Sloan, Catchings, and the Profit Project 
Not all industrialists thought research was worth the distraction.  Among Advisory 
Committee members, for instance, Gwilym Price (president of Westinghouse Electric) 																																																								
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suggested that in its first years the SIM should focus less on research and more on 
curriculum, student selection, and faculty recruitment.  For him the key was “developing 
to its full potential the product you turn out,” i.e., the graduates.  “I keep saying to myself 
that a school of industrial management such as you now have at MIT and Carnegie Tech 
now has in Pittsburgh, should be able much better to prepare young men for management 
positions in companies like Westinghouse than Harvard and Wharton Schools of Busi-
ness Administration.”  Perhaps the students’ engineering and technology background was 
the secret sauce, perhaps the curriculum and teaching staff.  Either way, Price and 
Westinghouse were eagerly awaiting “manpower and material quite different” from the 
alumni of any other “very fine” business schools.  Brooks must have been thrilled.37 
Meanwhile Killian and Sloan still spoke of research in glowing tones undimmed by 
the disagreements of the past year.  They also hinted that their positions hadn’t changed.  
At the Advisory Committee of October 6, 1953, Killian “laid down certain principles for 
guidance” in research, among them “emphasis on fundamental problems which 
management is less likely to tackle directly.”  He also extolled “the uncommitted scholar 
who works … in the free exercise of curiosity.  …  While concentrating on basic research, 
it is believed that a man should be free to follow his bent toward the solution of practical 
problems if he has the interest.”  At the same meeting Sloan wondered, perhaps disin-
genuously, about research’s role.  “Is it not to ‘bring business into the School and the 
School into business’ through the interests and efforts of the faculty and graduate stu-
dents and with active assistance from industry?  …  What should be the scope of 
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research?  To what extent should large projects of direct interest to industry be under-
taken by the School?”  Who chose the topics, why research was performed, how industry 
was to be involved: the battle lines hadn’t moved. 
Indeed, conflict was about to resume, the last and most intense phase – or at least 
the most openly hostile – of the SIM’s research war.  The first salvo was fired by Frank 
Howard, Chairman for Scientific Policy at the Sloan-Kettering Institute and another of 
Sloan’s entourage and fellow Advisory Councilors.  In a November 9 memo, Howard 
noted that “the approach of the University on research is necessarily somewhat different 
from the approach of an industrialist.”  Howard therefore suggested finding “some equi-
table division of responsibility for the control and use” of the Sloan Research Fund, 
rather than assume the academic or the industrialist was “exclusively the repository of all 
wisdom required.”38 
At first blush this seems reasonable.  Yet “equitable division” revived the notion of 
a formula, which MIT thought it had quashed back in June.  Moreover, Howard went 
considerably further.  He proposed that among three areas of research, one would be “on 
substantive questions of economics and public and employee relations involved in indus-
trial management.”  This segment would be “under the exclusive control of the Advisory 
Council, the University being responsible only for the implementation of the decision of 
the Council.”  It was the first time in print that someone so close to Sloan had gone so 
far.39 
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The memo was sprung on Brooks at a New York meeting on December 3, 1953, 
attended also by Catchings and Sloan.  Sloan gave the context: he thought the Brookings 
Institute, the Bureau of Economic Research, and other research organizations weren’t 
getting anything done, so the SIM should step in as the new research institute for industry.  
Howard made the attack: “he and everyone else” considered the faculty-proposed pro-
jects “luxuries” and “inconsequential,” and when the Council brought its own ideas the 
School was obliged to undertake them.  If no faculty wanted the projects, then the School 
would have to hire people to complete them.  Catchings twisted the knife: he too read the 
Research Fund as an obligation – in spirit if not in law – and if the Council decided a re-
search project was necessary to the School and its purposes, then the School had to do 
it.40 
As Brooks wrote wryly, “This was pretty strong medicine.”  In the meeting he 
pointed out that MIT was constantly turning down research projects from industry and 
government, and he “could not believe that MIT would agree to be required to undertake 
any piece of research by the Advisory Council or any other body.”  That said, he 
managed to kick the can down the road.  So far the Council (which for all practical pur-
poses was the three in the room) hadn’t proposed any topics that fell into the “exclusive 
control” category.  Therefore Brooks asked that they suggest some at the upcoming 
December 11 meeting, and then the projects could be discussed on their merits.  In the 
meantime, Brooks had deduced that Catchings, embittered, was “pushing Mr. Sloan to 
create a research institute out of this place … some agency comparable to Brookings 																																																								
40 EPB to unknown (probably JRK and KTC), memorandum, “Discussion with Messrs. Sloan, 
Catchings and Howard in New York, December 3, 1953,” 5 December 1953, AC336:1:19, 1–5. 
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which will do their will.”  Brooks didn’t believe that Howard was more than a mere 
mouthpiece or that Sloan would “of his own free will reach the drastic conclusions” of 
Catchings.  But that didn’t make the problem go away.  “I think this matter must be 
straightened out once and for all.”41 
The December meeting did make MIT’s position stronger, if not straighter.  Judging 
by his letter to Compton a few days later, Sloan left “very happy now about the whole 
picture and sorry so much confusion go into it at the beginning.”  To his mind, when 
many on the Advisory Committee didn’t like the faculty’s first batch of research 
proposals, “we did not exactly understand what it was all about.”  Now, however, “we 
realize if it is a part of the educational system, that the need and the right can best be 
evaluated by those who are concerned with the administration of the educational system.  
We, on our part; i.e., the business side of the School’s activities, can still encourage and 
support the different kind of projects we are talking about.”42  There could be projects on 
the broad economy, as Catchings wanted.  There could be multi-firm projects, as the fa-
culty had proposed (though Sloan still considered some “insignificant”).  There could 
even be theoretical projects, such as Sloan’s question whether executive ability was inhe-
rent or teachable, or Compton’s whether the practical, fact-based engineering background 
and approach “is a good basis for a managerial career” – the same issue that had sparked 
Sloan’s interest in developing industrial management at MIT in the first place.43  But the 
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core point was the decision rights.  As Compton, Killian, and Brooks had underscored 
time and again (as recently as July) the Deed of Gift gave faculty the power to choose 
their topics.  The Advisory Council – even its chairman – had “exclusive control” over 
none.  And with that fact Sloan now declared himself content. 
Over the next four months the research dispute largely died away.  Sloan did 
propose one change that MIT was glad to accept: to support projects only with the 
income of the Fund, not the principal.  In Sloan’s words, the Research Fund was like the 
building: “it is part of the School activity, but we do not want to liquidate it.”  Brooks 
confirmed this on January 27, 1954, adding for the record that the income “will be 
controlled by the MIT administration in accordance with its regular budgetary and 
accounting policies.”44  Although Sloan and the administration wouldn’t get around to 
formally agreeing to these terms until May 1954, both were already treating them as 
settled.45  In Brooks’s words, “[a] lot of time has been consumed on the part of all of us 
in arriving at our present understanding.  …  We have all learned from those discussions 
and I am of the opinion that we are now on sound ground and that we know how to 
proceed.”  It was all over but the shouting.46 
Yet there’d still be plenty of shouting so long as Waddill Catchings was around.  
Brooks had been right: Catchings wanted to use MIT as his own economic research 
institute.  Catchings left the December 11 meeting determined to resolve the “misunder-
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standing” by that archetype of business eloquence, the memorandum.  He therefore wrote 
to Killian laying out his views on the SIM’s research program. 
The purpose is to learn fundamental facts.  These include the opinions of 
businessmen which play an important part in the making of decisions regarding 
production and distribution.  … 
[The SIM’s commitment includes] scientific investigation directed toward 
learning the truth in the basic controversies which exist between leading busi-
nessmen and leading economic teachers, such controversies, for instance, as 
those concerning the role of Government in economic life, and the essential 
features of our system of competitive enterprise. 
Though Catchings acknowledged (perhaps grudgingly) that “decisions concerning the 
nature, extent and conduct of projects to be undertaken are to be made wholly by MIT,” 
he insisted that it jump on this “investigation” right away.47 
Catchings had an idée fixe.  He believed American free enterprise stood on the brink 
of destruction: not by communism, but by expanded Government control and interference 
in “our economic life,” which he considered crypto-socialism.  He also believed 
Government policymakers took their cues from professional economists, who advocated 
“regulation that amounts … to State management of production … [and] master-
planning.”48  Therefore even when he declared “opinions of businessmen” to be “funda-
mental facts,” or when Killian gently wondered “how actually through research 
techniques to get at the facts and make a creative contribution,” Catchings was not de-
terred.  He insisted that as a research organization and educator of future executives, the 
SIM had to take an active part in “the conflict which to many businessmen seems to be a 
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life and death struggle for the continued existence of individual economic freedom.”49 
Catchings laid out his views – what he considered a research proposal – on January 
11, 1954, in “The Making of Profits as the Directing Force in Our Economic Life.”  If 
he’d written only the first page he’d have submitted a reasonably dispassionate proposal, 
albeit gigantic in scope.  He called for “a comprehensive investigation both of the actual 
manner in which competitive business is guided by profit, and of the factual basis” for 
Government supervision of savings, investment, unemployment insurance, large public 
work expenditure, and everything else Keynesians supported.  How this investigation 
would be accomplished Catchings didn’t say, though he did insist on “professional eco-
nomists of recognized standing.”50 
So far so good.  At this point, however, Catchings took it upon himself to write “a 
brief statement of what in my opinion will be the main accomplishments of the 
investigation.”  Eight pages followed.  Catchings outlined five facts and four conclusions 
for this Profit Project.  He expected competitive enterprise to be right and sufficient, and 
the theories of Keynes to be wrong and “not in accord with the actual facts of our econo-
mic life.”  Yet these were merely predictions, he insisted.  “It cannot be emphasized too 
strongly that my purpose is not to influence the fact finders but merely to set forth a per-
sonal opinion of the probable results of their study.”51 
Perhaps Catchings genuinely believed these were opinions, not predetermined 
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outcomes.  But after months of whispering in Sloan’s ear and insisting on MIT’s “obliga-
tions,” he shouldn’t have been surprised when Killian responded warily.  Though 
agreeing with Catchings’s points of view, Killian didn’t see the research project.  “The 
problem is to set up a research procedure which provides a valid examination of the 
problem and which is a true research project in the sense that the ultimate outcome yields 
new information and is not preordained or obvious.”52  Though he didn’t say so, Killian 
wrote his reply armed with two letters.  He’d already received Sloan’s December 21 
confirmation that faculty chose the projects, not the Advisory Council – the pivotal 
victory.  And he’d seen an evaluation by John Jewkes, the Oxford liberal economist so 
admired by Sloan who’d recently visited MIT.  Jewkes too considered the memo 
unworkable as a research proposal.  “I think that the Catching [sic] document would be 
most useful if regarded as a general statement of what many people, who believe in the 
competitive system, would accept as their creed and if, as a next stage, pieces of it could 
be isolated for further statistical or analytical treatment.”  Unfortunately, such treatment 
was probably impossible, since economics was a “frontier science … limited by the ina-
dequate material and the primitive analytical instruments.”  Most importantly, “some of 
the ideas which Mr. Catching [sic] puts forth can never be proved one way or the other by 
economists; they are matters of political judgment about which statesmen must decide.”53  
Killian took the point: Catchings was welcome to his creed, but no MIT research project 
could ever prove it. 
It would take another four months to get all the Profit Project issues out on the table.  																																																								
52 JRK to Waddill Catchings, 21 January 1954, AC4:202:9. 
53 John Jewkes to EPB, 16 January 1954, AC336:1:3. 
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Killian offered to convene a meeting.  Catchings eagerly agreed.  Catchings meanwhile 
insisted that the research findings were obvious, but obvious only to businessmen; once 
Paul Samuelson and his colleagues looked at “the facts which businessmen will make 
available to him,” Samuelson would abandon his “false teaching.” 54   The faculty 
themselves tried to show willing (at Killian’s and Stratton’s insistence) by coming up 
with relevant “specific studies for which empirical data are available.”  Perhaps they 
could study the relationship between “total business profits and national income,” or the 
markets’ role in resource allocation during uncertainty, or how different forms of taxation 
affected firms’ profits and managers’ behavior (a major topic among accounting 
researchers sixty years later).  But the faculty fell all over themselves to insist that 
pending further discussion the project list was preliminary, non-exhaustive, and “entirely 
tentative.”  They had no desire to be kicked around as they had the previous spring.55 
The shoe was on the other foot at the final showdown on May 13, 1954.  It was 
labeled an Advisory Committee meeting, but that was a misnomer.  The only Advisors 
present were Sloan, Zurcher, and Catchings, along with a “Mr. Dewey” (probably 
Bradley Dewey ’09, chairman of Dewey & Aly Chemical and life member of the MIT 
Corporation).  And when Eli Shapiro presented the project list, Catchings exploded in 
frustration.  Although the topics were valuable, “none of them relate to the subject of my 
memorandum.  It is a complete by-passing of the spirit and purpose of the memorandum.”  
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The studies might be interesting, but they had nothing to do with his Profit Project.56 
At last both sides were speaking bluntly.  The academics, heartened by knowing that 
disagreeing wouldn’t get their funding pulled, asked whether Catchings was writing 
“from a political point of view.”  Dewey felt that “if it is a political battle Brookings 
probably ought to do it.  It is not a battle to be fought at Tech and, furthermore, I am not 
so sure we would turn up things we would want to turn up.  …  It would give me the 
shivers.”  Catchings, though still insisting he wanted only open-ended, non-preordained 
research, declared the project had originated when he and Sloan asked “whether MIT 
wanted to undertake to help us in maintaining free competitive society.  …  There isn’t 
any intelligent education on profits and the function of profits in our economic life.  It 
seems to me hopeless that the profit system can be saved” unless MIT devoted two men 
full time to demonstrating that profits guide economic life – and guide it sufficiently.  
When Brooks tried to invoke Jewkes’s evaluation, Catchings snapped, “I am not interes-
ted in the academic point of view.”57 
It was Killian who eventually drove the nails into the Profit Project’s coffin.   
This kind of institution is very definitely interested in doing research.  We must 
do it always and let the chips fall where they may.  We must not seek to prove a 
point.  Let the chips fall where they may, we must get the basic facts first.  …  
What you really want is a powerful and forceful and comprehensive statement of 
the power of profits.  That is not necessarily a matter of research. 
He and the faculty might agree with Catchings’s creed.  They might even wish they’d 
written it.  But that didn’t make it a research project.58 
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Over the following month the debate gradually petered out.  Catchings wrote to 
Killian in high dudgeon (“Rarely in my lifetime have I been as disappointed”) asking to 
meet with the faculty again, asserting that he’d only ever wanted a “factual study.”  Kil-
lian agreed to the meeting, provided that the debate not divert attention from “the over-all 
welfare of the School,” or “disturb a relationship of confidence” between administration 
and faculty or between faculty and outside advisors.  Catchings agreed “most emphati-
cally,” claiming that he had “no intention of … creating an impression that pressure of 
any sort is being brought to bear upon your faculty.”  Killian asked Brooks to set up the 
meeting; Brooks asked to wait until midsummer; the process ground to a halt.59 
Research and “Scientific Investigations” 
Painful though they may have been, the twenty-odd months of research discussion 
hadn’t been entirely wasted.  The Research Fund continued to support projects through-
out the SIM’s early years, including one that Sloan must have welcomed: John Rae’s arti-
cle on “Engineering Education as Preparation for Management: A Study of MIT Alum-
ni.”60  On the strength of Myers’s and Shultz’s work the School even won a share of a 
$475,000 Ford Foundation grant “for studies of labor as a factor in economic develop-
ment,” awarded by Thomas H. Carroll, who would lead the Ford Foundation’s critique of 
management education five years later.61  Meanwhile Sloan would never again seek 
overtly to control the SIM’s research or researchers.  Though he’d occasionally grumble 
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about the topics, his experience with both the GM and Profit Projects seems to have con-
vinced him to allow MIT faculty their research independence.  Twice bitten, thrice shy.  
Catchings meanwhile, deciding that you if you want something done right you have 
to do it yourself, turned his creed into his final book, Do Economists Understand 
Business?  In light of its Foreword, his January 1954 memo looks like a first draft. 
This lack of agreement between the economic experts and the practical men of 
affairs is a tremendous handicap in America’s all-out struggle with Commu-
nism – a struggle in which our ultimate success or failure may depend upon basic 
economic knowledge.  …  But in the science of economics, [our] educational 
centers have not as yet provided … leadership in our efforts to learn the funda-
mental facts about business.  …  I have necessarily stated my personal views.  
But these, I may say, have been arrived at by much study of business facts during 
a long and wide experience in industry, commerce, banking, and finance.  …  I 
have had sufficient experience with important executives to know that I speak for 
them as well as myself.  Nevertheless, I cannot emphasize too strongly that all 
the views are stated merely as a opinions – to be proved or disproved like any 
other opinions by scientific investigations.62 
Catchings may have deluded himself about what the “scientific investigations” 
might prove.  But science remained the core issue.  Throughout 1951–54, the SIM leaders, 
advisors, and faculty had been groping to define the role of science in the School of 
Industrial Management.  Brooks and others contended that as a leader in engineering and 
science MIT had a special role in education for industrial management, a role in which 
science determined the students’ prerequisites, purpose, curriculum, and even mental 
discipline.  Meanwhile Killian, Compton, and faculty demanded that the SIM control its 
research agenda not just to protect its independence but also to ensure that the research 
projects were driven by empirical data, objectivity, rational analysis – in short, by science. 
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In 1951 Sloan had said that industrial management was “a matter of science.”  The SIM 
would spend the remainder of the 1950s arguing that science mattered.  
158 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
“Science for the industrial executive” 
By the fall of 1955, the SIM’s leaders were looking back on their achievements with 
pride.  They’d graduated the first two classes of the Master of Science in Industrial Man-
agement.  They’d finally recruited enough faculty to cover the School’s teaching and 
research commitments.  They’d even been complimented by Mr. Sloan on rising toward a 
position “commensurate with the Institute itself.”  As Brooks noted, “the Fifth School 
had to attain an equivalent stature, so that industry would consider MIT not only as a 
source of competent engineers, architects and scientists but also a source of competent 
managers.”1 
Yet just one year before, even the low threshold of “competent” had seemed dis-
couragingly high.  Several potential faculty hires had fallen through, and others already in 
place (particularly Mason Smith and Joseph Pechman) had departed after barely two 
years at MIT.2  More devastating were two deaths.  Associate Dean Ronald “Doc” Rob-
nett died in February 1954, much mourned by colleagues throughout the School.  Three 
months later MIT lost an even more pivotal figure.  Karl Compton, arguably the most 
significant MIT president of the twentieth century, had been a voice of conviction and 
behind-the-scenes leadership for the School of Industrial Management – even suggesting 
its name – since his original conversation with Sloan in September 1950.   Sloan himself 
had been devastated by Compton’s passing.  According to Raymond Sloan, “his brother 
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became very emotional about some people and some things.  …  Alfred had literally 
broken down when he read the reference to Compton’s death in the Sloan Foundation 
minutes.”3  From this time dates a gradual diminution in Sloan’s volume of correspon-
dence with the School; the loss of “my dear Dr. Compton” probably played a part. 
The SIM’s leaders had also confessed themselves discouraged about research.  
During the months of debate over the Research Fund, appropriate topic areas, and project 
decision rights, the faculty had made little progress.  Brooks found the slow start all the 
more disheartening because he considered teaching loads low (not that all faculty would 
agree) and MIT’s ambitions high.  As he noted in September 1954, “the spirit of research 
permeates MIT.  Not much research has characterized our program in the past.  …  But 
no one challenges that research should be a part of the program of this School.”  
Meanwhile Sloan continued to gripe about the research topics and what he saw as 
faculty’s disconnection from industry needs.  When Brooks showed him the Sloan 
Fellows’ thesis titles, Sloan declared that “these subjects are far more constructive as 
research projects than the projects recommended by the faculty of the School.”  Unlike 
their teachers, the Fellows had chosen “problems significant to business management 
[which] I believe reflects the fact that they are engaged in business management to a 
more or less extent.” 4  Little wonder that in July 1955 Brooks declared that School 
administrators had to assert leadership rather than depend on individual faculty initiative.  
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Even if industry relevance were irrelevant, measured simply by quantity of production 
“the progress we have made in the field of research is not adequate.”5 
The Developing Curriculum: “A Sound Concept” 
What they’d focused on instead was the curriculum.  This had meant starting from 
first principles: “the belief that training in science and engineering is an invaluable asset 
in the education of industrial managers.”  Translating belief into curriculum had proved 
problematic, as the SIM faculty struggled to develop “a sound concept of teaching indus-
trial management to exploit our resources in science and engineering” and apply “the 
findings of the social and physical sciences.”  They sought to emphasize “underlying 
principles” rather than “today’s successful practices,” to focus on “management decision-
making” and “greater understanding of the industrial process,” to recognize manage-
ment’s “responsibilities to employees, to customers, and to the public at large.  In our 
time management has become a high calling.”  Higher aspirations take longer to achieve.6 
It’s important to remember how little of other schools the SIM could imitate.  Even 
putting aside the unusual basis in science and engineering, most business schools’ curri-
cula were both traditional and inconsistent.  In 1949 the AACSB had tried gently to im-
pose on its members an undergraduate core requirement.7 
As the foundation for training in administration, instruction shall be offered in 
the fields of economics, accounting, statistics, business law, finance, marketing, 
or industrial management.  In general, candidates for the undergraduate degree 
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shall receive basic instructions in each of these fields.  Opportunities for 
advanced work shall be available in at least three of the above fields.8 
This requirement, which one former AACSB president called “unbelievably simple and 
noncontroversial,” had only limited effect on the members, even less on the majority of 
schools that the AACSB didn’t accredit.  It didn’t include some fields that today’s 
schools take for granted, particularly strategy (known in the 1950s as “administrative 
policy”).  Nor did it draw on the physical or even social sciences, as the SIM sought to 
do; glaringly missing from the AACSB core was organizational behavior (OB), which 
grew out of the work of social scientists like Douglas McGregor (SIM faculty since 1954).  
Even the AACSB’s reference to industrial management implies less than it seems.  As the 
document explained, “Production or Industrial Management is used as a generic term to 
describe courses in Industrial Management, Production Management, Industrial Relations 
and Personnel Management, Production Planning and Control, as well as courses in 
manufacturing or production.”  In other words, the AACSB’s “industrial management” 
loosely embraced both HR and the early precursors of operations management (OM) and 
operations research (OR).  If strategy, OB, OM, and OR could all be omitted from “non-
controversial” standards, then the standards-bearers can’t have considered them 
important.9 
MIT disagreed.  It disagreed both because of what it was – an institute of techno-
logy – and because of its objective: to provide industry not its specialists but its line man-
agers.  Other schools taught bookkeeping, actuarial procedures, even secretarial skills.  																																																								
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The SIM considered these jejune.  In Brooks’s words, “the goal is to produce not 
accountants but men who understand accounting and control for management purposes; 
not human relations experts but men who understand how to get things done through 
people; not salesmen but men who understand the importance of distribution.”  Industry 
needed general managers.  The SIM ought to educate them.10 
Therefore the “sound concept of teaching industrial management” stretched beyond 
the standard AACSB structure.  Brooks summarized the curriculum at length in 1954. 
Earlier I have mentioned and confirmed our faith in the value of studies of math-
ematics, physics and engineering as a basic, sound discipline for students 
planning a career in the field of management.  Our undergraduate students 
receive this at MIT, and our graduate students come to us having majored in 
some field of science or engineering.  The rationale underlying our current core 
curriculum in management subjects can be described briefly as follows: the 
fundamental tools for grappling with management problems consist of thorough 
grounding in accounting as a control device, statistics as an aid to managerial 
decision-making and the usefulness of incremental analysis as applied to profit 
maximation [sic].  These tools are then utilized in developing an understanding 
of the functional fields – production, marketing, finance and industrial relations.  
Certain of the relationships of industrial management to government are 
developed in the new law courses where the law is taught as a procedural and 
environmental process; the significance of change is elaborated in our work in 
industrial history; the relationship of the individual to society is developed in our 
work in human behavior.  Finally, the application of this entire body of 
knowledge to management decision-making is developed in our administrative 
policy courses and in our organization courses.11 
Although this curriculum drew from most of the same fields as the AACSB’s, 
Brooks carefully emphasized “understanding” and “grappling with management prob-
lems”: the fields were means to a general management end.  Moreover, the SIM chose to 
require human behavior, administrative policy (strategy), and “organization courses” (i.e., 
OB), fields that can represent close to 25 percent of the typical undergraduate and MBA 																																																								
10 Notes from the SIM Advisory Committee (convened 4 October 1955), 3. 
11 MIT Annual Report (1954), 94. 
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core today.  Missing only was economics, which was required but was taught at the 
undergraduate level by the Economics Department.  The omission was no criticism of 
Economics, which in fact had been extraordinarily helpful, far beyond even “bullish anti-
cipation.”  As Associate Dean Shapiro gratefully wrote to Killian, “I venture to guess you 
are the only university president to receive this kind of note [of praise] about an 
Economics Department from an administrator of a School of Industrial Management.”  
As Shapiro’s predecessor “Doc” Robnett had pointed out in 1951, at most other universi-
ties, economics and business faculties were at daggers drawn, often because economists 
sneered at business schools’ courses but coveted their popularity.12 
If economics should have been included, one other statement shouldn’t.  Brooks 
asserted in the 1954 Report to the President that “our graduate students come to us 
having majored in some field of science or engineering.”  This wasn’t precisely true.  As 
of December 1954, Sloan Fellows director Gerald Tallman was already explaining to 
Arnold Zurcher that entering graduate students could have “a substantial amount of 
science and/or engineering” but major in something else.13  Brooks had gone even further.  
Though the SIM demanded “rigorous discipline of thought,” and though science and 
engineering majors tended to have developed that discipline, other majors could have 
too – along with important complementary qualities.  “If a man is motivated toward man-
agement, and if he possesses the qualities of leadership, I would welcome him if he had 																																																								
12 Eli Shapiro to JRK, 27 January 1955, AC4:203:2.  For early concerns about intermingling 
economics and business faculties at MIT, see chapter 3 above.  In 1959 management education 
critics would decry “those schools where the economics faculty has withdrawn into their private 
domain and the business faculty into theirs, [as] the result has usually proven educationally 
preposterous and administratively unwieldy”: Pierson, 255–256. 
13 Gerald B. Tallman to Arnold Zurcher, 13 December 1954, AC336:1:24. 
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undergraduate work in philosophy, in art, or other areas in the liberal arts,” provided that 
he’d followed it through and “been subjected to the discipline of that particular field.”  In 
other words, so long as the student had had sufficient math to do the work, the SIM 
expected that he have a rigorous mind, not necessarily a scientifically trained one.14 
This wasn’t the only time Brooks sounded dogmatic in a public statement and 
nuanced in private.  In the 1955 Report to the President he extolled the faculty for their 
“integrated approach.”  Meanwhile he was complaining to Shapiro that “we have 
improved the curriculum, but I am not satisfied that we are going about it in a sufficiently 
organized way.”  He also worried about making the students “so theoretical and so de-
pendent in their thinking on analyses that they are not very useful in industry.”  For the 
Advisory Committee, however, he trumpeted that “the emphasis is on the use of analy-
tical methods, on methods for reasoning from the known to the unknown.”  To his bosses 
Brooks played up scientific methods and principles.  To his staff he fretted that they went 
too far.15 
Operations Research and the Role of Science in the SIM 
It also wasn’t the first time that Brooks hinted at misgivings about an over-emphasis 
on science.  Though he probably agreed with Sloan’s notion of industrial management as 																																																								
14 EPB to Arnold Zurcher, 31 December 1954, AC336:1:24.  In point of fact, however, it would 
be a few years before the SIM found applicants who’d accumulated enough background in 
quantitative fields without majoring in them.  Those men might have gone to liberal arts schools 
but majored in math or science anyway.  As Shapiro put it, “we don’t get the English majors at 
all.  … We’re assuming in our curriculum that these men are competent in mathematics and under 
the circumstances if you took the English major, he’d just be at sea.”  Notes from the SIM 
Advisory Committee (convened 4 October 1955), AC336:1:6, 4. 
15 EPB to Eli Shapiro, memorandum, 25 July 1955, AC336:1:22, 2; MIT Annual Report (1955), 
141; Summary Report from the SIM Advisory Committee (convened 4 October 1955), 
AC336:1:6, 4. 
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“a matter of science,” he had conspicuously insisted on featuring the social sciences 
alongside the physical and technological.  The SIM expected its students to develop 
quantitative tools and “the ability to analyze,” as well as “specific knowledge of the 
mechanisms of the business enterprise.”16  But it wasn’t training technicians, or even 
technocrats.  Science should refine and reinforce industrial management, not revolu-
tionize or reject. 
Illustrating this tension is the history of operations research at MIT.  As William 
Thomas has shown, OR rose to prominence in parallel with the SIM, yet its faculty ulti-
mately formed a separate Operations Research Center (ORC) rather than join the Fifth 
School.  This may seem surprising, since the SIM founders recognized OR early on as an 
MIT strength.  As early as March 1951, when Compton was welcoming Brooks to the 
deanship, he was already suggesting that the new School incorporate “the application of 
the war-time type of operational research to problems of industrial management.”17  That 
OR ended up in the (highly respected) ORC rather than the SIM, in Thomas’s words, 
“owed more to circumstance than to any final resolution concerning the relation between 
OR and the field of management.”18 
Operations research grew largely out of the Second World War.  British and Ameri-
can scientists and economists had been recruited by the war effort, particularly “to ana-
lyze resource allocation problems – shipping paths, anti-aircraft fire, convoy movements, 
anti-submarine warfare, logistics, military inventories, quality control of military produc-
																																																								
16 MIT Annual Report (1955), 140. 
17 KTC to EPB, 20 March 1951, AC4:202:8. 
18 Thomas, “Operations Research,” 103. 
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tion lines, etc.”19  So successful were these techniques and so impassioned their creators 
that they naturally sought to extend their work beyond the military.  “Some American 
scientists supposed that existing managerial decision-making in the civil sector was 
sufficiently haphazard, and scrutiny by scientists sufficiently beneficial, that it made 
sense to establish operations research as a new profession.”  OR had everything: 
innovative methods, sophisticated mathematics, and top-flight scientists eager to bring 
their discoveries to bear upon the modern corporation.20 
What it didn’t have, at least at the SIM, was a sponsor.  Despite Compton’s 
suggestion, Brooks was wary of jumping onto the bandwagon of a new field, particularly 
one that claimed to achieve dramatic breakthroughs unlike any before.  Shortly after 
starting as dean in 1951, Brooks asked Tom Hill, a junior accounting professor, to look 
into OR.  Hill wasn’t impressed.  Although he saw potential in the mathematical tech-
niques, he believed “‘OR groups have frequently done no more than to arrive at operating 
methods which we recognize as corresponding to existing practice in certain well-
managed, progressive companies.’”21  The work wasn’t bad, just banal.  At Hill’s recom-
mendation, the SIM remained friendly but independent.  A few years later Hill and others 
would see more potential for OR in “‘non-technical’ areas of industrial management,” 
what Jay W. Forrester later called “broader, top-management problems.”  But by that 
time MIT’s OR researchers had given up on joining the fold and set up the interdiscipli-
																																																								
19 E. Roy Weintraub, “Introduction: Telling the Story of MIT Economics in the Postwar Period,” 
in MIT and the Transformation of American Economics, ed. E. Roy Weintraub (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2014). 
20 Thomas, “Operations Research,” 100. 
21 Quoted in Thomas, “Operations Research,” 114. 
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nary ORC, which remains separate from (but next-door to) the School to this day.22 
Perhaps OR’s advocates had simply come on too strong.  Enthusiasm is one thing, 
proselytizing another.  But the records suggest two further explanations.  First, operations 
researchers may have seemed too narrow for too long.  They may have overemphasized 
quantitative means over practical ends, the techniques – linear programming, logistical 
optimization, queuing theory, and so on – over the problems they could be used to ad-
dress.  Their hammers may have been shiny and new, but that didn’t automatically win 
converts among those who owned the nails.23 
Second, operations researchers may have overstated their importance as scientists.  
By declaring their methods both novel and scientific, they implied – perhaps uninten-
tionally – that existing practices were antiquated and unsystematic.  This put industrial 
managers’ backs up.  Many rejected the claim that only scientists were accustomed to 
applying the scientific method, and that industry habitually relied on gut feel and hoary 
routine.  Others wondered what was so great about science anyway.  As Thomas has 
recently pointed out, the postwar period featured a narrative (particularly among 
scientists) in which “science is associated closely with technology, but also with 
rationality, which, in turn, is implicitly defined as the virtue underlying any sound 
policy.”24  OR advocates, despite the best attempts of a few within the ranks, tended to 
“presume that the idea of ‘science’ conveyed … inherent authority in the business world.”  
It was the “scientization” described by Fourcade and Khurana, and for those in industrial 																																																								
22 Thomas, “Operations Research,” 117–118; Jay W. Forrester, “Industrial Dynamics – After the 
First Decade,” Management Science 14, no. 7 (March 1968), 398. 
23 Thomas, “Operations Research,” 100. 
24 Thomas, Rational Action, 4. 
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management – and management education – scientization could veer awfully close to 
condescending dehumanization.25 
Even in the social sciences, seemingly the most human-centric areas of management 
studies, critics were detecting the threats or distractions of scientization and scientism.  
William Whyte, for instance, contended that those seeking to create “an exact science of 
man” took “the fatal step from science to scientism.”  In organizations they devised 
personality tests to assign concrete measures to immeasurable traits; at conferences they 
argued that “‘the world’s greatest need is a science of human relationships and an art of 
human engineering based on the laws of such science.’”  Although he dismissed fears of 
domination by science or a scientific elite, Whyte nonetheless warned against “the gospel 
of scientism.  …  The trouble is not so much that these techniques work, but that they do 
not work.  Schemes that don’t work have as much effect on society as schemes that do.”26 
Although he never joined Whyte in condemning “an exact science of man,” Dean 
Brooks nonetheless consistently focused on “understanding” rather than “science” of 
enterprises and human beings.27  He also tended to distrust academics who claimed to be 
blazing trails for managers to follow.  In part his suspicion grew out of his own executive 
experience: Sears, Roebuck had been solving logistical problems for over sixty years 
before OR came along, and without abstruse mathematics it had somehow muddled 
through.  Moreover, he’d just spent two years defending to Sloan and his cronies that 
academics’ work was even relevant, and some of the Advisory Committee’s disdain may 																																																								
25 Thomas, “Operations Research,” 105; Fourcade and Khurana, 5.  See Chapter 4 above. 
26 Whyte, 26, 203, 35; George M. Marsden, The Twilight of the American Enlightenment: The 
Crisis of Liberal Belief (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 33. 
27 MIT Annual Report (1955), 140. 
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have rubbed off. 
In the MIT President’s Report of 1955, for instance, Brooks managed both to com-
mend the study of automation and patronize it.  “In no subject can the merging of other 
MIT fields with the problems of business be more fruitful than in the ‘new’ area laboring 
under the name ‘automation.’”  Although automation – “great advances in electronics and 
mechanical devices” – was already improving industrial processes, Brooks insisted that 
“‘automation’ is not something new to our managerial thinking.”  Whom he was com-
forting isn’t clear; surely an MIT audience didn’t need to be reassured that automation 
was “not likely to overrun us like a tidal wave or a swarm of locusts.”  But amid the 
hyperbole and air quotes Brooks did see a place for this “new” area at the SIM. 
We think of the School as a logical meeting place where the developments of 
MIT’s researchers in electronics, in computing machines, and in the whole field 
of data processing can be made to join with the needs of the business world in 
accounting, forecasting, and managerial controls.  There are vast possibilities for 
fruitfulness in this integrated approach, and there is every reason to believe that 
the report for the coming academic year will call attention to substantial progress 
in research and curriculum development in the managerial implications of data 
processing.28 
Funds from Foundations: The Birth of System Dynamics 
Brooks was probably alluding to a scheme that he and Associate Dean Shapiro were 
cooking up, to get support for the SIM’s activities from the Ford Foundation.  As Roger 
Geiger has recounted, immediately after World War II foundations had little money to 
give – a total averaging $102 million per year in 1945–1952, 25 percent less in real terms 
than before the war.  The Ford Foundation changed the picture dramatically.  Owning 
90 percent of the non-voting shares in the Ford Motor Company, the Foundation in 1953 																																																								
28 MIT Annual Report (1955), 142–143. 
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gave out $66 million, compared to $99 million from all other foundations combined.  
Moreover, the Ford Foundation had decided to devote its resources to five areas: “the 
establishment of world peace; improving the economy; the strengthening of democracy; 
problems of education; and furthering what was originally termed the scientific study of 
man and later called the behavioral sciences.”  This last area, known as the Behavioral 
Sciences Program (BSP), would direct its grants largely to colleges and universities.29 
Shapiro and Brooks wanted the MIT SIM to be one of them.  In a portmanteau 
proposal of November 14, 1955 (now lost), Shapiro requested substantial support for “a 
wide range of activities” related to automation and management.  The Foundation’s 
response was encouraging, but only barely.  BSP director Lloyd Reynolds commented 
that the proposal involved “a wide range of activities and people throughout the MIT 
structure, some of whom, to speak very frankly, seemed to be dragged in by the heels.  … 
It seemed to start from the existence of certain machine facilities and to ramify out to 
everybody who might conceivably have some interest in machine processes, automation, 
or even technological change in general.”  The SIM might draw its strength from the 
Institute, but it needed to win Foundation support on its own merits.30 
It did its best.  In January 1956 the SIM sent Reynolds a new proposal draft, 29 
pages long, to support not a range of activities but a research program.  Researchers 
would create “a strong management science research program” in the Institute’s related 
technical fields, “then use the research results to feed a graduate school curriculum” that 
would in turn lead to curricula for undergraduates and executive education.  In the minds 																																																								
29 Geiger, 92–93, 101. 
30 Lloyd G. Reynolds to Eli Shapiro, 14 December 1955, AC132:7. 
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of the authors – Shapiro, Forrester, and electrical engineering professor Edward L. 
Bowles – the SIM had got its basic organization out of the way and was ready to trek into 
new territory.  “The time has come to begin an orderly, thoughtful and imaginative effort 
to see how the School of Industrial Management can proceed into the frontier of 
management education for the future by taking advantage of new developments in the 
social sciences” and technical disciplines.31 
Unfortunately the proposal still seemed a mile wide and an inch deep.  The authors 
imagined a program “aimed at ‘science for the industrial executive’ rather than ‘manage-
ment for the scientist,’” and quoted Peter Drucker on the dangers of scientists running 
around with solutions looking for problems.  But as Reynolds pointed out the following 
month, the proposal spent more time listing technical fields than detailing who would be 
involved, what lines of research would be pursued, or even what the efforts would cost.  
Having previously asked for focus, Reynolds must have been at best nonplussed to see 
(on page 1) that the SIM proposed to look for “new fundamental viewpoints” from 
“digital computation, operations research, feedback servo systems, sampled data-control 
theory, simulator studies of complex systems, game theory, information theory, 
development of information processing in military combat information centers, and group 
behavior and other studies in the social sciences.”32  Perhaps Reynolds didn’t read the 
technical explanations thoroughly, and Shapiro was probably right that Reynolds had 
“less than adequate comprehension of our program.”  But Reynolds’s criticism was fair: 
																																																								
31 Proposal, “Development of a New Industrial Management Curriculum at MIT,” 24 January 
1956, AC132:7, 1 and 6. 
32 Proposal, “Development,” 6–7, 1. 
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the document reads more like preamble than statement, and the proposed analysis like 
internal operations instead of field-advancing research.  And if the research really was 
Institute self-study and curriculum-building, said Reynolds, then it was the Institute that 
should pay for it.  “The fact that the program is sound and desirable, in short, would not 
of itself constitute a justification for Foundation support.”33 
Shapiro was disappointed.  Brooks was impatient.  In September 1956, seven 
months after Reynolds’s letter, Brooks was urging Shapiro to “make some real progress 
on this shortly,” implying that he had dropped the ball. Brooks was also wondering about 
membership in the AACSB, another of Shapiro’s responsibilities, and about building up 
staff in marketing and “accounting-control” – two of the same areas he’d emphasized a 
year before.34  Judging from this and other memos, the two weren’t getting along and 
hadn’t been from the beginning.  In 1954, for instance, Shapiro had confessed himself 
“perturbed by the marked chasm between our stated personnel procedure memorandum 
and the actual practice.”  As the intellectual leader of the SIM faculty Shapiro was 
already tetchily guarding his turf, less than a month into the job.35 
Even when not squabbling with his associate dean, Brooks had plenty to worry 
about.  Although graduate student quality was improving, the head of admissions repor-
ted that “the caliber of our applicants has been consistently poorer than that of all the 
																																																								
33 Eli Shapiro to JAS, 28 February 1956, AC132:7; Lloyd G. Reynolds to Eli Shapiro, 20 
February 1956, AC132:7. 
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other Schools” at MIT.36  Moreover, as acting chair of the admissions committee, Doug-
lass Brown thought that candidate interviews were a waste of time, the SIM wasn’t ready 
to start a doctoral program, and the total student body should be kept below 120 lest it 
take on “some of the characteristics of a ‘crowd’ or ‘mob.’”37  Meanwhile Brooks had to 
endure peculiar requests from the well-connected and well-meaning.  Sloan Foundation 
director Arnold Zurcher for example hoped that MIT would stop referring to the SIM as 
the Fifth School, as “that ordinal number has a connotation in popular usage which I do 
not like because it is so often used in a derogatory expression where it is combined with 
another word that describes one of our revolutionary inventions.  I am really supersensi-
tive!”  Brooks passed the letter along to Shapiro with a hand-written note: “This is too 
subtle for me – what does he mean?”  Shapiro’s reply: “I don’t get it either.”38 
The biggest issue was resources, not rebellion.  Sloan’s gift of operating funds – 
$275,000 per year – was scheduled to run out in 1960.  For years Brooks had been trying 
to convince the Sloan Foundation to increase the amount, or at the very least commit to 
extending beyond 1960 (when Sloan would be 85).  The School’s scope and therefore 
budget had already increased substantially; funding it without the $275,000 would be “a 
prohibitively big task” that would warrant “in the interest of safety a curtailed program.”  
Zurcher however “was very frank in saying that the original plan was something cooked 
																																																								
36 Nicholas Melissas to EPB, memorandum, 2 July 1956, AC156:11.6, 7. 
37 Douglass Brown to EPB, memorandum, 24 September 1956, AC156:11:6, 1, 6, 10–11.  As a 
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up between Dr. Compton and Mr. Sloan,” without much consideration of the long term.39  
Furthermore, Sloan had been clear from the beginning that he was making “a one-time 
grant designed to pursue a new venture.”  He left it to the venture’s leaders to make it 
sustainable.40 
Hence Brooks’s keen interest in the Ford Foundation gravy train.  As Shapiro 
argued in version 3 (November 1956), “despite the apparent widespread opinion to the 
contrary, the School of Industrial Management does not enjoy the financial affluence 
necessary” to increase its research and teaching.  Therefore the SIM was asking the Foun-
dation for $526,000 (more than $4.6 million in 2015 terms) “to underwrite expansion of 
an exploratory program … of such a fundamental character that we believe it will con-
tribute a new dimension to the solution of management problems.”  The School would – 
in keeping with its MIT roots – bring into management research the theories and tech-
niques from science and engineering.  Since that was a “broad charter,” Shapiro proposed 
to begin with a “specific area”: “the dynamic ‘systems’ behavior of industrial organiza-
tions and economic systems.”41 
Version 3 was the turning point.  Despite additional questions from Reynolds and 
reservations by Stratton, the Ford Foundation would eventually give $275,000 to MIT to 
develop what became the field of system dynamics.  Although it refused to pay his salary 
(on the grounds that the SIM had already hired him), the Foundation funded the rest of 
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40 Eli Shapiro to Lloyd G. Reynolds, 7 January 1957, AC132:7, 6. 
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the team and expenses for the lead researcher, Jay W. Forrester.  Forrester (b. 1918), a 
lifetime MIT man, had previously headed the Institute’s Whirlwind project, developed 
magnetic core memory (the forerunner of computer RAM), and led the SAGE air defense 
project at the MIT Lincoln Labs.42  It was Forrester who realized that because computers 
had grown so fast and so cheap, he could use computer simulation to apply the concepts 
of feedback systems and simulation modeling to “social systems” – including industrial 
firms.  He and his team could simulate hundreds of variables, particularly “more enduring 
underlying characteristics (habit, traditions, communications and shipping speeds, time 
lag to process),” etc.43  To quote one example in the proposal, in a distribution system – 
factory, warehouse, distributors, and retailers – a minor fluctuation in consumer sales 
often produces wild swings in inventories and production rates, a phenomenon now 
known as the Forrester effect or bullwhip effect.  The term describes the physical action 
of a bullwhip when cracked, oscillation Forrester would have remembered from his 
boyhood on a Nebraska cattle ranch.44 
The grant, formally approved in May 1957, didn’t appreciably change the SIM’s 
financial situation.  Most of the resources Forrester needed MIT had to hire, so the new 
money was spent on new costs.  But it did help the School position itself as a home of 
pioneering management research, research that industry could translate into practical 
solutions.  The research would also spawn courses for graduate and even executive-level 
students, to inculcate “modern management methods” and “the basic philosophy of scien-
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tific management.”45  Today system dynamics underlies many areas of operations man-
agement, macroeconomics, and business decision-making, though to some it remains 
more gimmick than breakthrough – not unlike OR in 1951.  Yet it remains one of the 
most prominent, and earliest, innovations of management science that indisputably began 
at MIT. 
The SIM at Age Five 
These innovations were mere glimmers in Forrester’s eye in 1957, however, as the 
SIM approached its fifth anniversary.  It celebrated the occasion with a Convocation in 
April, attended by 525 people, half of them “the most distinguished group of industri-
alists that have ever assembled at MIT” other than at the Institute’s 1949 Mid-century 
Convocation (the one addressed by Winston Churchill).46  Forrester presented his early 
research on “Systems Technology and Industrial Dynamics,” Shapiro his on “Financial 
Forces in Industrial Growth.”  Arguably most significant for the field of management was 
Douglas McGregor’s paper on “The Human Side of Enterprise,” contrasting authoritarian 
and participatory approaches to managing people.  His pairing would prove seminal for 
generations of OB theorists, who now know it as “Theory X and Theory Y.”47 
Yet the most significant academics at the Convocation were not those who spoke 
but those who attended.  According to Howard W. Johnson, future SIM dean and later 
MIT president, the Convocation was not just an anniversary.  It was the School’s debu-
tante ball, a milestone of Institute acceptance, when many departments came to see the 
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SIM for the very first time. President Killian declared that “we of MIT look with parental 
pride and enthusiasm on [the SIM].  …  We of MIT are happy to have the School of 
Industrial Management take its coequal place in the galaxy of MIT professional schools.”  
Moreover “we need it to achieve our broad mission at MIT” and to address “immense 
national tasks of the highest priority.”  America’s success, America’s challenges, and 
therefore the School’s purpose “given its special setting” at MIT would require “boldness 
of management and administration coupled with an audacious and advancing technology.”  
By teaching only those already prepared in science and engineering, and by teaching a 
curriculum combining management and technology, the SIM would contribute to “the 
continuing evolution of our indigenous American capitalism.”48 
Despite all the self-congratulation, however, it was too soon for the SIM to declare 
victory.  Its curriculum in particular was nowhere near final.  According to Zenon Zanne-
tos, a recent master’s graduate who had since joined the faculty, most SIM courses “lack 
either quantitative or qualitative organization or both.  …  The content was not deep 
enough and the essence of the subject was soon exhausted, leaving the class to rumble on 
aimlessly.”49  Douglass Brown, though citing Zannetos’s recommendations, did seem 
more positive.  Yet he worried that for all the SIM’s claims about the importance of 
social sciences, its graduate requirements in those areas remained superficial.  “Can a 
student be said to be trained in industrial management if he has not had a course in, say, 
organization, or administrative policy, or (Shapiro please note) financial control?”  In 																																																								
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other words, though these fields appeared in the core curriculum, they lacked the depth 
and stature of others’ stand-alone courses.50 
Even the fundamental principles of a SIM education seemed uncertain.  As recently 
as October 1956, Dean Brooks had affirmed to the Advisory Council the School’s 
commitment to equipping “a young man mounting the ladder of management 
responsibility” with “the rigorous, analytical frame of mind.”  This “frame of mind” 
would best arise in “the environment of a strong engineering and scientific community” 
and draw upon “training in mathematics, physics, and engineering.”  Yet he also implied 
a corollary: basing something in science didn’t make it a science.51 
Essentially we believe there is no scientific theory of business as such.  There is 
no scientific theory of marketing.  There is no science of personnel administra-
tion, and there is no science of finance.  All business decisions are based upon 
the interpretations of some quantitative data, intuitive appraisals of unquantified 
information, considerations of the limitations imposted [sic] by law, and by the 
reactions of human beings in cooperative, productive effort.  What we try to 
teach are the basic disciplines which equip the students (1) to generate useful 
quantitative data, (2) to analyze and interpret these data, and (3) to create policies 
and procedures which both conform to the law, and result in an efficient use of 
human and other resources in the complicated, cooperative endeavor which we 
call business.52 
Brooks claimed that this philosophy “may strike you as obvious.”  Most of his 
audience – industrial executives – may have agreed.  Yet it’s hard to square this notion of 
management with the School’s proposal to mathematically model “the non-linear nature, 
the complexity, the important characteristics of human behavior,” and other features of 
“industrial organizations and economic systems.”  Nor would it be consistent with ap-
																																																								
50 Douglass Brown to EPB, memorandum, 24 September 1956, 5.  Compare the curriculum 
outlined by Brooks on pp. 4–5 above.  
51 EPB, Speech to the Advisory Council, 23 October 1956, AC336:1:5, 8. 
52 EPB, Speech to the Advisory Council, 23 October 1956, Insert A. 
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plying “the findings of the social and physical sciences – as well as those of engi-
neering – to the solution of problems of management,” as Brooks had avowed two years 
before.53  And he made no attempt to reconcile this philosophy with that of the most 
important executive in his audience, Mr. Sloan.  The School of Industrial Management 
had indeed begun to earn the respect of executives, funders, and academics, and was 
developing a reputation for its rigorous, analytical, scientific approach.  But five years 
after launch, it still hadn’t resolved what “scientific” meant.  When the dean says “there 
is no science” to what the founder has called “a matter of science,” then more than voca-
bulary may be at stake. 
																																																								
53 “Proposal for Funds,” 2; MIT Annual Report (1954), 91. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
“It never will be finished” 
The contradictions, whether philosophical or merely semantic, didn’t hold the 
School back.  The years following the 1957 Convocation would be years of growth: 
growth in size, stability, and reputation.  By 1964 the School could boast a population of 
about 125 undergraduates and 300 graduates, including 48 in the Sloan Fellows Program 
(it had doubled again) and 50 Senior Executives, members of a new, multi-week, execu-
tive certificate program.  The School had also launched a doctoral program in 1960, from 
which eight had graduated by 1964 with a Ph.D. in Industrial Management.  That number 
was dwarfed by the more than 1000 who had received the Master’s in Industrial Manage-
ment, of whom 880 had graduated since 1952 and exactly one (in 1963) was a woman.1  
On the research side, faculty were publishing so extensively that in 1959 their first 
printed list of publications already ran four pages.  True, Mr. Sloan was still kvetching 
that the research he’d seen was “of very mediocre character; not so much in the treatment 
of the subject, but in the subject itself.”  Yet within three broad “research emphases” of 
the School – Organization Studies, Management Functional Areas, and Quantitative 
Applications – the dean in 1964 saw “a new spirit of inquiry” and results “that are 
																																																								
1 MIT Annual Report (1964), 300, 282; MIT Sloan School of Management, “First Woman 
Graduates with MIT Sloan Master’s Degree,” http://mitsloan.mit.edu/100years/our-stories 
/barbara-carpenter-becomes-the-first-woman-to-graduate-with-a-masters-degree/.  Ms. Carpen-
ter’s arrival didn’t end the off-handed sexism rampant at the School.  In 1964 the student-run 
Graduate Management Society described life in Cambridge: “Cars, like women, are a perennial 
problem: you can’t live with them, and you can’t live without them.”  Graduate Management 
Society, An Unofficial Guide to Life around MIT, Summer 1964, AC156:12:4, 1. 
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becoming a significant force in industrial development.”2 
That dean was not E. Pennell Brooks, who had departed in 1959 as mandatory 
retirement loomed, but Howard W. Johnson.  Trained as an economist, Johnson had come 
to the SIM from the University of Chicago in 1955 as an associate professor, running the 
nascent executive education department.  By 1959, at the age of 36, he had impressed 
Stratton and Killian as “a superb administrator, with a clear understanding of what we are 
trying to accomplish in our School of Industrial Management and … the energy and 
intelligence to build it into a very great school.”3  Under Johnson’s leadership the School 
achieved new maturity, in both space – the new Hermann building (E53) opened next 
door to the Sloan building in 1964 – and funds.  Brooks had spent most of the 1950s 
trying unsuccessfully to convince Mr. Sloan to support the SIM and the Sloan Fellows 
with “a sustained source of income” from his foundation.  Not only did Johnson succeed 
where Brooks had failed, but by negotiating intra-Institute transfer payments and in-
creasing master’s students he even balanced the School’s operating budget.  Little won-
der that when he tried to leave MIT in 1966 he would end up its president instead.4 
The SIM had hit other key milestones too.  It was admitted to the AACSB in 1957, a 
year when Brooks warned not of discouraging exits but of swelling heads: “the school 
enjoys a reputation that it did not have a year ago.  …  [We are in] danger of being over-
																																																								
2 Annual Report of the School of Industrial Management (1959), 15–18; APS to EPB, 28 January 
1959, AC336:1:17;  MIT Annual Report (1964), 289. 
3 HWJ, Holding the Center, 91; JAS to APS, 2 June 1959, AC134:104:4.  
4 HWJ, Holding the Center, 101–104.  For a dramatic account of how Johnson went from dean to 
ex-employee to president, including a rare account of Mr. Sloan using the telephone and 
addressing someone by his first name, see 111–119.  
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rated and coming to believe it.”5  By 1959 Professors Brown and McGregor were finding 
themselves besieged by peer schools’ faculty looking for advice on developing their own 
schools’ programs.  In May 1962 Dean Johnson noted that because “the leaders of any 
pack are always pressed by their competitors,” and a faculty post at the SIM “is highly 
valued currency in today’s academic bourse,” other schools were pursuing nearly all its 
senior and junior faculty members.6  That summer Forbes and the Chicago Tribune 
named the MIT SIM among the ten top business schools; only eight schools appeared on 
both lists, and the SIM was the youngest.7 
By 1963 MIT, according to at least one observer, was leading not just a pack but a 
revolution.  In the judgment of the Financial Times, the debate on management education 
was an argument between two camps: “the proponents of the Harvard ‘case study’ 
method of teaching and the more rigorously analytical approach pioneered by MIT.”  
Although Harvard had long been “the recognised pace-setter of business studies,” many 
thought it over-relied on the case method.   
Leader in this reaction has been the less elegant, more technologically minded 
MIT.  …  Compared to Harvard the teaching syllabus has concentrated much 
more heavily on imparting techniques.  The training has a higher analytical 
content, and it tends to be strong in such areas as finance, quantitative analysis 
and economics.  …  All of the major business schools in the U.S. seem to be 
moving towards a synthesis of what might be loosely called the ‘Harvard’ and 
‘MIT’ approach – including Harvard and MIT themselves. 
																																																								
5 MIT Annual Report (1957), 118; EPB, notes for staff meeting, 2 October 1957, AC336:1:22. 
6 EPB to Arnold Zurcher, 13 March 1959, AC336:1:23; HWJ, Report to the SIM Visiting 
Committee and Advisory Council, 10 May 1962, AC134:137:5. 
7 Bob Flaherty, “The ‘B’ School,” Forbes (15 June 1962), archived in AC336:2:F; Chesly Manly, 
“Top Schools Vary Business Education,” Chicago Tribune (7 July 1962), archived in AC336:2:M.  
The other seven schools were Harvard, Wharton, Dartmouth (Tuck), the Carnegie GSIA, 
Columbia, Stanford, and University of Chicago.  Forbes also cited New York University and 
Berkeley, Chicago Tribune Cornell and Purdue. 
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It’s striking that even though modern historians often credit the Carnegie GSIA with 
driving a new, quantitative tools-based “institutional order in graduate business educa-
tion,” it was MIT that the journalist dubbed the leader among the analytically oriented.  
Maybe he’d just been too lazy to go to Pittsburgh.  But for a major British paper to 
identify an “MIT approach” suggests the School had come a long way since the days 
when it wasn’t even sure what to teach.8 
Critique and Reflection: The 1959 Foundation Reports 
It had also been vindicated by reformers.  After more than a decade of complaints 
and critiques – that B-schools’ non-doctorate-holding faculty taught mediocre material to 
the worst students – criticism had exploded in 1959 with the survey reports by the Ford 
and Carnegie Foundations.  As Rakesh Khurana has explored at length,9 the reports exco-
riated most business schools for not emphasizing rigor and science, management as a 
profession, or management science and technology.  They did identify a few schools that 
stood out for their high standards, schools that tended to fall into two groups.  One, 
exemplified by case method leaders like Harvard and Stanford, were “managerial and 
clinical,” concentrating on “decision-making with respect to the internal problems of the 
firm.  …  The viewpoint is almost exclusively that of the general manager faced with the 
need to make decisions.”  Others like Chicago and Columbia had “more of an external 
and analytical emphasis … explaining why and how firms function in and adjust to their 
environment.”  The authors considered these schools “more ‘academic’ in their approach,” 
putting more weight on faculty research but also on students developing as functional 																																																								
8 Khurana, 251; Shanks, 13. 
9 Khurana, 238, 255–282.   
184 
specialists rather than general managers.10   
But then Gordon and Howell, writing for the Ford Foundation, extolled a third 
category. 
The graduate offerings at Carnegie Tech (and MIT) differ from other master’s 
programs in their technical setting and the consequent fact that their students 
have backgrounds in engineering or science.  In their orientation toward research 
and their emphasis on significant subject matter, they resemble the second group, 
but both also put a fair amount of emphasis on managerial decision-making.  
However, both stress analysis and the search for principles considerably more 
than the first group.  Research is emphasized in both schools and particularly at 
Carnegie Tech.11 
It’s no accident that Carnegie Tech (a.k.a. GSIA) got the pinnacle and MIT the paren-
theses.  As Khurana has shown, the GSIA dean and the Ford Foundation program head 
had developed a symbiotic relationship, one seeking legitimacy, the other a model.  But 
to the SIM it mattered not.  The reports wanted business schools to transform themselves: 
to hire research-oriented, discipline-trained faculty and to teach future executives a curri-
culum deeply grounded in quantitative analysis and social sciences.  In other words, to be 
like MIT.  (And Carnegie Tech.)12 
Most business schools responded aggressively and dramatically.  Even if the 
foundations largely agreed with existing AACSB standards, as its Executive Committee 
claimed, they did give those standards sharper teeth, louder publicity, and fatter grants.  
Thus by 1964 all 25 of the largest schools met AACSB accreditation standards (up from 
half ten years before).  Business schools rushed to poach “research-oriented, discipline-
trained faculty” from other schools and even to hire mathematics, economics, and 																																																								
10 Gordon and Howell, 32.  See also Warren Bennis to SIM Graduate Committee, memorandum, 
23 September 1960, AC156:11:8, 2, summarizing “Pierson’s typology of business education.” 
11 Gordon and Howell, 32–33. 
12 Khurana, 273; Fourcade and Khurana, 20. 
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statistics PhDs, the only other sources of the limited supply.  At the same time the top 
universities, “driven by conscience and cash … began to treat their business schools 
almost as seriously as law schools.”  Within a decade or two, management education 
would be offering professional faculty, rigorous research, and skilled graduates.  It had 
achieved legitimacy.13  
It would have been hard for Johnson to resist gloating.  He did his best.  In 1960, 
when an alumnus asked him to comment on the reports, Johnson noted that “obliquely 
they use a small group of schools, including our own, as a model for the direction of im-
provement,” particularly in the quality of teaching and the work on “behavioral sciences 
and the quantitative analyses.  …  All in all, I think we agree with the studies (since they 
tend to agree with us), but I am far from satisfied in this regard.”  Three years later he ex-
plained that the SIM had “started out on a different premise from Harvard.  It is our 
purpose to take men already trained in looking at the facts as engineers and scientists and 
to give them a careful education in decision making for profit.”  Now that HBS and 
others were “moving somewhat in our direction … [it] is reassuring to have others copy 
us, but it does make the problem of differentiating ourselves from others more 
difficult.”14 
Meanwhile Johnson’s faculty were far from confident that they’d achieved the 
balanced education so admired by the foundation reports.  Faced in September 1960 by 																																																								
13  Fourcade and Khurana, 20–21, citing John Wheeler, “Changes in Collegiate Business 
Education in the United States 1954–64 and the Role of the Ford Foundation in these Changes,” 
Ford Foundation Archives (1965); Augier and March, 133–134; Bennis and O’Toole, 2; Khurana, 
288. 
14 HWJ to Robert C. Sprague, 29 December 1960, AC336:2:S; HWJ to Frank Howard, 30 January 
1963, AC336:2:H. 
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student criticism that they “‘spend too much time on correct integrals and too little on 
business decisions,’” Graduate Committee chair Warren Bennis thought that “we all 
would agree that this is a false polarization.” Nonetheless, he was sufficiently disturbed 
by such feedback and by “the collective soul-searching” among business schools that he 
launched a process of internal exploration and debate.15  As he reported in June 1961,  
throughout the year’s deliberations, the issue we returned to time and again was 
the appropriate mixture between analytic courses – emphasizing theory, quanti-
tative analysis, rigorous, formal tools – and empirical or practical courses – 
emphasizing practice, decision-making in concrete situations, or broadly what 
Pierson calls “managerial-clinic” type skills.  …  In many ways these discussions 
have been useful, heated, enlightening, and often fun.  …  Around we went on 
the issue: rigorous analytic techniques vs. an integrative, institutional, empirical 
approach.  Naturally we want both; at times, though, we have to choose.16 
Bennis came up with his own typology, a four-box model cross-indexing emphasis 
on “theory and analytic tools” with emphasis on empirical experience.  In his opinion, 
thanks in large part to the foundation reports – and the implicit influence of MIT and the 
GSIA – “business schools, particularly the first-rate ones, have moved dramatically” on 
these dimensions.  They’d largely replaced Institutional courses (low on analytic, high on 
empirical) with Formal ones (high-analytic, low-empirical).  “And while this was an 
indispensable antidote to the folksy, anecdotal pedagogy, the balance, I believe, has to be 
redressed to attain a careful balancing of theory and practice”: the high-theory, high-
empirical approach Bennis called Scientific.17 
 As Bennis pointed out, “this is not only our problem; it is an issue which pervades 
all professional schools, and particularly management schools.”  The SIM faculty, who 																																																								
15 Bennis to SIM Graduate Committee, memorandum, 1–2. 
16 Bennis to HWJ, memorandum, June 1961, AC156.11.8, 5–6. 
17 Bennis to HWJ, memorandum, 6–7.  The fourth box, low-theory/low-empirical, Bennis labeled 
Inspirational. 
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like Johnson were “far from satisfied,” attacked it in multiple ways.  Externally they 
declared that since most of their students sought to be executives rather than specialists, 
they’d designed the master’s program to prepare students for “ultimate general manage-
ment responsibilities.”  Internally they argued about how to achieve “a more managerial 
emphasis,” though Professor Billy Goetz contended that business schools too often 
focused only on top management.  Instead “we should concern ourselves with the ap-
proaches to managerial problems – to all kinds of managerial problems – at every level 
of command.”18  In November 1963 Ed Roberts argued that they should reduce the 
required mathematics courses that he believed “not essential for a strong management 
education.”  His colleague Edwin Kuh declared some parts of the proposal “a massive 
series of misconceptions,” others mere “question begging.  … The Harvard Business 
School has a ‘more managerial’ emphasis but we do not necessarily wish to emulate it.  
What constitutes a proper managerial education is a difficult problem, but let’s face it, 
rather than assume it away.”19   
 Another approach to bridging the theory-reality gap was to create new courses.  
One of these, the Management Laboratory, required the student “to become personally 
involved in an actual industrial situation through the search for and the selection of a 
current problem chosen from the operations of an existing company.”  Advised by faculty, 
the company staff, and a group of fellow students, “he becomes mentally and emotionally 
																																																								
18 Warren Bennis to HWJ, memorandum, 5; MIT Catalogue, “School of Industrial Management: 
Graduate Program of Study,” 1959, AC156.11.8; Billy E. Goetz, “Reorientation of Management 
Education,” Journal of the Academy of Management 3, no. 3 (December 1960), 183. 
19 Edward Roberts to SIM Graduate Committee, memorandum, 22 November 1963, AC156:11:8, 
1; Edwin Kuh to SIM Graduate Committee, memorandum, 2 December 1963, AC156:11:8, 1. 
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as well as physically involved.”  Fifty years later MIT Sloan offers an alphabet soup of 
over fifteen “action learning labs” – A-Lab, G-Lab, S-Lab, etc. – in which “students work 
side-by-side with corporate and nonprofit partners to apply classroom lessons to high-
impact business challenges.”  The portfolio has expanded; the objectives haven’t 
changed.20 
The Management Laboratory predated the 1959 foundation reports.  A course they 
spawned was “business policy,” otherwise known as “case” or as strategic management.  
Memoranda of November 1961 show the faculty struggling with this novel concept.  
They tasked operations management professor Ned Bowman with summarizing the Ford 
Foundation recommendation.  They read that it could “offer the student something he will 
find nowhere else in the curriculum: consideration of business problems which are not 
prejudged as being marketing problems, finance problems, etc.; emphasis on the 
development of skill in identifying, analyzing, and solving problems in a situation which 
is as close as the classroom can ever be to the real business world.”  They heard from 
Professor William Massy that the course would fulfill “one of our most important respon-
sibilities … to integrate the so-called scientific techniques … with the ‘practical’ or 
intuitive methods of problem solving that are so important in business.”  And a few years 
later they agreed to add a Management Policy elective, though in their own minds they 
distinguished management policy from management.  Indeed Bowman, the course’s first 
instructor, told a student he saw no future in studying management.  Bowman would go 																																																								
20 Leo B. Moore, “Experiencing Reality in Management Education,” Journal of the Academy of 
Management 1, no. 3 (1958), 7–14: 11–12; MIT Sloan, “Action Learning Labs,” 
http://mitsloan.mit.edu /actionlearning/, as viewed on February 7, 2016.  The three examples 
stand for Analytics Lab, Global Entrepreneurship Lab, and Sustainable Business Lab. 
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on to chair the strategy department at Wharton.  The student, Henry Mintzberg, would 
join the McGill faculty, teach their first Management Policy course, and write Managers 
Not MBAs (2004), a caustic attack on business schools for creating spreadsheet-minded 
technocrats rather than results-oriented leaders.21 
Though on business policy the SIM was reacting to outside critique, through its own 
self-examination it would redouble the emphasis on quantitative rigor.  The efforts came 
in two forms.  First, in 1960 the SIM created a Quantitative Option for the small number 
of master’s students (soon dubbed the “Q men”) who didn’t want the “managerial 
emphasis” but instead sought specialist careers in “operations analysis and synthesis.”22  
Second, the School beefed up its math requirements by adding 15.091 and 15.092, a two-
course sequence on Mathematics for Industrial Management.  This was the brainchild of 
the Subcommittee on Mathematical Requirements, who had polled several SIM and 
Economics faculty.  “It is the consensus of opinion … that quantitative methods are of 
such great importance in teaching industrial management as to require that every student 
either qualify by means of prior course work or examination or otherwise take formal 
instruction upon his arrival at MIT, no matter how painful this experience might be.”  
That experience would have to include differential and integral calculus, introduction to 
probability theory, difference equations, matrix algebra, and mathematical programming 
and Markov processes, lest other courses’ instructors have to reduce their empirical mate-
																																																								
21 Gordon and Howell, 207; Edward Bowman to SIM Graduate Committee, memorandum, 13 
November 1961, AC156:11:8, 1; William F. Massy to SIM Graduate Committee, memorandum, 
14 November 1961, AC156:11:8, 1; Mintzberg, 33n.4 and n.5.  For Mintzberg’s critique, see p. 
195 below. 
22 MIT Annual Report, 28. 
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rial and “bootleg in the necessary understanding of math required” to comprehend it.23  
This was debatable.  According to Roberts and others (presumably those the Subcom-
mittee didn’t poll), 15.092 was unnecessary for most of the curriculum.  Students agreed.  
According to one editorial, “what is needed is a further evaluation of the non-Q program 
with the ultimate objective of separating the program into one for academicians and 
consultants, and the other for those who want to become ‘businessmen,’ in the traditional 
sense of the word.”  Faculty – then and since – pondered their positions on the balance of 
analytic and managerial.  Students overwhelmingly leaned toward the latter.  Executives 
themselves, judging from the records, were never asked.24 
Renaming the School 
The one executive whose opinion might have been consulted, Alfred P. Sloan, had 
grown less and less involved in the School’s activities.  In June 1958, in fact, MIT’s 
leaders had heard a grave rumor: the Sloan Foundation had been approached by the 
Columbia Business School.  Columbia wanted the Sloan name (and money).  Stratton and 
Killian were worried: “if his name were to be attached to a School of Business or Man-
agement, the appropriate place would be at MIT, and I would so express myself to Mr. 
Sloan if he raised the question.”25 
What followed was one of the most disingenuous letters in the history of fundraising.  
On July 25, seemingly out of the blue, Brooks wrote to Sloan that he’d “reached the 
																																																								
23 HWJ to Harold L. Hazen, memorandum, 23 February 1960, AC156:11:8; Report of the 
Subcommittee on Mathematical Requirements, 6 February 1961, AC156:11:8; Warren Bennis to 
HWJ, memorandum, 3. 
24 Gary Owen, “The Goals of SSM,” Output (27 May 1964), AC156:12:5, 4. 
25 JRK to JAS, 30 June 1958, AC134:104:4. 
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conclusion that it would be a fine thing to give the School the official name of the ‘Sloan 
School of Industrial Management at MIT.’”  As he pointed out, even though Sloan had 
been reluctant to put his name on the School in the first place,26 people used it anyway.  
Moreover, alumni felt a strong connection to Sloan, “the ‘statesman’ associated with the 
most significant developments in industrial organization.”  According to Brooks, “this is 
not an idea that has come to me as of the moment for I have given a lot of thought to this 
over some months.”27 
If Sloan questioned the coincidence of rumor and letter he didn’t say so.  As far as 
he was concerned, “if you think a change in name would help the School by a closer 
identification with myself, and Dr. Killian, Dr. Stratton, as well as others, were convinced 
of that fact, then I would be agreeable to the change.”  He also agreed with Brooks that 
the title should continue to use “management” rather than “administration,” though he 
preferred it include his name in full: “Alfred P. Sloan School of Industrial Management.”  
Brooks replied that he’d talk it over with Stratton and Killian, and that although no one 
knew for sure whether adding the name would give the School better students or status, 
“personally, I am in favor of it.”  He was glad to have Sloan’s favorable reaction, though 
“this is not something to rush into.”28 
Truer words were never written.  For whatever reason – perhaps because they were 
searching for a new dean, perhaps because they only cared about blocking Columbia – 
MIT’s leaders dropped the idea for another five years.  Not until May 1963 did it resur-
																																																								
26 See Chapter 1 above, pp. 56–57. 
27 EPB to APS, 25 July 1958, AC336:1:17. 
28 APS to EPB, 5 August 1958, AC336:1:17; EPB to APS, 25 August 1958, AC336:1:17. 
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face, when Killian wrote to Sloan again.  In retrospect the new letters seem bizarre, for at 
no time did anyone acknowledge that the 1958 discussions had taken place.  Like Brooks 
before him, Killian remembered Sloan’s original reluctance, his worry that attaching his 
name would deter donors.  Now that more than a decade had passed, however, the name 
would not dissuade but distinguish.  Moreover, the MIT Corporation felt that “it would be 
symbolically important and wonderfully appropriate to have some permanent program at 
the Institute bearing your name.”  Unspoken were two facts.  One, at 88 years old Sloan 
had to be approaching the end of his life.  Two, he and his foundation had given MIT 
more than $60 million over the previous 56 years.  As an MIT historian later noted, it was 
“by far the largest amount attributable to a private source.”29 
On May 21 Sloan replied gratefully and the discussions began in earnest.  No one 
seemed to know what the name would be.  Sloan first presumed the SIM would become 
the “Sloan School of Industrial Management” (no “Alfred P.” this time).  Killian replied 
confirming that name and the intention to announce it soon, “thus delighting your friends 
and adding permanent distinction to the School.”30  Brooks chimed in on June 18 that he 
was “very pleased,” but referring to it as the “Sloan School of Management.”31    Sloan 
replied that on June 19 he, Killian, and Johnson had met for “quite a discussion” and had 
decided on “Alfred P. Sloan School of Industrial Management.”  Sloan added, “Now, of 
course, that is quite a long and formal name, and the school will always be known, I 
																																																								
29 JRK to APS with bcc to JAS and Melvin Kispert, 3 May 1963, AC134:104:4; Wylie, 158. 
30 APS to JRK with cc to HWJ, 21 May 1963, AC134:104:4; JRK to APS with bcc to JAS, 
Melvin G. Kispert, and HWJ, 27 May 1963, AC134:104:4. 
31 EPB to APS, 18 June 1963, AC134:104:4.  In what may be a reference to 1958, Brooks sent a 
copy to Stratton’s office with a handwritten note: “JAS: I hope this will stick! EPB.” 
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imagine, and called the Sloan School, but it is just as well to have a name that is 
representative and on a somewhat broader basis, and so far as I am concerned, I am very 
happy to have it called as it is.”32  Yet Killian recorded the result differently. 
Dean Johnson and I, in our meeting last week with Sloan, presented to him the 
Corporation resolution on the renaming of the School of Industrial Management.  
This prompted a discussion of the form which the new name should take.  Mr. 
Sloan clearly wishes that it be “The Alfred P. Sloan School” and not simply 
“Sloan”, and he and Johnson both felt (and I concurred) that it would be good to 
propose as the complete name “The Alfred P. Sloan School of Management”, 
dropping the word “Industrial”.33 
Whence the difference?  In his autobiography Johnson asserted that it was he who 
had proposed the name change to Stratton and Killian and he who had suggested drop-
ping “Industrial,” to recognize “the fact that the preparation of our students was broader 
and more encompassing than only industrial management.”34  Sloan’s own letter, howe-
ver, implies that he thought “Industrial” important enough to keep, meaning someone 
talked him out of it between the June 19 meeting and the September 24 confirmation by 
MIT’s Academic Council.35  Two possibilities make the most sense.  Perhaps Sloan did 
agree to drop “Industrial” – in his words, putting the School on “a somewhat broader 
basis” – but dictated his letter incorrectly.  Or perhaps everyone simply decided that the 
name was too elaborate.  Maybe “Industrial” wasn’t limiting, just long-winded. 
Whatever the reason, MIT made the official announcement on March 6, 1964.  
Again there’d been delay, but this time with clear purpose: MIT’s leaders wanted to 
announce the new name along with the new Hermann building.  Moreover, though no one 																																																								
32 APS to EPB, 20 June 1963, AC336:1:16. 
33 JRK to JAS, memorandum, 25 June 1963, AC134:104:4. 
34 HWJ, Holding the Center, 113. 
35 MIT Academic Council, notes, 24 September 1963, AC61:1. 
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said so in the surviving documents, they probably wanted to commemorate an anniver-
sary.  For as Stratton recalled at the celebratory luncheon, it had been 50 years since 
MIT’s faculty had created Course XV, despite those who felt that “aptitude for business 
is not a thing that can be acquired in the schools.”  Johnson, speaking at the same event, 
spoke of the field of management education as “basically unrecognizable from what it 
was ten years ago.  …  Problem identification, problem analysis, decision making, and 
evaluation became a responsible field of study.  MIT’s School of Industrial Management 
is seen, I believe, as riding the crest of this new wave.”  But it was Sloan who reminded 
everyone that though the School was now a reality, “a completely integrated operation,” 
the work wasn’t done.  “I hope we all recognize that the Alfred P. Sloan School of Man-
agement is not finished.  It never will be finished.  It is only on its way.”36 
Sloan never would be satisfied.  Looking from the new Hermann building onto the 
MIT campus, he already thought it cramped.  In January 1966 he would ask Howard 
Johnson, newly announced as the next MIT president, how much it would cost to move 
MIT to a new city with more space.  “He said if a place could be found and the cost were 
not prohibitive, he would fully support such a move.”  Johnson steered their conversation 
to other topics.37 
It was the last time the two would meet.  Alfred Pritchard Sloan, Jr. died at the age 
of 90 on February 17, 1966, in the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center that bore his 
name.  He’d worked at his foundation until two days before his death, maintaining his 
daily office hours and frill-free lifestyle (according to the New York Times, lunch at the 																																																								
36 MIT Sloan, Celebration Luncheon Program, 6 March 1964, AC134:104:4, 6, 12, 4. 
37 HWJ, Holding the Center, 119. 
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office was “a homemade sandwich, which he had brought with him, neatly wrapped in 
paper, in his coat pocket”).  Praise and encomia poured in from around the country, such 
as from the president of the American Motors Company, who called him “‘the most 
advanced practitioner of modern management of our time.’”  An associate, hearkening to 
Sloan’s roots, compared him to a roller bearing: “‘self-lubricating, smooth, eliminates 
friction and carries the load.’”38 
Among the many who recalled him vividly was Penn Brooks, now long retired from 
deaning.  Judging from Arnold Zurcher’s reply to a letter now lost, Brooks recognized 
that he and Sloan had not had an easy relationship.  Zurcher admitted that Brooks’s role 
in developing the School “was never fully appreciated even by those close to the affair.  I 
think Mr. Sloan understood but I concede that he was not especially articulate about the 
matter if he did.”  Sloan might admire Brooks’s successor in a way that he never did 
Brooks, but that was “at least implied approval of the wisdom you displayed in staffing 
the School in its earlier days.”  And though that might be small comfort to Brooks (who 
would live even longer than Sloan, dying in 1991 at age 95), “what came out of your 
ministrations was a distinguished institution – one of the best in the business.”39 
The Transformation of Management Education 
It was a business that Brooks, Sloan, and others had joined in fundamentally resha-
ping.  As the account above has sought to show, the MIT School of Industrial 
Management had helped revolutionize the design of management education.  In their first 
70 years, American business schools had prospered by teaching young men to cope with 																																																								
38 “Alfred P. Sloan Jr. Dead at 90.” 
39 Arnold Zurcher to EPB, 7 March 1966, AC336:1:16. 
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current business issues, to follow current business practices.  In the 1950s MIT, along 
with the Carnegie GSIA, Chicago, and to a lesser extent Stanford, decided that wasn’t 
enough.  They pioneered management as a respectable academic discipline, “a broad and 
important substantive focus for systematic research grounded in several basic scientific 
and social science disciplines.”  That research then fed the training of potential and prac-
ticing managers who, in the words of fourth MIT Sloan dean Abraham Siegel (1980–
1987), “translate and refine further the tested theories into managerial practice which they 
find to be [of] immense practical value.”  This design was what the Ford and Carnegie 
Foundations subsequently promoted, and what most B-schools worldwide – even HBS – 
have adopted and adapted.  MIT co-created it.40 
Not everyone today agrees that that’s something to be proud of.  Detractors have 
professed themselves “troubled” by the current state of management education, specifi-
cally its overemphasis on analysis and technique.  The Economist claims that “business 
schools have been captured by the academic guild.”  Business leaders demand that 
schools work with them not to refine esoteric methods but to “justify the role of busi-
ness … [and] create business practices that themselves vindicate this justification.”  
Henry Mintzberg asserts that by stressing analysis over experience or insight, business 
schools foster a “‘calculating’” style typical of technocrats.  In his view the entire 
premise of business education is flawed: “pretending to create managers out of people 
who have never managed is a sham.”  And critics aren’t limited to MIT Sloan’s graduates.  
Its former professor Warren Bennis contended that in the 1950s and 1960s, when the top 
																																																								
40 Abraham J. Siegel, speech, early 1980s, AC156:6:23, 4, 9. 
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schools built or transformed themselves into academically distinguished institutions, 
“their focus switched, and now the objective of most B schools is to conduct scientific 
research.  Going back to the trade school paradigm would be a disaster.  Still … it is 
necessary to strike a new balance between scientific rigor and practical relevance.”  
Bennis and co-author James O’Toole summed up their view of history in their title: “How 
Business Schools Lost Their Way.”41 
These critiques depend on a basic premise: that the purpose of a management school 
is to develop managers.  But if it were actually to develop management practice, then 
history could be re-read.  William F. Pounds, MIT Sloan’s third dean (1966–1980), has 
argued that the revolution begun by the MIT SIM and the Carnegie GSIA created new 
kinds of B-school graduates, whose new ideas and new training had not prepared them 
for traditional business jobs.  Instead they increasingly joined the “advisory/consulting/ 
banking industry” that today employs over half of all top business schools’ students.  
“Virtually none of them go to the kinds of organizations that hired virtually all of them 50 
years ago.”  Yet those organizations – GM and its many brethren – have benefited from 
the graduates’ talent and education.  By hiring consultants for their complex assignments, 
they could “buy the ideas they needed as they needed them and not have to be concerned 
about the care and feeding of experts on their own staffs.”  The result: more effective 
practice throughout the business world.  True, some old-line industrial firms are strug-
gling because they can’t afford to compete for talent with McKinsey, Goldman Sachs, 																																																								
41 Schumpeter, “Those Who Can’t, Teach,” The Economist (February 8, 2014); Ken Starkey and 
Armand Hatchuel, “Back to the Future of Management Research,” in The Institutional 
Development of Business Schools, ed. Andrew M. Pettigrew, Eric Cornuel, and Ulrich Hommel 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 272; Mintzberg, 1, 5; Bennis and O’Toole, 2. 
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and their ilk.  But overall, says Pounds, the new business education did lead to what 
Sloan called “the management and further refinement of the great productive machine in 
competitive enterprise.”  Although that refinement didn’t take the form Sloan would have 
predicted, the revolution nonetheless achieved its “intended consequences.”42 
For MIT, meanwhile, the consequences were continuations: extending into business 
the Institute’s historic marriage of theory and practice, science and action, rigor and 
realism.   In 1913 President Maclaurin commented that many men “have advocated the 
establishment of [a business school] within this Institute, holding that the scientific spirit 
and the scientific method of attack that it is the special function of Technology to instill 
into the minds of its students would be a powerful aid to many business men.”43  Sloan, 
Compton, Killian, and others envisioned a school that would teach scientific approaches 
to the problems of industrial management and “substitute realistic education for experi-
ence.”  Abraham Siegel urged that MIT Sloan teach future executives “to learn from 
experience and to reason about markets, … to evaluate evidence, … to find and solve 
problems on their jobs and in addition to raise questions about the way things are.”44  
This is continuity not just within MIT Sloan.  It’s continuity with MIT.  In Siegel’s words, 
the Sloan School of Management, in retrospect, was shaped by and is today very 
much a part of that MIT tradition valuing and seeking to bridge theory and 
practice.  The MIT logo mens et manus legitimiately [sic] portrays our emphasis 
on the vitality and effectiveness of the combination of mind and hand.45 
																																																								
42 Pounds; “Deed of Gift and Agreement,” 2–3. 
43 MIT Annual Report (1913), 18. 
44 Erwin H. Schell to JRK, 27 November 1950, AC4:203:2, 2; Siegel, 12. 
45 Siegel, 10. 
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Directions for Further Research 
This account has been an origin story, a history of the MIT School of Industrial 
Management in the years before it adopted its founder’s name.  The story has been 
derived almost entirely from sources in the MIT Archives.  Apart from occasional refe-
rences to an autobiography or coffee-table history, all primary material has come from 
the letters, memoranda, speeches, and reports of leaders at MIT and the SIM. 
One way to widen the perspective would be to compare the SIM’s development 
with that of a peer.  The obvious choice is the Carnegie GSIA.  Although Khurana’s 
From Higher Aims to Hired Hands focused heavily on the GSIA, his objective was 
always to look broadly at the founding of U.S. business education.  Therefore he drew his 
archival material not from the GSIA but from HBS (“the largest and most comprehensive 
collection of primary business material in the world”) and the Ford Foundation.46  This 
leaves room for a parallel or convergent study.  The MIT SIM 1950–1964 could be set 
against the GSIA 1949–1964, or both schools could be seen alongside their longer-
established peers over the following couple of decades.  Revolution can be just as 
interesting after the dust of battle settles. 
Another approach would be to pull one of this study’s thematic threads, such as the 
clashes between a university and a donor.  The SIM is not the only academic institution 
that has struggled to honor its founder’s vision while maintaining its independence.  Thus 
a researcher could identify productively contrasting examples, perhaps ones in which the 
institution was far less successful in brushing the donor back, or the donor maintained 
																																																								
46 Khurana, 389. 
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more power over research and faculty.  Alternatively, one could delve into the archives of 
the Sloan Foundation and look at Mr. Sloan’s style in dealing with other organizations.  
With MIT he varied between magnanimous and dictatorial; perhaps he took a more 
consistent tack, for example, when co-founding the Sloan Kettering Institute (now 
Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center). 
Any of these projects would, like the current study, be institutional histories, 
histories from above.  This is not the only way to look at a school.  Although many of the 
SIM’s senior leaders are dead – Brooks, Compton, Killian, Sloan – several of its young 
faculty are today respected and prolific academics.  Professors Forrester, Pounds, and 
Roberts have all said they’d be willing to be interviewed for their recollections; other 
colleagues may agree as well.  Meanwhile, of all the 1953–1964 SIM master’s graduates, 
roughly 600 appear in MIT’s alumni directory (Infinite Connection), not to mention 
another 150 or so Course XV BS alumni.  Interviewing a sample would add nuance, 
perhaps even additional continuity, to the portrayal of the School’s earliest years.  Experi-
mental though the MIT SIM was, it strived always to be a full-fledged member of the 
MIT community. 
“The Demand for a Truly Scientific Approach” 
If the SIM/Sloan School embodies MIT tradition, then so too does it represent MIT 
innovation.  In 1914 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology began an experiment.  At 
a time when engineering schools trained technicians and business schools clerks, it 
resolved to teach executives who would think like engineers: rationally, analytically, 
scientifically.  And it resolved to partner with great industrial firms and leaders to ensure 
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that these executives would be more than academics: they’d have the practical under-
standing to think and do. 
Neither resolution proved easy.  Even once the School of Industrial Management 
was established, faculty still found themselves on terra incognita, struggling to discover 
not just how to teach but what – the methods, but also the curriculum itself.  They deve-
loped a commitment to research that helped turn management into a reputable academic 
discipline, yet they clashed with their own industry advisors on what should be 
researched and at whose behest – independence at the cost of integration.  And if today 
the School extols its education as more practical and firm-based than its competitors’, 
then it may be damning with faint praise.  Management has indeed become more analy-
tical and rational, as several of the 1950s reformers predicted.47  Whether management 
school graduates are better managers remains hotly debated. 
Yet MIT did what it set out to do.  It created first a department, then a school in 
which science mattered: knowledge of science and engineering and technology, and an 
environment that nurtured the scientific method and “habits of careful observation and 
objective analysis that are indispensable in reaching sound management decisions.”48  
This culture of the scientific crucially influenced not just the School but also management, 
in both senses: management as an academic discipline and management as a professional 
function.  Although Fourcade and Khurana have described the “scientization of the 
business curriculum” and the “new ‘scientific’ – that is, quantitative and highly 
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technological – approach to management,” they give too much credit to the Ford 
Foundation as the instigator.49  Because the SIM, like its handful of peers, was a new 
school, it could build itself without institutional constraints.  What it built – scientifically 
oriented, designed, and inspired – is the standard for management today. 
That doesn’t make management a science.  Toward the end of his deanship Brooks 
was calling it “not yet a science, but an art immensely and increasingly benefited by the 
application of scientific methods.”  MIT’s research and advances didn’t replace 
managerial skill, though it did strengthen it.  Yet “to the extent that these management-
science approaches have been fruitful in dealing with problems not amenable to other 
solutions, the art of management increasingly becomes more predictable or describable – 
hence, more scientific.”50   
Throughout its earliest years, applying science to the art had become a responsibility 
for the SIM as it had long been for MIT.  It was a responsibility to industry and to the 
nation.   
The revolution in industrial management in the United States has been 
characterized by the use of an executive group, increasingly professional in 
background and method, by growing stress on human relationships at all levels of 
industry, and by a wave of new techniques.  The significant lesson we have 
learned is the requirement, in the cause of increased efficiency, of a more 
intimate relationship between working industry and working education.  In 
accepting that concept the management of American enterprise is recognizing, in 
an accelerating degree and in its own self-interest, the demand for a truly 
scientific approach to the problems of industrial management.51 
These principles – executive professionalism, efficiency through modern techniques 
and human understanding, alliances between industry and academe, scientific approaches 																																																								
49 Fourcade and Khurana, 14. 
50 MIT Annual Report (1957), 116; MIT Annual Report (1959), 167. 
51 APS, speech at the Sloan Fellows Convocation, quoted in MIT Annual Report (1959), 174. 
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to management problems – are more than features of a school.  They’re a credo, articles 
of faith.  And none believed in these principles more fervently than the man who invoked 
them, the man whose name is now borne by the MIT Sloan School of Management. 
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